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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
John F. Kennedy: “Let 
us begin anew; remembering 
on both sides that civility is 
not a sign of weakness. Let 
us never negotiate out of fear, 
but let us never fear to nego-
tiate”.  
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Chapter Aims 
 
•  What is the general aim of this work? 
• What is the state of the art of Online Dispute Resolution? 
•  What are the outcomes of this thesis? 
•  What is the methodology used in this thesis? 
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Section 1: General aim of Thesis 
Section 2: State of the art  
Section 3: Key Issues that will be Raised in this Thesis 
Section 4: Chapter breakdown 
Section 5: Methodology 
Section 6: Desired take away messages 
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This chapter aims to introduce the reader to the concepts ex-
plored in this thesis. In doing so, the author will explain to the 
reader the aim of the thesis, the methods used and the reasons why 
they were selected.  
Credit must also be attributed to Professor Francesco Romeo 
and Professor Paul de Hert for their joint efforts in some of the 
work described. 
How a dissertation regarding the use of new technologies for 
settling disputes could be important in the scholarly debate con-
cerning the functioning of justice and the settlement of disputes? 
What I will achieve in my thesis is to apply fair division algo-
rithms – effective only in Common Law areas – all over the world, 
including Civil Law areas like Italy, Belgium and Europe. 
The aim of the project is to apply these principles not just in 
the shadow of law, but also by trying to operate on the available 
rights of each European national regulation, in order to have more 
credit and foster access to justice.  
I would substantiate the need to provide all stakeholders with 
a real, practical alternative solution to courts. A legal layer into the 
framework of fair division schemes. 
This introductory chapter will therefore allow the reader to un-
derstand the overall context and aims behind each of the chapters 
in this thesis. 
Section 1 briefly explains the general aims of this thesis. Section 
2 will explain the current background and context that exist as a 
backdrop to this work. Section 3 discusses a series of key questions 
that form the basis of the five chapters of this thesis, analysed in 
section 4. The methodology used in these chapters will be ex-
plained in section 5. Finally, in section 6, the author will identify 
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two key points that he hopes the reader will take with away from 
this thesis. 
 
 
Section 1: General aim of Thesis 
 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the primary con-
tention described below: 
 
The primary contention is the advantages of online dispute res-
olutions, involving the use of fair division principles, compared to 
trials and other alternative dispute resolution methods, in particular 
with regards to family disputes. 
 
In harmony with wider changes in society – in particular the 
advances in technology and the large scale use of online services to 
transact all forms of business – recent developments in the field of 
online dispute resolution – such as the new European ODR plat-
form – have led to a new and deep interest in their use as one of 
the best alternatives to the trial in several law domains, like con-
sumers and family disputes.  
The concept is discussed in more detail below in section 5. An 
example of the advantages might include the fact that judges are 
restricted by the law; ODR does not have these kinds of bounda-
ries. Another example of the relevance of ODR might include the 
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necessity of online and offline approaches, e.g. in disputes raised 
online. 
These approaches will help reduce obstacles to the good func-
tioning of civil proceedings, negotiations and settlements, espe-
cially the cross-border ones, by enforcing a method that could im-
prove agreements by means of a new e-procedure in certain areas 
of civil law. These areas include successions and trust and matri-
monial regimes in a first stage, and later in other areas such as prop-
erty and lease, company law and consumer law. 
It is the creation of such e-procedure that triggers the engage-
ment of a number of important legal and non-legal approaches. 
The first is the use of reason – let me persuade you that this is the 
way to settle –  or, in other words, the rational thinking, the argu-
ments and reasoned persuasions. However, to reach a solid agree-
ment engaged people need more than merely rational-economical 
forces.1 Logic is not always the best way and does not always leave 
room for our values and emotions. A much more systematic ap-
proach would examine and take adequate account of two other 
major modes of modern discourse: bargaining and affective (in-
volving emotion and ethical, religious, or strongly held values) or 
feeling-based arguments.2  
As proved by John Nash’s work on game theory, in certain 
cases an optimal solution for the individual could lead to a sub op-
timal solution for the entire society. Thus, it is not always true, as 
claimed by Adam Smith, that if each person in society worked to 
                                                          
1 Gould, J.P., The Economics of Legal Conflicts, Journal of Legal Studies, 
1973, 279-300: “The rational-economical model traditionally assumes that 
people strive to maximize their own gains, without regard to the gains of oth-
ers”.  
2 Menkel-Meadow, C., Scaling up Deliberative Democracy as Dispute Reso-
lution in Healthcare Reform: a work in progress, 2011, available at 
www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
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optimise his welfare the whole society would have the optimal wel-
fare. Therefore, if we are looking for the paramount results not just 
for individuals, but the group as a whole, we should regard emo-
tional and psychological forces not merely as barriers but as poten-
tial promoters of a positive outcome for the dispute. 
Such approaches, including where it occurs not only rational 
arguments but also bargaining for common interests and the own 
and other’s values and emotions, can produce a proper settlement. 
Online dispute resolution also has some drawbacks, but if our so-
ciety invests in the development of ODR and IT realities, they will 
be a fundamental resource, especially in family and e-commerce 
disputes.  
This thesis will demonstrate how, in several law domains, e-
procedures based on game theory principles of fair division and 
win-win solutions are more satisfactory than using law principles. 
A perusal of research on issues related to introduction of these 
procedures in the law domain shows that whilst there is numerous 
debate, finding their origin in social engineering studies – such as 
Rational Choice Theory – there is, at least in Europe, little or no 
debate concerning the use of these methods.  
In particular, Rational Choice Theory is an approach used by 
social scientists to understand human behaviour.3 Individual are 
supposed to act as “rational agents” and the social desirability of a 
rule is thought as if it could be rationally and objectively stated. On 
the contrary, the debate in the jurisprudence in the last two decades 
                                                          
3 Green, S.: Rational Choice Theory:  An Overview, Prepared for the Baylor 
University Faculty Development Seminar on Rational Choice Theory, May 
2002. 
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has highlighted the important role of the law in protecting individ-
uals in their non-rational choices. Particularly the whole consumers 
law is devoted to protect citizens “against themselves”4.  
This lack of debate (both in academic and judicial circles) means 
that the situation in Europe is radically different from the one ex-
isting in U.S., due to the lack of unity of the European Public Or-
der and, consequently, to the presence of various multiple and dif-
ferent mandatory rules in each Member State.  
This thesis, following Brams’s proposal of 19785 and the sub-
sequent debate aroused from this proposal, will argue the potential 
of online negotiation systems for providing greater access to the 
judicial system. This thesis will show how ODR providers use their 
experience from earlier settlement agreements not only for resolv-
ing disputes but also for preventing them, including the possibility 
of changing the behaviours of disputants. 
 
 
Section 2: State of the art  
 
 
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the online dispute 
resolution’s (ODR) development and evolution. 
                                                          
4 Browne, M., Bischoff Clapp, K., Kubasek, N. and Biksacky L.: Protecting 
Consumers from Themselves: Consumer Law and the Vulnerable Consumer, 
Drake Law Review, Vol. 63/2015, 157-191. 
5 Brams, S.: Applying Game Theory to Antitrust Litigation, Jurimetrics, Jour-
nal 18 (Summer), 320-327. 
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Over the past century there has been an increasing interest in 
online dispute resolution due to the enormous potential for meet-
ing the needs of the system and its users.  
Its aim is to broaden access to justice and resolve disputes more 
easily, quickly and cheaply. The challenge lies in delivering a system 
that fulfils that objective. A system which has more than one con-
nection with IT.  
IT can be used in support of the court system in two quite dif-
ferent ways. The first involves the application of technology to im-
prove what is already in place today. In this way, IT is grafted onto 
existing working practices and so replaces or perhaps enhances 
current systems. This approach tends to be costly, difficult, and, in 
the end, often delivers ‘mess for less’, that is, it replaces today’s 
inefficient, paper-based processes with IT-based systems. It does 
not fundamentally change the underlying processes and proce-
dures. 
The second use of IT in the courts is to enable the delivery of 
services in entirely new ways. When this is the aim, it encourages 
new and imaginative thinking and urges reformers to start afresh, 
with a blank sheet of paper. This is therefore in contrast with many 
projects that are currently in progress in the civil justice system – 
those that fall into our first category and are seeking to systematize 
the traditional operation of the courts.6 
Nowadays, the conception of ODR is broader than that of 
many specialists in online dispute resolution. The term ODR has 
come to be used to refer to IT and the Internet to help resolve 
                                                          
6 Online Dispute Resolution for Low Value Civil Claims, Online Dispute Res-
olution Advisory Group: www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/02/Online-Dispute-Resolution-Final-Web-Version1.pdf. 
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disputes. While a variety of definitions of ODR have been sug-
gested, this thesis will not use the definition of “computerization 
of the current court system”, in other words, conducting court 
hearings across video links or online tracking of the progress of 
trials could not be referred to ODR. 
When a conflict is handled using ODR, a traditional courtroom 
or hearing room is not employed. Instead, the process of settling a 
dispute is entirely or largely conducted across the Internet. In other 
words, dispute resolution services are made available as a type of 
online service. Many techniques fall under the umbrella of ODR. 
Sometimes human beings remain heavily involved, as when ODR 
systems provide facilities for judges, mediators, or negotiators to 
handle disputes by communicating electronically with parties and 
by reviewing documents in digital form. On other occasions, the 
assessment of a legal problem or the negotiation itself might be 
enabled by online e-supported service without much or any expert 
intervention. 
ODR techniques are already being deployed around the world 
in resolving a wide range of disagreements – from consumer dis-
putes to problems arising from e-commerce, from quarrels 
amongst citizens to family disputes. ODR is not appropriate for all 
classes of dispute but, on the face of it, is best placed to help settle 
high volumes of relatively low value disputes – robustly, but at 
much less expense and inconvenience than conventional courts. 
We find that ODR is best explained by example. Accordingly, in 
chapter 4, we provide a set of illustrations of ODR and algorithms 
in action. 
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Section 3: Key Issues that will be Raised in this Thesis 
 
 
In order to demonstrate the main contention of this thesis (de-
scribed in section 1 above) this thesis will examine four major is-
sues: 
 
1) Which algorithms are used in solving disputes? 
2) What is the most suitable legal context for using such a 
method? 
3) Is there a role for online e-supported systems in solving dis-
putes? 
4) Is this approach efficient (pareto-optimal) in practice for all 
the parties involved? 
 
 
Section 4: Chapter breakdown 
 
 
This thesis will consist of 5 chapters. Each of these chapters is 
related to one of the key questions identified above. Each of these 
chapters will allow a key issue to be demonstrated that, when taken 
together, will allow the main contention of this thesis to be demon-
strated. 
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a. Chapter 1 Background chapter  
 From Game Theory principles of Fairness, Win-
Win solution and Envy-freeness (Brams and Taylor 1996) 
to algorithms – based on these principles – able to solve a 
dispute.  
Nowadays a good amount of disputes could be solved applying 
several “games” for a fair solution for the parties involved. Since 
the pioneering work of the three mathematicians Hugo Steinhaus, 
Bronislaw  
Knaster and Stefan Banach in Poland during World War II, fair 
division procedures made their entry (Brams 1996).  
In the 1990s fair division literature has grown and a popular 
book was written by Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor in 
1999.Several fair division algorithms were developed throughout 
this whole period (Brams, Jones and Klamler 2004). The recent 
years have witnessed an increasing interest by the international sci-
entific community, testified by a large number of publications in 
the field from all over the world.  
Unfortunately, very few empirical studies have put fair-division 
procedures to the test. Despite their immense potential we have 
only Pratt & Zeckhauser in 1990, Raith in 2000, Schneider & Kra-
mer in 2004, Daniel & Parco in 2005, Dupuis-Roy & Gosselin in 
2009.  
b. Chapter 2 Background chapter  
 The three forms of dispute resolution, with a partic-
ular focus on Negotiation and Mediation.  
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This chapter will describe how the process of Alternative Dis-
pute Resolution was developed in USA and how it was adapted in 
Europe with a different ratio. Moving through the idea of the van-
ishing trial (Galanter 1984), the importance of the trial (Mulcahy 
2012) and the idea of being against settlement (Fiss 1984), with all 
the related concerns about this strict point of view (Luban 1995), 
I will focus on the possible ways of Dispute Resolution (Menkel 
Meadow 2015) and the importance of getting to yes (Fisher and 
Ury 1981). Finally, I will focus on the importance of the 3rd party’s 
role (Black and Baumgartner 1983).  
c. Chapter 3 Empirical chapter  
 Online Dispute Resolution (Origin, ratio, forms) 
from its actual use and limits to the Automatic Systems (ra-
tio, applications in common law, limits especially in civil 
law).  
This chapter will describe how the Online Dispute resolutions 
diverge from Alternative Dispute Resolution. This chapter will in-
vestigate the e-supported systems. 
The Online Dispute Resolution environment should be envi-
sioned as a virtual space in which disputants have a variety of dis-
pute resolution tools at their disposal. Participants can select any 
tool they consider appropriate for the resolution of their conflict 
and use the tools in any order or manner they desire, or they can 
be guided through the process.  
Even if a stalemate occurs, suitable forms of ADR (such as 
blind bidding or arbitration) can be used on a smaller set of issues. 
In this chapter I will focus on new decision analysis strategies 
(Brams 2008), (Thiessen and MacMahon, 2000) (Zeleznikow 
2014).  
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In this chapter I will introduce the concept of E-Negotiation 
and E-Mediation. 
These are processes that may use a negotiation support system 
including computers or other forms of electronic communications 
that enable parties to negotiate their own agreements. In its most 
advanced form, E-Negotiation is a form of artificial intelligence 
that fully automates mediation (perfectly neutral, super intelligent, 
and very secure). While in many cases unnecessary, E-Negotiations 
and E-Mediations can include face-to-face meetings if such meet-
ings enhance the process (Thiessen, Miniato and Hiebert 2012).  
As said by Ernest Thiessen, Paul Miniato and Bruce Hiebert, 
“the key difference with eNegotiation is that the parties are in full 
control both during the process and in accepting or rejecting an 
outcome… and a well-designed eNegotiation systems will reduce 
the conflict or eliminate it by changing the fundamental nature of 
the interaction between the parties”.  
d. Chapter 4 Analytical chapter  
 Analysis of ten Italian situations in which the e-pro-
cedure could be useful (or, at least, better than the final judg-
ment).  
Throughout the empirical chapter, I will have explored the in-
teractions between alternative dispute resolution and game theory. 
This analytical chapter will delve from the empirical data presented 
to discuss the idea of a dialogical relationship between online ne-
gotiation systems and fair division algorithms. Analysis will criti-
cally assess with the Italian jurisprudence and in particular with 
family law cases offering different ways of framing the benefits of 
using such a procedure instead of going to the trial.  
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It is crucial to emphasize the fact that in chapter 4 I will apply 
this method in an experimental way. I will take judgments already 
decided and, thanks to the final verdict and confidential documents 
related to the case judged, attributing values to the parties, I will 
show how convenient and efficient is such a method. 
In this analytical chapter I will engage once again with my initial 
theoretical chapter, before I began fieldwork. So far, throughout 
the data analysis process much of the initial theoretical ideas reso-
nate, thus they form a good base for the discussion.  
e. Chapter 5  
 Conclusions  
This chapter, based on the analysis of the previous chapter, will 
underline once more the use and development of algorithms for 
the resolution of disputes. Use that should be applied once we dis-
tinguish available rights (droits disponibles) from national manda-
tory rules (loi de police) which are presently in force in the different 
member states. I am focused on the family law sector (offering an 
analytical approach in the previous chapter). Some of them have 
been patented in the United States; others are either patent-pend-
ing or in the process of development.  
A potential use of these theories, based on the application of 
this methodology instead of law is based on the concept expressed 
by the article 1134 and 1165 of the Belgian civil code and the article 
1322 of the Italian civil code – the principle of freedom of con-
tract7 – could eschew recourse to national courts by simplifying 
                                                          
7 Germany: Article 2(1) of the German Constitution; Greece: Article 5(1) of 
the Hellenic Constitution and Article 3 of the Civil Code; Denmark: Article 
5.1.1 Danske Lov (old Danish Code of 1683); Spain: Article 6 and 1255 of 
the Civil Code; France, Belgique and Luxembourg: Article 6, 1123 and 1134 
para 1 of the Civil Code indirectly; Italy: Article 1322 of the Civil Code; The 
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and solving disputes using algorithms as expeditiously and fairly as 
possible.  
In ODR, the use of algorithms, if successful, will supersede 
differences in national laws, paving the way for their adoption and 
enforcement by the EU. 
 
 
Section 5: Methodology 
 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the primary con-
tention (see section 1) through consideration of each of the key 
issues described above (see section 3). Approaching each of the 
issues demands a multidisciplinary approach. This involves re-
search concerning areas as diverse as, on the one hand, game the-
ory and fair division and, on the other hand, alternative dispute 
resolution and online dispute resolution in particular. 
 The use of such approaches, and the reasons for their selection 
is described below. 
1) Empirical approach of fair division algorithms (related to key 
issue 1) 
2) Empirical approach of alternative dispute resolution (related 
to key issue 2) 
                                                          
Netherlands: Article 6:248 BW; Portugal: Article 405 of the Civil Code; Aus-
tria: § 859 ABGB. 
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3) Empirical approach of online dispute resolution (related to 
key issue 3) 
4) Analytical approach of ten Italian judgements in which I ap-
plied the Adjusted Winner (related to key issue 4) 
 
 
Section 6: Desired take away messages 
 
 
This thesis refers to and discusses a wide range of content. In 
this context the author realises that it may be difficult for the reader 
to retain a clear grasp on the central message of this thesis. In order 
to improve clarity, the two main messages that the reader should 
derive from this thesis are described below. 
1) There is no single truth  
While two or more people are arguing, no decision will be accepted 
if people will not believe in it; a solution that is fair, a good out-
come. To achieve it, it is essential to “get the focus off the focus”. 
People have to bear in mind that the main negotiation is the one 
they have with themselves, their internal dispute.  
Although transparency and openness are the basis, it is crucial 
to emphasize the concept that truth is not so strict anymore: there 
is not just a single truth, but there are more truths such as the ra-
tional one or the emotive one. 
The evidence of this last sentence can be clearly seen in the 
touching scene of the movie “I am Sam”. In this movie, a mentally 
handicapped man fights for custody of his 7-year-old daughter, and 
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in the process teaches his cold hearted lawyer the value of love and 
family.  
As described by Roger Ebert, I Am Sam is aimed at audiences 
who will relate to the heart-tugging relationship between Sam and 
Lucy. Every device of the movie’s art is designed to convince us 
Lucy must stay with Sam, but common sense makes it impossible 
to go the distance with the premise. “You can’t have heroes and 
villains when the wrong side is making the best sense”.8 
Hence, the final message of this movie is that we are in the 
middle of an evolution; perhaps we may find the truth and perhaps 
is it not the only one. This is where mediation comes in, to take 
into account the interests behind the position, not just ZOPA, 
BATNA or WATNA, but possible and practical solutions, such as 
the idea of a joint custody in the movie “I am Sam”.9 
2) People should be part of the solution  
The phenomenon of Online Dispute Resolution, in both a socio-
psychological approach and in its legal one, represents an excellent 
perspective through which to view the expressive activity of solv-
ing dispute. 
In such a context, ADR are not the Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution but the Appropriate Dispute Resolution. 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 www.rogerebert.com/reviews/i-am-sam-2002. 
9 Message elaborated from the speech of Prof. Menkel-Meadow in Leuven 
University at the conference Beyond Mediation (building Blocks of Constructive Con-
flict Management), on the 8th of February 2016. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Game Theory and Fair Division models 
 
 
 
 
Rumi: 
 “Beyond our ideas of 
right-doing and wrong-
doing, there is a field. 
I’ll meet you there”. 
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Chapter Aims 
• What is Game Theory and Fair Division. 
• What are Fair Division’s principles. 
• Describe the most well-known fair models, such as the Last-Di-
minisher, the Divider-Chooser, Taking Turns, the Lone-Divider, 
the Selfridge–Conway, the Moving Knife, the Lone-Chooser and 
the Adjusted Winner. 
• Demonstrate the advantage and the differences between the Ad-
justed Winner and all the other procedures. 
 
Sections: 
Section 0: Introduction 
Section 1: Game Theory and the four Fair Division principles 
Section 2: The eight well-known fair models 
Section 3: 1st model 
Section 4: 2nd model 
Section 5: 3rd model 
Section 6: 4th model 
Section 7: 5th model 
Section 8: 6th model  
Section 9: 7th model 
Section 10: 8th model 
Section 11: Conclusions    
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Section 0: Introduction of the 8 fair division models 
 
This chapter aims to develop an understanding of the phenom-
enon of fair division. This may help us to understand, firstly, why 
game theory’s tools may be an added value in the context of solving 
a dispute (this will be discussed further in chapter 3 where the au-
thor will attempt to offer a wide-ranging summary of procedures 
already tested) and, secondly, why fair models have received lim-
ited attention thus far from legal scholars, as a result there has been 
little efforts to define the concept when it is discussed in a legal 
context (this is discussed further in chapter 5). 
Following the most notably Rawls’s “Justice as Fairness”, this 
chapter will show how four game theory principles for having fair-
ness and a win-win solution, such as “proportionality”, “effi-
ciency”, “equitability” and “envy-freeness” and several algorithms 
– based on these principles –  are able to solve a dispute. This idea 
is important in allowing individuals to live their lives in the manner 
in which they would want and therefore also in maintaining a plu-
ralistic society. The perception is useful in allowing the fair proce-
dures to be linked to ideas and arguments found within ethical and 
philosophical theories. 
Starting by providing in section 1 a broad overview of the no-
tions of game theory and fair division, this chapter will describe 
eight different models that are commonly used in the field of game 
theory. Each of which is capable of describing important facets of 
fair division and satisfying more or all of its properties.  
This description begins with section 2, which starts by intro-
ducing generally the fair division models and their properties. Sec-
tion 3 will provide an overview of the Last-Diminisher method. 
Section 4 follows on from this with a focus on the Divider-
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Chooser method. Section 5 follows on paying attention to Taking 
Turns. Section 6 follows on with an emphasis on the Lone-Divider 
method and section 7 on the Selfridge–Conway method. Section 8 
and 9 will concentrate on the procedures of Moving Knife and 
Lone-Chooser respectively. Finally, section 10 will explore the Ad-
justed Winner and its properties, underlining that it’s the method 
that reflects more properties than the others. 
Nowadays, a good amount of disputes could be solved apply-
ing several “games” for a fair solution for the parties involved. 
Since the pioneering work of the three mathematicians Hugo 
Steinhaus, Bronislaw Knaster and Stefan Banach in Poland during 
World War II, fair division procedures made their entry (Brams 
1996). In the 1990s fair division literature has grown, a popular 
book was written by Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor in 1999 
and several fair division algorithms have been developed through 
the whole period. The recent years have witnessed an increasing 
interest by the international scientific community, testified by a 
large number of publications in the field from all over the world. 
Unfortunately, despite their immense potential, just very few 
empirical studies have put fair-division procedures to the test: Pratt 
& Zeckhauser in 1990, Raith in 2000, Schneider & Kramer in 2004, 
Daniel & Parco in 2005, Dupuis-Roy & Gosselin in 2009. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with a firm 
understanding of fair division procedures, an understanding that 
will be required in subsequent chapters in order to: (i) understand 
how fair procedures can be more efficient, cheaper and shorter in 
time compared with standard legal procedures; (ii) understand why 
Adjusted Winner is the model the author will use in the analytical 
chapter (this is discussed further in chapter 5) and (iii) understand 
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whether fair procedures that deal with analogous issues of legal ap-
proaches are able to limit the recourse to courts in a subsequent 
phase to the dispute. 
 
 
Section 1: Game Theory and the four Fair Division principles 
 
1.1 Definition of Game Theory and Fair Division 
As announced we are now introducing the notion of Game 
Theory, in order of illustrating later the notion of Fair division and 
its four principles. 
Game theory is a branch of mathematics devoted to the study 
of strategic interactions, i.e., interactions which involve more than 
one agent and in which the effects of each agent’s decision depend 
not only on her decision but also on the decisions of the other 
agents so that what each agent does depends on what she thinks 
the other agents will do.10  
In other words, game theory can be defined as “a set of tools 
and a language for describing and predicting strategic behaviour”. 
Strategic behaviours are situations in which one person would like 
to take into account how a second person will behave in making a 
decision, and the second person would like to do likewise. Strategic 
settings typically involve two or more decision makers, and the 
                                                          
10  Załuski, W., Game Theory in Jurisprudence, Copernicus Center Press, 
2013. 
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possibility of linking one decision to a second decision, and vice 
versa.11 
Since his pioneering studies, Steinhaus introduced the concept 
of “Fair division”: it all starts with the renowned and well-known 
example of cake cutting division introduced in his “The Problem 
of Fair Division”, 1948 and the foremost and notorious dilemma 
“How do we fairly share the cake?”.12 
It is necessary here to clarify exactly what is meant by Fair Di-
vision: 
In the literature, the term tends to be used to refer to achievable 
ways of dividing a resource among several parties in such a way 
that all recipients believe that they have received a fair amount, 
according to different criteria of fairness. 
Of course, it is never an easy task, due to the fact that each 
recipient may have a different measure of the value of the re-
sources involved in the division. 
 
1.2 Principle 1 and Principle 2 
There is a large number of published studies describing the 
principles of a fair division: 
                                                          
11 Picker, R., An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law, Chicago Working 
Paper in Law & Economics, 1994, 1-26. 
12 Id. 
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 According to Steven J. Brams, professor of New York Univer-
sity “there are four criteria by which to judge the fairness of settle-
ments: Proportionality, Envy-freeness, Equitability and Effi-
ciency”.13 
Besides, it is easy for Brams to reduce these principles to three 
due to the fact that Proportionality could be seen as a weaker ver-
sion of Envy-freeness and it could be not taken into account.  
More precisely, when we are talking about two-parties disputes, 
proportionality and envy-freeness are equivalent (if I think I have 
at least one-half, then I will not envy you, so the settlement is envy-
free, and also proportional).  
On the other hand, in the case of a three-parties dispute, envy-
freeness is stronger than proportionality:   
If I think I have at least one-third, then I will not envy you, 
whenever I think the others together don’t receive more than two-
thirds, so the settlement is envy-free and, consequently, it’s easy to 
say that it is also proportional. 
If I think I am getting one-third, but I think you are getting 
one-half and the third party just one-sixth, then, in my eyes, I will 
envy you. 
Thus, as a direct consequence, it is easy to affirm that, on one 
hand, an envy-free allocation is always proportional, even if there 
are more than two parties, but, on the other hand, a proportional 
allocation is not necessarily envy-free. 
                                                          
13 Brams, S. & Taylor, A., The Win-Win solution, Norton & Company, 1999. 
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Brams’s statement can be proved by considering its equivalent 
contrapositive: “If a fair-division method is not proportional then 
it is not envy-free”. 
It is suitable to prove this to be true as follows: 
Suppose a fair division method is not proportional.  Then one 
of n players (say P1) believes that he or she did not receive at least 
1/n of the total value in the division.  Thus, that player believes the 
total value shared by the other players is more than (n-1)/n of the 
value.  Then, if that is true, one of the other n-1 players must have 
more than 1/n of the total value.  Thus P1 will envy that player.  
For making it easy to understand this previous argument, it is 
better to try in the case n = +2 (i.e., n = 3 or n = 4). 
Hence, avoiding to linger on the first principle, it is easy to trace 
back the principle of proportionality to the Greek philosopher Ar-
istotle. The Alexander the Great’s preceptor in his “Ethics” argued 
that “goods should be divided in proportion to each claimant’s 
contribution”. 
In other words, a division of goods can be described as a pro-
portional between two people if each player, based on his/her own 
preferences, evaluates the piece he/she received worth at least one-
half of the whole amount of goods to divide between them. If there 
are three people, each evaluates the piece he/she received worth at 
least one-third of the total value and so on. 
35 
 
Generally speaking, “an envy-free division is one in which 
every person thinks he or she received the largest or the most val-
uable portion of something – based on his or her own valuation – 
and hence does not envy anyone else”.14  
Although the concept of envy-freeness has been used in the 
mathematics literature on Fair division for almost sixty years 
(Gamow and Stern, 1958) and in the economics literature for al-
most fifty years (Foley, 1967), only almost two dozen years ago 
several algorithms have been developed. Algorithms able to guar-
antee envy-freeness in a wide variety of situations.15 
 
1.3 Principle 3 
Moreover, slightly related to the concept of envy-freeness, 
there is also the third principle of Equitability that has to be taken 
into account as one of the fair division criteria. 
Roughly speaking the term equitable has been applied to fair 
division method where each participant believes he or she has re-
ceived the same fraction of the total value of the object or objects 
divided.  
This concept might seem simple but it is not. 
Think about an inheritance or a divorce settlement, in which 
you got 60% of the total value of the joint holdings but in which 
your opponent thinks he or she got 95% of the total value, because 
your rival had little interest in what you got. 
                                                          
14 Brams, S. & Taylor, A., Fair Division, from cake cutting to dispute resolu-
tion, Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
15 Id. 
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The first person, regardless of what his or her opponent thinks, 
in his or her eyes his or her opponent received only 40% of the 
total value that was divided. 
The focus point is that if we couple these two principles (envy-
freeness and equitability) it means not only that both get more than 
50% but also that both exceed 50% by the same amount.  
In the previous example an equitable and envy-free division 
would hold if the first person believed he got 65% and his or her 
opponent 65% which is quite a different story from the one above 
mentioned.  
 
1.4 Principle 4 
The last criteria to analyze for having a fair division is the term 
Efficiency. 
In Economics, the term Efficiency is generally understood to 
mean Pareto-optimality (also named after Vilfredo Pareto), which 
is an extremely important property to economists. 
A fair-division method is Pareto-optimal if and only if there are 
no possible exchanges or different allocations that would benefit 
at least one participant that doesn’t also make at least one other 
participant worse off.  
To summarize, a fair method of fair-division is fair if it satisfies 
one of the preceding criteria of fairness (either proportionality, 
envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, or equitability). 
 
1.5 Applying fair division principles in the models 
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A method can be: 
Proportional: if every player gets at least 1/n of the cake, by 
her own valuation. 
Envy-Free: if no player prefers getting the piece allotted to any 
of the other players. 
Equitable if all the players get the exact same utility in x, by 
their own valuations. 
It is essential to note that each of these criteria of fairness is 
satisfied if and only if every participant considers the allocation he 
made fair in that sense.   
That is, as it is more appropriate now to define it, a method of 
fair-division is fair (in some sense) if and only if every participant 
considers it to be fair (in that sense). 
It is crucial to bear in mind the assumptions implicit in the 
above definitions: 
Firstly, the above mentioned definition of fairness is restricted 
to situations in which all participants to a division do have equal 
claim in whatever is being divided.    
Secondly, perhaps some allocation of goods and/or issues can 
be considered fair but it does not satisfy any of the criteria already 
defined.  For this reason, it is possible to speak, for example, of 
fair-division methods which is “fair in the sense of being propor-
tional” or which is “fair in the sense of being equitable.” 
Actually, these economic principles are not suited to every dis-
pute. Brams and Taylor (1990s) investigated the differential impact 
of several fair division procedures (hereafter fair division models 
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and in the following sections will be analysed 8 well-known mod-
els) on series of disputes and they realised that these economic pro-
cedures are more suitable for two-party disputes, relating to the 
division of goods or issues (preferably divisible) and based on vol-
untary choices and a willingness to state preferences.16 
Firstly, nowadays, most of the conflicts inherently involve two 
parties or coalition who shared interests and coordinate their ac-
tions and, secondly, they are not only more practical but also more 
amenable and less complicated for achieving a settlement. 
In addition, the disputes could involve both goods or issues, 
but it’s possible to refer to them merely as items. On the one hand, 
the goods can be described as the physical objects that must be 
divided among the heirs to an estate and, on the other hand, the 
issues can be defined as matters on which there are opposite posi-
tions. 
Bram’s and Taylor’s studies observed that all fair division mod-
els are based on voluntary choice. The output is left to the dispu-
tants, to their choices, as allowed by the rules. They may be sup-
ported, clarified and facilitated by a mediator or a negotiator but 
the final decision will never be imposed by an outside third party, 
as a tribunal court or as an arbitration panel. 
In conclusion, through the following models and especially in 
the last one analysed, the adjusted winner, it will be shown that, 
regarding the opportunity of stating preferences, to the party is at 
least required to pick a favourite item among the goods and/or 
issues, but it could be requested also to compare and then to 
choose between two piles of items or even to attribute to each sin-
gle item a personal value. 
                                                          
16Id. 
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Section 2: The eight well-known fair models 
 
The opportunity of applying Fair Division principles to solve 
disputes will provide a real alternative from courts to disputants. 
An alternative method based on people’s preferences, following 
Nash’s optimal negotiation and bargaining.17 
The huge toughness in finding solutions acceptable to all the 
players involved in a dispute motivated many mathematicians and 
game theorists to develop fair-algorithms. 
Inspired by “I cut… you choose procedure”, since 1940s, 
Steinhaus, Banach and Knaster produced the first algorithms aim-
ing at dividing a single divisible good between a number of agents 
fairly which will be the underpinnings of these “fair procedures”. 
Previous empirical studies, in Common Law areas, have put 
these fair-algorithms in practice, applying them in an alternative 
fair dispute resolution, without receiving a due credit. (Pratt & 
Zeckhauser, 1990; Raith, 2000; Schneider & Kramer 2004, Daniel 
& Parco 2005, Dupuis-Roy & Gosselin 2009). 
In the field of alternative dispute resolution there are a huge 
number of methods, which are not well used or developed as much 
as it could be done. 
Nowadays, as we will illustrate in the following section a good 
amount of disputes could be solved applying several “models” for 
a fair solution for the parties involved. Here there are eight models 
                                                          
17 Nash, J., Two person Cooperative Games, Econometrica, 1953. 
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which will be simplified in order of being able to understand why 
the last model has more advantages, comparing to the others men-
tioned below. 
 
 
 
Section 3: 1st model 
 
 
A first example of a fair division procedure is Divide and 
Choose: 
A fair division procedure for dividing an object into two parts 
in any way that one desires and the other party chooses which-ever 
part he/she wants.18 
“One divides, the other chooses” can be seen as the first cake-
division procedure. 
A cake-division procedure is used to divide and choose some 
object among three or more people, and cake is the metaphor used 
to help explain this procedure.19 
The cake-division procedure involves finding allocations of a 
single object that is finely divisible.  
                                                          
18 For definitions and graphs in this paragraph, I am referring into this chapter 
to: Freeman, W.H., For All Practical Purposes: Mathematical Literacy in To-
day’s World, Comap, 2011. 
19 Id. 
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In this procedure, each player has a strategy that will guarantee 
his or her satisfaction, even in the face of collusion by the others. 
In other words, to be satisfied means that one thinks his piece 
is of size or value at least what he viewed as a fair share or he does 
not want to trade. 
A cake-division procedure (for n players) will be called propor-
tional if each player’s strategy guarantees that player a piece the size 
or value at least 1/n of the whole in his or her own estimation.  
It will be called envy-free if, as in the adjusted winner context, 
each player’s strategy guarantees that player a piece he or she con-
siders to be at least tied for largest or most valuable.20 
Steven J. Brams, in its article “Fair Division”,21 made two as-
sumptions about cake-cutting:  
1. “The goal of each player is to maximize the minimum-size 
piece (maximin piece) he or she can guarantee for himself or her-
self, regardless of what the other players do. To be sure, a player 
might do better by not following such a maximin strategy; this will 
depend on the strategy choices of the other players. However, all 
players are assumed to be risk-averse: They never choose strategies 
that might yield them larger pieces if they entail the possibility of 
giving them less than their maximin pieces”.22 
2. “The preferences of the players over the cake are continu-
ous, enabling one to use the intermediate-value theorem. To illus-
trate, suppose that a knife moves across a cake from left to right 
and, at any moment, the piece of the cake to the left of the knife is 
A and the piece to the right is B. If, for some position of the knife, 
                                                          
20 Id. 
21 www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/brams/fd_handbook.pdf 
22 Id. 
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a player views piece A as being larger than piece B, and for some 
other position he or she views piece B as being larger than piece 
A, then there must be some intermediate position such that the 
player values the two pieces exactly the same”.23 
The origins of the divide and choose procedure, also called the 
Divider-Chooser method, date back thousands of years. The rules 
to the procedure are simple: 
 “Someone divides the object into two parts and the other per-
son chooses first”. 
As suggested by his name, the first player, called the divider, 
divides a cake into two shares, and the second player, called the 
chooser, picks the share he or she wants, leaving the remaining 
share of the cake to the divider. 
The natural strategies of the divide and choose procedure are 
quite obvious: 
The divider makes the two parts equal in his estimation. 
The chooser selects whichever piece he feels is more valuable. 
 
This method guarantees that divider and chooser will each get 
a fair share (with two players, this means a share worth 50% or 
more of the total value of the cake).  
Not knowing the chooser’s likes and dislikes, the divider can 
only guarantee himself a 50% share by dividing the cake into two 
halves of equal value; the chooser is guaranteed a 50% or better 
share by choosing the piece he or she likes best. 
                                                          
23 Id. 
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Other strategic considerations may be relevant, such as the 
question: 
Would you rather be the divider or the chooser?         
Not knowing the other party’s preference, one would want to 
be the chooser.  
The divider is guaranteed a share worth exactly 50% of the total 
value of the cake. Conversely, the chooser could end up with a 
share worth more than 50%. 
If the players each had the same value system, they would each 
end up with exactly 50%.  
The differences between their value systems is what allows the 
chooser to virtually end up with more than 50%. 
 
 
Section 4: 2nd model 
 
 
Another example of a fair division procedure is Taking Turns: 
A fair-division procedure in which two or more parties alter-
nate selecting objects.24 
The rules to the procedure are simple too: 
“With two parties, one party selects an object, then the other 
party selects one, then the first party again, and so on”. 
                                                          
24 Freeman, W.H., supra note 18. 
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Questions arise with taking turns: 
How do we decide who goes first? 
A possible answer for deciding it could be to toss a coin or bid 
for the right to go first. 
Since choosing first is often quite an advantage, should the 
other party be compensated in some way? 
A possible and fair compensation could be extra choices at the 
next turn (i.e., in a 4 items division one player could choose item 
n1, the second player item n2 and item n3 and the first player the 
remaining item, item n.4). 
Should a player always choose his or her favourite from those 
that remain, or try to choose strategically to get better overall re-
sults? 
If a player chooses strategically, he or she could get better re-
sults. 
Example of Taking Turns: 
Suppose Bob and Carol are getting a divorce and their four 
main possessions are ranked from best to worst by each: 
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Figure 1 
If they both choose sincerely, the items would be allocated as 
follows: 
First turn: Bob takes the pension.   
Second turn: Carol takes the house.   
Third turn: Bob takes the investments.   
Fourth turn: Carol is left with vehicles. 
Anyway, Bob may vote insincerely and chooses the house first. 
He actually would do better (getting his first and second choice). 
First turn: Bob takes the house.         
Second turn: Carol takes the investments.         
Third turn: Bob takes the pension.       
Fourth turn: Carol is left with vehicles. 
This is the so called Bottom-up strategy. It is another method 
that can be used for optimal strategy for rational players, each 
knowing the other’s preferences.  
The called Bottom-up strategy is based on two principles: 
During your turn, you should never choose your least-pre-
ferred available option. 
You should never waste a choice on an option that will come 
to you automatically in a later round.25 
 
                                                          
25 Id. 
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Section 5: 3rd model 
 
 
Since the pioneering work of the three mathematicians Hugo 
Steinhaus, Bronislaw Knaster and Stefan Banach in Poland during 
World War II, fair division procedures made their entry.26  
Banach-Knaster “last-diminisher procedure” was developed in 
1946, and the Steinhaus “lone-divider procedure” in 1948. Both of 
these two procedures can be seen more in details below.27 
The last-diminisher procedure and the lone-divider procedure 
are both cake-division procedures. 
More in details, the Lone-Divider Method developed by Hugo 
Steinhaus is a cake-division procedure that works for three players 
and produces an allocation that is proportional but not, in general, 
envy-free.28 
This is just an extension of the Divider-Chooser Method to 
more than two players.  
One cuts the cake and the other two players must approve a 
piece if they think it is the size of at least one-third. If the other 
                                                          
26 Brams, S., Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution, Cam-
bridge University Press, 1996. 
27 Steinhaus, H., The Problem of Fair Division. Econometrica, 1948. 
28 Freeman, W.H., supra note 18. 
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two players disapprove of a piece, then that piece can go to the 
cutter, or some pieces can be put back together and recut. 
 
This fair division scheme requires three steps: 
 
Step 1. Division: 
The divider slices the pizza into three pieces. This division is 
rational only if each piece has equal value to the divider. 
Step 2. Declarations: 
Each chooser declares which pieces he or she considers ac-
ceptable (a fair share, in other words). 
Step 3. Distribution: 
What happens here depends on the declarations. 
 
In case number 1, one chooser declares more than one piece 
acceptable. Then the other chooser gets her or his chosen piece, 
the chooser of more than one piece gets her or his other choice, 
and the divider gets what was left. (Note that everyone gets a fair 
share.) 
In case number 2, both choosers declare just one piece, and 
they are different. The distribution is obvious in this case. 
In case number 3, both choosers declare just one piece, and it 
is the same piece. Here we give the divider one of the two unde-
clared pieces (randomly selected). Then we put the remaining two 
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pieces back together and apply the divider-chooser method. Again 
everyone gets a fair share. 
Moreover, even though we have described the process for 
three players, we can easily extend it to more players if needed.29 
 
 
Section 6: 4th model 
 
 
On the other hand, the Last-Diminisher Method developed by 
Banach and Knaster is a cake division procedure for any number 
of players that produces an allocation that is proportional but not, 
in general, envy-free.30 
In the first ever paper on fair division, Steinhaus (1948) reports 
on his own solution and a generalisation to arbitrary items pro-
posed by Banach and Knaster.31 
In this method everybody is both a divider and a chooser. The 
method makes sense only for division problems in which the item 
that should be divided among the parties involved is something 
more complicated than a cake. 
 
                                                          
29 Brams, S. & Taylor, A., An Envy-free Cake Division Protocol. American 
Mathematical Monthly, 1995. 
30 Freeman, W.H., supra note 18. 
31 Steinhaus, H., supra note 27. 
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a) Player 1 cuts off a piece (that he or she considers to represent 
1/n). 
 
b) That piece is passed around the players. Each player either lets it 
pass (if he or she considers it too small) or trims it down further 
(to what he or she considers 1/n). 
 
c) After the piece has made the full round, the last player to cut 
something off (the “last diminisher”) is obliged to take it. 
 
d) The rest (including the trimmings) is then divided amongst the 
remaining n−1 players. Play cut-and-choose once n = 2.  
 
The procedure’s properties are similar to that of the Steinhaus 
procedure (it is proportional; not envy-free; not contiguous; 
bounded number of cuts).32 
For four or more players, one person cuts a piece of the cake 
and hands it to another player. The player examines it. If it looks 
fair, he passes it along to the next player.  If it looks too big, he 
trims it first (puts the trimmed part back on the cake) and then 
passes it on (either unaltered or diminished). This continues down 
the line until all everyone has had a chance to trim. 
The last person to trim the piece receives that piece and exits 
the game. 
                                                          
32 Id. 
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Figure 2, example 1 of a cake procedure33 
 
 
                                                          
33 Freeman, W.H., supra note 18. 
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Figure 3, solution of example 134 
 
 
Figure 4, example 2 of a cake procedure35 
 
 
                                                          
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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Figure 5, solution of Example 236 
 
A few years later, more precisely in 1960, John Selfridge devel-
oped the Selfridge–Conway discrete procedure for creating an 
envy-free cake-cutting among three people.  
Selfridge, a mathematician at Northern Illinois University, de-
veloped this in 1960, and John Conway, a mathematician at Prince-
ton University, independently discovered it in 1993. Neither of 
them ever published the result, but Richard Guy, a British mathe-
matician, Professor Emeritus in the Department of Mathematics 
at the University of Calgary, told many people Selfridge’s solutions 
in the 1960s, and it was eventually attributed to the two of them in 
a number of books and articles. 
 
Section 7: 5th model 
 
The Selfridge–Conway discrete procedure is an envy-free vari-
ation of the lone divider method for n=3 people, proposed inde-
pendently by Selfridge and Conway.37 
Let Bob, Carol, and Dick be the three people who want to di-
vide the cake. The method has two steps. 
Step 1: The first step, as in Steinhaus’s lone divider method, is 
to let one person—say Bob—divide the cake into three equal 
(from her point of view) pieces. Bob is the divider. 
                                                          
36 Id. 
37 Borgers, C., Mathematics of social choice: Voting, Compensation and Divi-
sion, 2010. 
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Next, Carol inspects the three pieces. If one piece is strictly 
larger than the other two in his opinion, he trims that piece, so that 
there is a tie for first place. The trimmings are set aside. For now, 
he will only divide the cake minus the trimmings in an envy-free 
way.  
The trimmings will be divided in the second step. Carol is the 
trimmer.  
The trimmer might not trim anything at all from any piece, if 
he thinks that there is a tie for first place; in that case, there are no 
trimmings, and there will be no need for a second step. 
Now Dick is asked to choose one of the three pieces. Thus, 
Dick is the chooser. 
Of course, Dick will choose the piece that, in his opinion, is 
the largest or, if there is a tie in his opinion, one of the pieces that 
are largest. So Dick will envy nobody in the first step. 
After this, Carol gets to choose a piece. Recall that in his eyes, 
after the trimmings were removed there were two pieces that tied 
for first place.  
Perhaps, Dick chose one of those two pieces, but even then 
Carol can still choose the other; so Carol has no reason to envy 
anybody in the first step.  
Next, it does impose one extra constraint on Carol: If Dick did 
not choose the trimmed piece, then Carol must choose it. Actually, 
since in his eyes the trimmed piece tied for first place, he has no 
reason to object to this rule. 
Finally, Bob takes the remaining piece. Note that the piece that 
remains for Bob is not the trimmed piece, for that one was taken 
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either by Dick or by Carol. So what remains for Bob is one of the 
pieces that he originally cut. 
 
Section 8: 6th model 
 
In 1961, Dubins and Spanier proposed a proportional proce-
dure for n agents, producing contiguous slices - the “moving knife 
procedure” - the first n-person version of the last-diminisher pro-
cedure.38 
It produces contiguous slices (and hence uses a minimal num-
ber of cuts), but it is not discrete and requires the help of a referee.  
 A referee moves a knife slowly across the cake, from left to right 
and any player may shout “stop” at any time.  
 Whoever does so receive the piece to the left of the knife.  
 When a piece has been cut off, we continue with the remaining 
n−1 players, until just one player is left (who takes the remaining 
part).  
It is crucial to bear in mind that this is also a not envy-free 
procedure. The last chooser is best off (he or she is the only one 
who can get more than 1/n). 
 
Section 9: 7th model 
                                                          
38 Dubins, L.E & Spanier E.H., How to Cut a Cake Fairly, American Mathe-
matical Monthly, 1961, 1-17. 
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In 1964, a mathematician at Iowa State University, Arlington 
M. Fink, proposed a completely different approach for extending 
the divider-chooser method.  
This new method is well-known as the “lone-chooser proce-
dure”, because in this method one player plays the role of chooser 
and in the meantime all the other players start out playing the role 
of dividers.  
The “lone-chooser method” was revised and extended by Aus-
tin (1982) and Woodall (1986).39 
In 1982, Austin noticed that using his moving-knife procedure 
into Fink’s procedure, one can obtain a procedure that yields an 
allocation among n players such that each player thinks he or she 
receives a piece of size exactly 1/n. On the other hand, in 1986, 
Woodall provided an algorithm for achieving an allocation with 
Knaster’s properties. Woodall assumed that, firstly, there is a piece 
of cake that two players value differently, and, secondly, we know 
the fraction of value that each player attributes to that piece.40 
The lone-chooser method involves more than two players.  
This procedure allows all but one of the players to cut up the 
goods as they wish, and after that, the last player is allowed to 
choose his pieces first. 
As an example, assume Bob, Carol, and Dick want to split a 
cake into three pieces.  
                                                          
39 Id. 
40 Brams, S., supra note 26. 
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Using the Lone Chooser Method, we let Bob and Carol be the 
dividers and let Dick be the lone chooser.  
The method would then be carried out as follows: 
Step 1: First Division 
Bob and Carol divide the cake into 2 slices using the divider-
chooser method. Each considers her slice worth at least one-half 
of the total (or a fair share).  
Step 2: Second Division 
Bob and Carol divide their slices into 3 pieces of equal value.  
Step 3: Selection 
Dick now chooses 1 of Bob’s three pieces and 1 of Carol’s 
three pieces. Bob gets her remaining two pieces and likewise with 
Carol. 
This method is not envy-free. Actually, both Bob and Carol 
might envy Dick’s share. 
Finally, a number of substantial and important considerations 
need to be revealed, regarding the characteristics of each fair divi-
sion procedure mentioned up to now. 
Firstly, Divide and Choose is proportional and envy-free, but 
it is not Pareto-optimal: 
By definition, divide and choose is a fair-division method for 
only two players.   
Divide and choose is proportional because the divider can di-
vide the object (or objects) so that he or she considers each part of 
the division to represent 1/2 of the original value. Also, the 
chooser may select either of the parts cut by the divider so that he 
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or she receives a portion that represents at least 1/2 of the value 
as perceived by the chooser. 
In divide and choose, once a player believes he (or she) has 
received at least 1/2 of the original value, that player would con-
sider that the other player will not have received more than 1/2 of 
the value and would therefore not envy the other player. 
With regards to the efficiency: 
Suppose two players consider dividing a cake that is half choc-
olate and half vanilla.   
Suppose one player, the divider, likes both vanilla and choco-
late equally while the other player, the chooser, loves chocolate but 
hates vanilla. 
Suppose the divider cuts the cake so that each piece is half 
chocolate and half-vanilla.   
In the eyes of the divider, this represents a proportional divi-
sion – each will get half. 
It has to be noticed that there is another allocation that will 
make the chooser happier without hurting the divider.   
In other words, this division is not Pareto-optimal.   
By definition, a division procedure is Pareto-optimal if it always 
results in a division such that no other division could make one 
party better off without hurting at least one player. 
In this case, if the divider cut the cake so that half was vanilla 
and half was chocolate, the divider would be equally happy (he 
liked both) and the chooser would be much happier – he only 
wanted chocolate. 
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Secondly, the lone divider method is proportional but not 
envy-free: 
Remember that there are three possibilities that could result af-
ter division by the lone divider.  It is clear that the first two possi-
bilities result in allocations that are proportional.   
It is also clear that the third possibility also yields a proportional 
allocation is justified as follows: 
Suppose Bob, Carol and Dick are dividing a cake and Bob has 
divided the cake into parts x, y and z that he considers are worth 
1/3 of the value of the cake.  
Suppose Carol and Dick only approve of part x.  Then we give 
Bob part z and combine parts x and y into xy and let Carol and 
Dick use divide and choose to split xy.   
Now Carol and Dick each will consider this a proportional al-
location because Carol and Dick did not approve of z and thus 
consider xy to be more than 2/3rds of the value of the cake.  
Because divide and choose is proportional, Carol and Dick will 
each get 1/2 of what is at least 2/3rds in their estimation and there-
fore at least 1/3rd of their estimation of the cake. 
Finally, it is clear that in every possibility that the divider (Bob) 
always gets a share she considers proportional. 
Thus in each case all 3 players will always receive an allocation 
that he or she considers proportional. 
To show that this method is not envy-free we consider the case 
where both choosers (Carol and Dick) both split the combined 
piece xy.   
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Suppose they split that piece in a way that Bob considers not 
equal.  In that case, it is possible that while Bob receives what he 
considers to be at least 1/3 of the cake, he may consider what one 
of the other players received to be better than his share. Thus Bob 
may envy one of the choosers. 
Thirdly, the last diminisher method is proportional but not 
envy-free: 
The last diminisher method begins with some player (say 
Gianni) first cutting a piece of the object to be divided.  Suppose 
all n players consider that piece to be not more than 1/n of the 
value of the object.  Thus Gianni takes that piece and exits. 
Now suppose that as the process continues, player B (say Dick) 
cuts a piece that Gianni considers to be more than 1/n of the orig-
inal value.  If all the remaining players consider that piece to be not 
more than 1/n of the original value, then B takes that piece and 
exits.  However, Gianni will envy the piece received by Dick. 
Thus, in spite of the fact that the to complete the last dimin-
isher method all divisions must be considered no more than 1/n 
of the total value, it is possible that at least one player will envy 
another (like Gianni will envy Dick in the discussion above). 
Fourthly, the Selfridge-Conway method of fair division is pro-
portional and envy-free: 
To show it is envy-free we must reconsider the Selfridge-Con-
way division process: 
Remember there were two stages in this division method and 
we considered this method only in the case of three players.  We 
will show no player experiences envy in the first stage and then no 
player experiences envy in the second stage. 
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In the first stage of the Selfridge-Conway division procedure, 
player 1, say Bob, will cut the object into three pieces.  He would 
be equally happy with any of these pieces.  Now player 2, say Carol, 
might trim one of the three pieces to make at least a two-way tie 
for best piece among the three.  If Carol does trim a piece he will 
have to take that piece if player 3, say Dick, doesn’t take it.  Now 
Dick will experience no envy in the first stage because he is the 
first to choose.  Carol will experience no envy because he can pick 
one of the two that were tied for best and Bob will experience no 
envy because there will always remain an untrimmed piece after the 
others have taken theirs. 
If there are no trimmings left from the first stage then the di-
vision is done and the second stage is not needed, there will be no 
players experiencing envy. 
If there are trimmings left from the first stage, then we can 
show the steps involved in the second stage for insuring that no 
player will experience envy.   
Remember, initially, either Carol or Dick did not receive a 
trimmed piece and that player will cut the trimmings and choose 
last from the trimmings. 
Now the player that got the trimmed piece will pick first from 
the trimmings and envies no one because he picks first. 
Bob picks second from the trimmings and will not envy the 
player that went before him because that player got a trimmed 
piece in stage 1 and only gets a portion of the trimmings from that 
piece.  Bob also does not envy the other player because he is pick-
ing before him. 
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The last player to choose from the trimmings in the second 
stage envies no one because he had cut the trimmings into what he 
considered equal pieces. 
In1990s fair division literature has grown, thanks to five aca-
demic books written (starting from Young in 1994,41 Brams and 
Taylor in 1996,42 Robertson and Webb in 1998,43 Moulin in 200344 
and Barbanel in 200445), a popular book written by Steven J. Brams 
and Alan D. Taylor in 1999 and several fair division algorithms 
developed through the whole period.46 
 
Section 10: 8th model 
 
Fair Division Theory originated in mathematics,47 and then be-
came a proper branch in the modern social sciences at the end of 
1990s with the publication of the book “Fair Division” by S. J. 
Brams and A. D. Taylor.48 
                                                          
41 Young, H. P., Equity in Theory and Practice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 
1994. 
42 Brams, S., supra note 26. 
43 Robertson, J. & Webb, W., Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You Can, 
Cambridge, 1998. 
44 Moulin, H.J., Fair Division and Collective Welfare. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2003. 
45 Barbanel, J.B., The Geometry of Efficient Fair Division. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004. 
46 Brams, S., Jones M., Klamler C., Perfect Cake-Cutting Procedures with 
Money, New York University, 2004. 
47 Steinhaus, H., supra note 27. 
48 Brams, S., supra note 26. 
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Hence, in this last book the authors presented one widely 
known model – Adjusted-winner – patented by Brams and Taylor 
on the 9th of November 1999 (Patent Number: 5983205).49 
The present procedure was designed to determine how two 
parties should settle a dispute involving issues or objects by each 
party quantifying the importance he/she attaches to getting its own 
way on each of the objects or issues.50 
The key aspects of the Adjusted Winner Procedure can be 
listed as follows:  
1. Each party distributes 100 points over the items in such a way 
that reflects their relative worth.  Essentially, the party quantifies 
the importance for an item by placing a higher “bid” on that item. 
2. Each item is initially given to the party that assigned it more 
points.  Each party then assesses how many of his or her own 
points he or she has received.  The party with the fewest points 
is now given each item on which both parties place the same 
points. 
3. Since the point totals are not likely to be equal, let A be the party 
with the higher point total and B be the other party.  Start trans-
ferring items from A to B in a certain order (as in step 4) until the 
point totals are equal. 
4. The order is determined by going through the items in order of 
increasing point ratio. An item’s point ratio, fraction, is =  (A’s 
point value) ÷ (B’s point value) , where A is the party with the 
higher point total.51 
                                                          
49 Brams, S. & Taylor, A., supra note 29. 
50 Freeman, W.H., supra note 18. 
51 Id. 
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For two parties, the adjusted winner procedure produces an al-
location, based on each player’s assignment of 100 points over the 
items to be divided. 
This can be illustrated briefly by a few examples: 
 Carol Bob 
Main home 20 30 
Second home 10 20 
Investments 15 20 
Summer cottage 11 14 
Retirement Account 10 5 
Diamonds 15 6 
Silverware 5 1 
Old clock 2 1 
Carol’s mother’s kitchen 10 2 
Old table 2 1 
Figure 6 
Suppose Carol and Bob are getting a divorce and must divide 
up some of their assets. Suppose they distribute 100 points among 
the ten items as shown in the above graph. 
Once Carol and Bob each distribute their 100 points as given 
in the table below, we can pass to the first assignment phase: 
 Goes to Carol Bob 
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Main home Carol 10 5 
Second home Bob 10 20 
Investments Bob 15 20 
Summer cottage Bob 11 14 
Retirement Account Bob 20 30 
Diamonds Carol 15 6 
Silverware Carol 5 1 
Old clock Carol 2 1 
Carol’s mother’s 
kitchen 
Carol 10 2 
Old table Carol 2 1 
Figure 7 
 
 
The adjusted winner procedure goes through the list of items 
and initially divide the items among the two parties according to 
who had placed a higher point value on each item.   
Generally, the point totals received by each party will not be 
equal - as in this case.  The totals listed at the bottom of the table 
indicate the total points received by each party according to that 
initial point distribution. 
 
Carol Bob 
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Main home (10)  
 Second home (20) 
 Investments (20) 
 Summer cottage (14) 
 Retirement Account (30) 
Diamonds (15)  
Silverware (5)  
Old clock (2)  
Carol’s mother’s kitchen (10)  
Old table (2)  
Total = 44 Total = 84 
Figure 8 
 
It is notable that point values are based on that party’s valuation 
of a given item. The adjusted winner procedure could stop here if 
each party receives an equal number of points. 
If there are any items that both parties valued equally, it is pos-
sible to transfer those items to the party with the smaller point to-
tal.  If a fraction of an item had to be transferred at this stage to 
make the totals equal, it will be useful the algebraic process shown 
later in the above example. 
Because the point totals are not equal, it will now be suitable to 
transfer items, or a part of one item, from one party to the other 
to equalize the point totals. 
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 Carol Bob Point ratio 
Second home  10 20 20/10 =2 
Investments 15 20 20/15=1.33 
Summer cottage  11 14 14/11=1.27 
Retirement Ac-
count 
20 30 30/20=1.5 
Figure 9 
 
The point ratio mentioned in the graph is the result of A’s val-
uation divided by B’s valuation: 
Formula of Point ratio = (A’s valuation / B’s valuation) 
Where A is the party with the greater point total, in this case 
Bob. 
Notice that because it will only be transferred a certain amount 
of items from Bob to Carol, it is possible to calculate point ratios 
for items belonging to Bob only. 
Thus, following the adjusted winner procedure, we will transfer 
items from Bob to Carol in order of increasing point ratio (from 
smallest to largest point ratio). 
 
Carol Bob 
Main home (10)  
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 Second home (20) 
 Investments (20) 
Summer cottage (11)  
 Retirement Account (30) 
Diamonds (15)  
Silverware (5)  
Old clock  (2)  
Carol’s mother’s kitchen (10)  
Old table (2)  
Total = 55 Total = 70 
Figure 10 
 
Because of the lowest point ratio, the first transfer is the sum-
mer cottage. 
Notice the Summer cottage was worth 14 to Bob but only 11 
to Carol.  It is necessary to adjust the point totals accordingly. 
After the first transfer the procedure will continue to transfer 
items from Bob to Carol until the point totals are equal. 
By increasing point ratio, the next item to transfer will be the 
Investments. 
Remind that if the transfer includes the entire investments 
from Bob to Carol then Carol (with 60 points of total value) will 
have more points than Bob (with 50).   
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Therefore, the entire Investments will not be transferred to 
Carol, but just a part of them. 
Let x be the fraction of the Investments that Bob will keep and 
therefore 1 – x will represent the fraction that Carol will receive. 
For example, if x = 2/3 then 1 – x = 1/3. 
In the transfer of the Investments, Bob will keep 20x points 
from the Investments and Carol will receive 15(1-x) points. 
An algebraic procedure will be used to find the fraction x of 
the Investments that will be transferred from Bob to Carol. 
Note that Carol currently has 55 points and will receive 15(1-
x) points. 
 
 Note that Bob has 50 points plus will keep some portion of 
the Investments, which is represented by 20x. 
 
 To equate the point totals, the equation will be: 
55 + 15(1-x) = 50 + 20x 
Now, solving this linear equation: 
 
55 + 15(1-x) = 50 + 20x 
55 + 15 – 15x = 50 + 20x 
70 – 15x = 50 + 20x 
20 = 35x 
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x = 20/35 
x = 4/7 
 
Therefore, Bob will keep 4/7 of the chest and Carol will receive 
3/7 of the Investments. 
Observe the significance of the solution to this equation: 
Given the equation:   55 + 15(1-x) = 50 + 20x 
If x = 4/7 then each side becomes   
55 + 15 (3/7)  =  50 + 20 (4/7) 
 
61.43  = 61.43 
 
Each party will receive an equal number of points.   
This is where the adjusted winner procedure ends, with a partial 
transfer of the chest, all of the items have been divided in a way 
that each party will consider equitable. 
 
 
Carol Bob 
Main home (10)  
 Second home (20) 
Investments (3/7 of 15) Investments (4/7 of 20) 
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Summer cottage (11)  
 Retirement Account (30) 
Diamonds (15)  
Silverware (5)  
Old clock  (2)  
Carol’s mother’s kitchen (10)  
Old table (2)  
Total = 61.43 Total = 61.43 
Figure 11 
 
 
The result of the adjusted winner procedure is the distribution 
of items as shown in the table. 
 Carol gets the main home, the summer cottage, the diamonds, 
the silverware, the old clock, her mother’s kitchen, the old table 
and 3/7ths of the investments. 
 Bob gets the second home, the retirement account and 4/7ths of 
the investments. 
 
Another example of what is done by the adjusted winner pro-
cedure: 
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Figure 12, Example 2 of Adjusted Winner52 
 
Figure 13, Solution 2 of Adjusted Winner53 
 
                                                          
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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Compared to the fair division procedures above mentioned, 
the Adjusted Winner is more complete, as it has all the previous 
cited properties: 
 
The allocation is equitable:    
Both players believe that he or she received the same fractional 
part of the total value. 
 
The allocation is envy-free:    
Neither player would be happier with what the other received. 
 
The allocation is Pareto-optimal:    
No other allocation, arrived at by any means, can make one party 
better off without making the other party worse off. 
 
However, the adjusted winner procedure has not escaped crit-
icism that Brams and Taylor explained on their website:  
One major drawback of the adjusted winner is that this proce-
dure is easily applied to goods but less easily to issues, in which 
much negotiation must precede its use. In applying the Adjusted 
Winner to goods in a divorce or an estate division, the only real 
difficulty is in each person’s assigning points to the goods.  
With the direct consequence that, if the items are not physical 
goods but issues that must be resolved, then the parties need to 
reach an agreement on not only what the issues are but also what 
winning and losing on each issue means. 
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Because there is no mechanical procedure that can resolve dif-
ference at this level, this is the area in which a good deal of hard 
bargaining is to be expected.54 
Another critical point is that the packaging of issues is crucial 
in applying Adjusted Winner, particularly breaking up a single large 
issue into different parts that are as separable as possible.  
Thus, if salary is the overriding concern in a labor-management 
dispute, then there is nothing to trade off against losing on this 
issue. But often an issue like this can be broken down into compo-
nents, such as basic hourly or piecework rate, overtime wages, pen-
sions, medical benefits, and the like that the employer and the em-
ployee value differently.  
Hence, “salary” is turned into a compensation package, and its 
components can be treated as separate issues.  
Care must be taken in packaging items, however, so as to make 
them relatively independent of each other. This is to ensure that 
winning on one does not affect how much one wins on another; 
otherwise, the summation of points across all items would not be 
meaningful.55 
The last criticism regards manipulation. This is sufficiently dif-
ficult under Adjusted Winner so as not to be a practical problem.  
One catch in using Adjusted Winner is that, theoretically, one 
side can do even better, at the expense of the other side, by capi-
talizing on its advance knowledge of the other side’s allocations.  
                                                          
54 www.nyu.edu/projects/adjustedwinner, last accessed on 31st March 2016. 
55 Id. 
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This is not usually a serious practical problem, however, be-
cause it is highly unlikely that one side would have the precise in-
formation it needs about the other side’s allocations to exploit Ad-
justed Winner in this manner.  
In fact, although being off by only one point can lead to a rel-
atively poor outcome for both parties, the honest party’s sincerity 
guarantees that it will not envy the disingenuous party.  
Thus, the incentives to exploit Adjusted Winner will be mini-
mal, with honesty guaranteeing a party at least half its total valua-
tion of all items.56 
 
Section 11: Conclusions 
 
 
The aim of this chapter was to develop a normative argument 
concerning the use of fair division. In doing so the author has at-
tempted to forge a link between concepts found most commonly 
in the field of game theory associated with fair division principles 
to important ideas in theories concerned with new dispute resolu-
tion methods. More specifically this effort revolves around the pri-
marily “fair division principles” of “proportionality, envy-freeness, 
equitability and efficiency’ (section 1). The first principle refers to 
an estimation made by each person of receiving at least a piece of 
the cake that he considers is at least proportional, such as at least 
1/3 of the cake among three people. The second that is related to 
the first, express the idea that each person prefers his share than 
trading it randomly with another person’s share. With regards to 
                                                          
56 Id. 
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the third, it is satisfied if everyone has the same satisfaction level 
and the forth – the so-called efficiency or Pareto-optimality – when 
there is no other distribution that can help some players without 
hurting others, or at least not making them worse off.  
Subsequently, in section 2, I described the state of the art of 
the existing different models. In this thesis the author focuses on 
eight models, which are ordinarily used in the field of game theory 
for solving disputes in an envy-free, equitable and efficient way. 
In section 3, the author provided an overview of the Last-Di-
minisher method. Section 4 followed on from this with a focus on 
the Divider-Chooser method. Section 5 the attention was towards 
the Taking Turns. In section 6 the emphasis was on the Lone-Di-
vider method and in section 7 on the Selfridge–Conway method. 
Section 8 and 9 concentrated on the procedures of Moving Knife 
and Lone-Chooser respectively. Lastly, section 10 explored the Ad-
justed Winner and its properties, highlighting that it’s the method 
that reflects all the properties above mentioned, compared to the 
others. 
What I will do in my next chapter is to analyse the main forms 
of getting to yes and trying to focus on negotiation and mediation, 
where the parties are involved in the final solution, in order to ver-
ify if these methods could be the basis for introducing the e-sup-
ported systems in chapter 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
76 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
Chapter 2 
 
The three forms of Dispute Resolution 
 
 
Henry Kissinger: 
“Each success only buys 
an admission ticket to a 
more difficult problem”. 
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Chapter Aims 
•  An introduction to the concept of ADR. 
•  Making the reader aware of what is behind a dispute. 
•  Describe the importance of getting to yes. 
•  Describe the importance of the 3rd party’s role.  
• Describe the resolution forms of Negotiation and Mediation. 
Sections: 
Section 0: Introduction 
Section 1: Naming Blaming Claiming 
Section 2: Litigotiation  
Section 3: The three main forms of Dispute Resolution 
Section 4: The list of factors 
Section 5: Criticisms of the trial and the shift towards ADR 
Section 6: Getting to Yes 
Section 7: The six phases of negotiation 
Section 8: The four barriers of negotiation 
Section 9: Ten reasons to mediate 
Section 10: Facilitative mediation 
Section 11: Narrative and transformative mediation 
Section 12: Riskin’s grid  
Section 13: Conclusion 
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Section 0: Introduction 
 
 
This thesis is not concerned with application of game theory 
into the field of law in general, but more specifically by the possible 
practises into the field of alternative dispute resolution. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide the reader with a firm 
overview of alternative dispute resolution methods, an outline that 
will be required in subsequent chapters in order to: (i) appreciate 
where exactly is it possible to apply the economic algorithms in the 
field of law; (ii) recognise whether in several cases it is better to go 
to the court/to an arbiter or to negotiate or to have a mediation; 
(iii) discuss whether it is appropriate to solve the dispute with or 
without a third party’s involvement. 
In this chapter, I focus especially on just one aspect of dispute 
resolution: to define the three primary forms of dispute resolution 
and to assess the factors to consider when choosing a particular 
process.  
It is important to acknowledge from the outset that in the vast ma-
jority of cases there is not a proper and unique method to choose 
for solving a dispute.  
In order to provide a broad overview of the concept of alter-
native dispute resolution, I will start focusing in section 1 on the 
perception of an injury and the process of Naming Blaming Claim-
ing that will lead us to the birth of a dispute. After that in section 
2 and section 3 I will illustrate, respectively, the theory of Litigoti-
ation and the three forms of dispute resolutions. In section 4, I 
show the factors that you have to bear in mind when you have to 
choose which one is the most appropriate for yourself. In section 
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5, I will analyse the ADR critics compared to the trial and from 
section 6 to section 12 I will focus entirely on two of the form 
illustrated before, negotiation and mediation. 
In addition, this chapter will describe several different ap-
proaches that were commonly used in understanding these proce-
dures. This begins with section 2 which starts by introducing the 
definition of a “dispute” and its “social construct”. In this section 
it’s also explained how the process of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion was developed in USA and how it was reformed in Europe.  
Moving through the idea of the vanishing trial (Galanter 1984), 
the importance of the trial (Mulcahy 2012) and the idea of being 
against settlement (Fiss 1984), with all the related concerns about 
this strict point of view (Luban 1995), I will focus on the im-
portance of “getting to yes” (Fisher and Ury 1981) and the possible 
ways of Dispute Resolution (Menkel Meadow 2015). Moreover, I 
underline. Through all the chapter it will be emphasised the im-
portance of the 3rd party’s role (Black and Baumgartner 1983).  
In section 3, I focus accurately on just one aspect of dispute 
resolution: to define the three primary forms of dispute resolution 
and to assess the factors to consider when choosing a particular 
process instead of another. Factors such as confidentiality and eth-
ics, costs, speed, expertise of third parties, fairness, establishing a 
precedent, predictability, quality of the judges , maintenance of 
relationships and timing. 
All the factors, analysed in section 4, should be considered, as 
well as any underlying issue to the dispute.  
Section 6 until section 12 of this chapter, they will attempt to 
make the reader aware of the differences, the critical issues, con-
troversial points, benefits, advantages and disadvantages regarding 
the negotiation and the mediation. On the one hand, with regards 
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to negotiation, in section 6 I will focus on the importance of getting 
to yes, in section 7 the six phases and in section 8 the four barriers. 
On the other hand, focusing on mediation, in section 9 I will con-
centrate on the ten reason to mediate, in section 10 on facilitative 
mediation, in section 11 on the narrative and the transformative 
ones and, finally, in section 12 on the well-known Riskin’s grid. 
It follows that certain issues and the nature of the dispute will 
state that some factors are more relevant than others in order to 
solve a particular dispute. The questions pursued in the sections 
that follow focus on pros and cons of Adjudication, Mediation and 
Negotiation as regards to the factors involved in particular cases. 
How do people select the method of dispute resolution that they 
used? More importantly, how should they select the method? 
Therefore, I would like to focus the attention on two basic 
ideas. The first one concerns the fact that in this mare magnum it’s 
essential to understand that our perspective is influenced not only 
by the work of lawyers57, but also by the one of anthropologists 
who have observed forum choice, economists concerned with re-
sponses to consumer dissatisfaction and others who have meas-
ured or observed the way individuals manage personal problems. 
The second idea, on the other hand, concerns that albeit many 
other disciplines have much to offer, there are needs (i.e. factors 
like timing, quality of the judges or maintenance of relationship, 
discussed in section 4 of this chapter) that can be protected and 
safeguarded just going to the trial and going to the court. 
 
                                                          
57 Felstiner, W., Abel, R., and Sarat, A., 1980, The Emergence and Transfor-
mation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, Law & Society Review, vol. 
15, no. 3/4, pp. 631-654. 
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Section 1: Naming Blaming Claiming  
 
 
Knowing the law and being one of the best lawyers: are these 
qualities really necessary to solve a dispute in a fair, efficient and 
envy-free solution? Nowadays, going to the trial is just one of the 
possibilities in the many options that you have to bear in mind 
when you are taking into account which is the most suitable form 
of dispute resolution to pursue your aims and to solve the incon-
venient situations in which you are involved.  
Before speaking about the various forms of dispute resolution 
it is mandatory to focus on the dynamics of disputes. Indeed, we 
can consider how grievances and disputes arise in the first place, 
what motivates people to voice, pursue or abandon their griev-
ances, the point at which a grievance becomes a dispute and the 
part that different thresholds of tolerance or notions of equity play 
in decision making. Nevertheless, we also begin to look at what it 
is that people seek to achieve when they pursue disputes and the 
structural barriers that exist to people engaging in legal disputes. 
As suggested by various sociologists 58 , it is important to 
acknowledge from the outset that disputes are not concrete things 
but “social constructs”: a social process where experiences, 
through several transformations, convert into legal disputes. 59
  
                                                          
58 See Lewis (1973), Mayhew (1975), Marks (1976), Griffiths (1977). 
59 Felstiner, W., Abel, R., and Sarat, A., supra note 57. 
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The first step for the emergence of a dispute is that un unper-
ceived injurious experience (so-called unPIE) must be transformed 
in a perceived injurious experience (so-called PIE). This step is 
called “Naming”, when a party, indeed, recognizes an experience 
as injurious [transformation from unPIE to PIE].  
The following step is the attribution of fault for the injury to 
someone else that could be an individual, a group or an entity. This 
step is called “Blaming”, when a party figures out that someone 
else is responsible for her injury [transformation from PIE to a 
grievance]. 
The next step occurs when it happens the phenomenon of 
voicing something to someone asking for some remedy60. This step 
is called “Claming”, when a party communicates that conclusion 
to the faulty party [transformation from a grievance to a claim]. 
Once and only once a claim is rejected, in whole or in part, by 
the faulty party, the claim itself is transformed into a dispute. 
Because of the perception of an injury is really subjective and 
consequently unstable, complicated and incomplete, not all the 
grievances evolve into law suits. This is the so called “Grievance 
Apathy”. 
There are so many personality variables which may affect trans-
formations, including risk preferences, contentiousness and per-
sonal feelings and that’s why not every injurious experience needs 
to wind up in a court of law. 
In such a context, the competing languages of different norma-
tive frameworks is what it is crucial for a proper transformation. 
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The most known forms of languages involved in transformations 
are three: Rephrasing, Narrowing and Expansion.61 
1. Rephrasing: it consists in a “reformulation of the issues in a dis-
pute into a public discourse”. Parties may rephrase in front of 
third. Third party may rephrase to them e.g., mediator as devil’s 
advocate. 
2. Narrowing: it consists in a process through which established cat-
egories are imposed in a way which makes it amenable to con-
ventional categories e.g., courts. It’s a process where there are 
routine ways of dealing with cases. 
3. Expansion: it consists in a challenging of existing established cat-
egories for defining the ambit of dispute, a framework not previ-
ously accepted by third party e.g., Southwark mediation. This is 
the way that social change can be linked to legal change e.g., com-
mon law, in which adversaries encouraged to put alternative vi-
sions. 
During these transformation it’s essential to underline the role 
of a third party in providing support and narrowing or expanding 
the issue involved. This third party could be involved in just one 
of the processes or even in the three of them among the antago-
nists62. 
Moreover, in the late twentieth century, the perceived prob-
lems of civil justice set out. Because of the litigation system had 
become a battleground where no rules work properly 63, one of the 
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possible scenario was to promote settlement at the earliest moment 
and preferably without the issue of court proceedings64.  
 
 
Section 2 Litigotiation 
 
 
An appreciation of these antecedents of disputes is particularly 
important to better understand that alternative dispute resolution 
methods may be much more dependent on the “non-legal context” 
in which the dispute arose as it is the strength of the legal case. 
Therefore, in the United States of America is it evident the de-
cline in the portion of cases that are terminated by trial and the 
decline in the absolute number of trials in various American judi-
cial fora, both federal and state courts, since the mid-1980s (60 per-
cent decline in the absolute number of trials)65. 
He identifies five “vanishing trial stories” as hypotheses to ex-
plain the phenomenon66: convergence of common law and civil 
code systems; displacement of trials to administrative, arbitral, and 
other dispute resolution mechanisms; assimilation of trial-like pro-
cedures and due process into surrounding institutions other than 
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courts; transformation of the legal system from a rational, rule-cen-
tered, and formal system into an informal decisional process en-
tailing negotiation, participation, and interaction; and evolution of 
an adversarial process into something different, entailing process 
pluralism “intelligently designed” to produce more optimal out-
comes.67  
Plausible causes for this decline could be not only the diversion 
of cases to alternative dispute resolution forums but also the shift 
in ideology and practice among litigants, lawyers, and judges, the 
engagement in outsourcing to ADR institutions and the enhance-
ment of both the power of those institutions and their exclusive 
jurisdiction. ADR institutions and programs have proliferated.68  
The fear here is, of course, that we may reach a point where we 
actually lose the ability to retain the trial as an important element 
of our public culture, even if we want to69.   
And the numbers make it clear that the word “death” is not 
too strong as a word.  
Marc Galanter and Angela Frozena have updated previous 
work to bring the data up to 200970. With regard to civil trials in 
the federal courts, they conclude that there is “no news” and “big 
news.” The “no news” is that the half-century old downward trend 
lines continue. The “big news” is that the civil trial in the federal 
                                                          
67 Galanter, M., A World Without Trials?, Journal Disp. Resol. 7, 2006. 
68 Id. 
69 Burns, R., What Will We Lose If the Trial Vanishes?, Northwestern Univer-
sity School of Law, 2011. The analogy with global warming is inevitable. At a 
certain point in the process, it becomes irreversible. 
70 Galanter, M. & Frozena, A., The continuing decline of civil trials in Ameri-
can courts, Forum for State Appellate Court Judges, 2011.  
www.poundinstitute.org/sites/default/files/docs/2011%20judges%20fo-
rum/2011%20Forum%20Galanter-Frozena%20Paper.pdf.  
87 
 
courts is approaching extinction. In 1938, about 20% of federal 
civil cases went to trial. By 1962, the percentage was down to 12%. 
By 2009, the number has sunk to 1.7%.  
The percentage of jury trials in federal civil cases was down to 
just under 1%, and the percentage of bench trials was even lower. 
So between 1938 and 2009, there was a decline in the percentage 
of civil cases going to trial of over 90% and the pace of the decline 
was accelerating toward the end of that period, until very recently, 
when there was almost literally, no further decline possible. 
In addition, most disputes don’t end in litigation also because 
most legal systems pressurize the parties to settle through negotia-
tion or mediation. 
In these circumstances, the parties tend to bargain by reference 
to what they may get at trial, especially because they can still use 
the threat of trial during an alternative resolution process. 
In this way litigation casts a shadow over negotiations so that 
the parties are said to “bargain in the shadow of the law”71.  
Disputants may have no intention of going to court, but they 
may use the threat of going to trial in negotiations or mediation in 
order to “persuade” the other side to do something. In other 
words, if a person has a good case and he can threaten to go to 
litigation, it always gives him some power. 
According to Marc Galanter, the negotiation of disputes is not 
an alternative to litigation. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that 
it is litigation. Indeed, there are not two distinct processes, negoti-
ation and litigation, however, there is a single process of disputing 
in the vicinity of official tribunals that we might call “Litigotiation”, 
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that is the strategies pursuit of settlement through mobilising the 
court process: “adjudication remains a compelling presence even 
when it does not occur”72.   
Besides, whilst a large part of the doctrine strongly concerns 
about the vanishing trial phenomenon73, other part, directed espe-
cially by Owen M. Fiss, considers that alternative dispute resolu-
tions underestimate the value of lawsuits and reduces the social 
function of adjudication to just the resolution of a private dispute.74  
According to Owen M. Fiss, “[adjudication’s purpose is] to ex-
plicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts 
such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and 
to bring reality into accord with them”.75 
Indeed, the settlements are a capitulation to the conditions of 
mass society. In such a context, Courts have a social and a political 
role: they exist to give meaning to public values, not only to resolve 
private disputes. 
Fiss explained with a strong metaphor the relationship between 
an alternative dispute resolution method and the trial: “The differ-
ence between a settlement and a judgment is like the one between 
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a signal and an explanation. Both reveal information but just the 
latter provides a basis for further conversation”76. 
He firmly believed that the confidential and private sphere of 
ADR may curtail the development of law and undermine the prec-
edent-setting role of Courts; “settlements deprive a court of the 
occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpreta-
tion”77. 
However, ADR processes can go beyond an individualistic res-
olution of isolated disputes. David Luban, in fact, revisited Fiss’s 
ideas arguing that Fiss is not against settlement in general, but “it’s 
essential to understand when to settle”78. In other words, the cru-
cial point is not whether to settle but when to do it. 
To this extent, it is better to illustrate two “pure” accounts of 
the legitimacy of government and of the judicial role:  
 
1. the problem-solving conception  
2. the public life conception79 
 
The first idea is the dominant version of state legitimacy in con-
temporary America. It can be shown in an equation like this:  
 
Public : Governmental = Private : Market Relationships 
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In accordance with the Hobbesian thought, the first point of 
view locates human freedom in the private sphere and it recognizes 
the functions of government in wholly pragmatic terms, as inter-
ventions meant to solve problems within civil society that civil so-
ciety cannot solve on its own80. 
The second idea, according to Hannah Arendt, is that public-
life conception locates freedom in the public sphere, not in market 
relationships or personal intimacy81. 
In Luban’s view, Fiss said that because the law is the visible 
residue of public action, the law elevates private disputes into the 
public realm. 
In Owen Fiss’s words: “Civil litigation is an institutional ar-
rangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer 
to our chosen ideals”.  
For the problem-solving conception, by contrast, government 
gets involved only by unhappy necessity in the private ordering of 
human affairs.  
On this view, judicial involvement in a dispute is a necessary 
evil, whereas for the public-life conception it is an essential good.82 
From Fiss’s point of view it can be clear that he is not against 
settlements in general but just against the wrong ones, but, follow-
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ing the public-life conception of legitimacy, it would not be diffi-
cult to have a proper set of criteria for deciding which settlements 
are wrong.83 
According to Luban, the problem-solving conception’s belief 
is that dispute resolution service to individuals should be the pri-
mary function of courts. In addition, facilitating settlement in pri-
vate sphere is healthy because private is the place of freedoms.  
Conversely, the public life conception’s view is that the trial is 
a sign of healthy public sphere, because people need rules and cer-
tainty framework to bargain in shadow of law. Adjudication is the 
process that makes lawyers more litigation savvy and it’s really im-
portant to publicize facts.  
In the common law system, indeed, going to the trial will afford 
so many obstacles because, firstly, most cases do not involve a 
point of law and, secondly, precedent setting is an uncertain and 
expensive business. Likewise, on the one hand litigants are not al-
ways interested in precedent and, on the other hand, lawyers are 
often ethically bound to agree to settlement. 
Thus, precedent and legal rules are public goods.  Although the 
original litigants of the cases purchase the rules, future litigants use 
these rules without paying.  This exemplifies a more general eco-
nomic receipt: absent public intervention, private economic actors 
often have inadequate incentives to produce public goods, because 
it is individually rational to be a free rider”84.  
The question concerning which forum to choose for the reso-
lution of a dispute is a tricky one, due especially to the wide variety 
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of processes that currently can help us for resolving disputes: “peo-
ple make their own settlement, but they do not make it just as they 
please” (adaptation Marx, 1976)85. 
Deciding the dispute resolution forum is something that could 
be established ex ante (when drafting the dispute resolution clause) 
or ex post (once a dispute has already arisen). In the first case, there 
are several options regarding the clause’s redaction and parties can 
either elect one forum or a combination of different forums. The 
starting point is deciding which is the most apposite clause: 
whether an adjudication or a mediation or a negotiation clause 
(Pactum de negotiando) or even an escalation clause86.  
This requires an understanding of the advantages and disad-
vantages of the different forums as, in each case, the transaction 
will be better suited to one or the other. In the latter case, based 
on the assumption that you or your client are firmly interested in 
solving the dispute, two are the primary concepts that you have to 
face: on the one hand the interests and the goals to achieve and, 
on the other hand, the impediments to a settlement.87  
Actually, it’s crucial to reflect on what are your client’s goals 
and the impediments to settlement in order to value what dispute 
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resolution procedure is most likely to achieve those goals and over-
come those impediments.  
David Luban argued that Law must to be seen as a valuable 
public good88.   
According to Linda Mulcahy, we definitively need law to guide 
our behaviour: “courts are the only forum in which there is an ef-
fective motivation to produce precedent for the good of all and 
where the principles established in a judgment are binding on fu-
ture generations”89. 
 
Section 3: The three main forms of Dispute Resolution 
Although our era is characterized by a considerable and sub-
stantial number of processes that are qualified as part of the “arse-
nal” of dispute resolution methodology, it’s easier to focus on the 
primary forms of dispute resolution.  
The primary processes consist of dyadic bargaining (negotiation), 
and third party facilitated approaches (mediation), or third party 
decisional formats (arbitration and adjudication)90. 
The ratio of this “process pluralism” is that “different disputes 
need different processes”. For instance, each of these three forms 
has its own logic, purpose and jurisprudential justification. 
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Firstly, it’s relevant to divide these primary forms and, sec-
ondly, to analyse them by the extent to which the intervention of 
a third party is less or more incisive91. 
 
 
3.1 Negotiation 
Negotiation is the natural expression of a dyadic bargaining, a 
process in which disputing parties attempt to resolve their conflict. 
To do this, the parties are unassisted by a neutral third party, but 
they may be represented by their attorneys. Thus, in this polycen-
tric dispute a main role is played by the human aspect.92 On the 
one hand, this could be helpful, if parties, producing a psycholog-
ical commitment to a mutually satisfactory outcome, try to under-
stand the consequences of the perceived facts and legal issues,93 or 
disastrous, if parties take a hard negotiation position which may 
lead to very unfavourable outcomes.  
 Compared to the other means, negotiation is largely unstructured, 
and as a practical matter, everyone, even if just in an unconscious 
way, engages in some sort of negotiation every day (i.e. family, pro-
fessor, or employer). 
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3.2 Mediation 
By contrast, in a mediation is crucial the role of the third party 
who actively coaxes the disputants towards a settlement.94 This 
person is not a decision maker but, according to Gulliver, he looks 
like a facilitator and adviser95. Indeed, the main function of the me-
diator should be always to improve the communication among the 
parties involved and, when it is necessary, also to “reorient” the 
parties to each other, helping them to find themselves their proper 
way to solve the problem. 
According to De Bono (1986), the role of the mediator could 
be seen as “converting the two-parties dispute into a three - dimen-
sional exploration leading to the design of an outcome” 96.
 Mediation is usually a private process, and tends to be more flex-
ible than other forms of dispute resolution. Even though several 
courts mandate that certain cases go to a preliminary mediation, 
the process is still considered to be a voluntary and a consensual 
one97. This is underlined also because of the parties’ self-determi-
nation and the flexibility of the agreements. 
 
3.3 Adjudication 
Moreover, before introducing the concept of adjudication, it’s 
better to explain the difference between litigation and adjudication. 
This difference could be illustrated as follows: While the litigation 
                                                          
94 Roberts S. & Palmer M., Dispute Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms 
of Dispute Resolution, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 
95 Gulliver, P.H., Disputes and Negotiations: A Cross cultural perspective, 
New York Academic Press, 1979. 
96 Brown, H. & Marriot, A., ADR: Principles and Practice, Sweet & Maxwell, 
2012. 
97 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 90. 
96 
 
refers to the process, the adjudication refers, contrariwise, to full-
dress individualized and formal application of rules by officials in 
a particular litigation98.  
The adjudication’s ratio is about solving definitely a dispute re-
quiring, firstly, fact finding, secondly, the interpretation of contrac-
tual terms and, finally, the application of legal principles. 
Indeed, as a natural consequence, it’s easy to say that arbitration 
is a form of adjudication.  
In the adjudication the function of resolving dispute is dele-
gated to lawyers or court, the outcomes are defined by winner and 
losers, the process is private (arbitration) or public (litigation) and 
follows strict procedural rules. The party who loses the adjudica-
tion can appeal to the appropriate appellate court which will con-
sider only the legal issues in the case. 
 
 
Section 4 List of factors 
 
 
What dispute resolution process is best suited to achieving that 
goal? What alternative options do you have to solve a dispute? 
There are a number of factors parties should consider in selecting 
the best form of settlement. Here I will focus briefly on dozens of 
them. Although a lot of them are not related to law, there are needs 
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and interests which cannot be protected without going to the 
court, under the authority of a judge. 
Before analysing the factors, it is necessary to underline once 
again the importance of your approach and to bear in mind a good 
strategy based on defining your “best alternative to a negotiated 
agreement” (hereafter BATNA) and trying to improve it as much 
as possible. 
With regards to your approach, according to Felstiner, Abel 
and Sarat, it’s crucial: 
to be aware of an injury (Naming), 
to attribute fault to a person, institution or event (Blaming) 
to voice (Claiming).  
Only if your remedy is rejected, you can eventually think which 
is the most suitable forum. 
For what concerns, conversely, your strategy, according to 
Fisher and Uri, “the better your BATNA the better your power”.  
Several mediators argued that it’s always possible, once you 
identified your BATNA, to improve it, so that you can focus on 
your priorities to understand which form is the most convenient. 
 
List of factors: 
 
1. Confidentiality and Ethics 
98 
 
All out-of-court forms of dispute resolution promise some de-
gree of confidentiality. In an arbitration hearing, even if the proce-
dure is as much as like litigation as possible, its most attractive 
characteristic is that it promises to be confidential. 
Communications made during mediation are frequently pro-
tected by evidentiary rules, and are not admitted during a trial 
(without prejudice communication)99. 
 
2. Cost  
Cost is one of the primary reasons given for resorting to an 
alternative dispute resolution method. Any reduced cost may be 
due in part to the reduced time involved. Due to their informality 
and flexibility, and the fact that they can be conducted in any con-
venient location, mediation and negotiation are often less expen-
sive than more elaborate techniques. Although it is often assumed 
that arbitration is also less expensive than litigation, that may not 
always be the case. 
 
3. Speed 
Courts in almost all over the world are overcrowded, and trials 
are delayed. Any other method of dispute resolution would prob-
ably be faster than that. An arbitration hearing may be scheduled 
as soon as convenient for the parties’ and arbitrator’ schedules, 
sometimes in a matter of weeks. Due to its informality and flexi-
bility, mediation is often speedier than more elaborate techniques. 
 
                                                          
99 Brown, H. & Marriot, A., supra note 96. 
99 
 
4. Expertise of third parties  
In adjudication, decisions are made by a judge, or by a jury. In 
arbitration, non-lawyers are often asked to make legal determina-
tions. In mediation, the mediator does not actually make legal de-
terminations, but an unrepresented party may waive legal rights 
without realizing it. There are qualified neutrals experienced in all 
forms of dispute resolution. The real issue is the method used for 
identifying and selecting them. 
 
5. Fairness (fairness of process) 
Parties’ perceptions of procedural fairness have been found to 
have an effect on the acceptance of an unfavourable outcome, and 
on evaluations of the neutral party. Procedural fairness improves 
satisfaction with the resolution, fosters better relationships be-
tween the parties, and prevents the recurrence of the dispute.  
During a mediation, ensuring that parties enter into a fair agree-
ment is not within the power or function of a mediator, but a me-
diator can and need to establish fairness of process as ensuring that 
parties may negotiate and decide freely, preventing power imbal-
ances from distorting the process100. 
 
6. Establishing a precedent 
Despite all the advantages of other forms of dispute resolution, 
only litigation is designed to establish precedent. There are certain 
situations where parties need a determination from the courts. 
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7. Predictability 
Methods with the greatest predictability in their result are those 
that follow precedent.  
 
8. Quality of the judges  
Wherever the quality of court judges is top-class: the judgment 
given in those courts is usually sensible, correct and justifiable. 
 
 
9. Maintenance of relationships 
Court proceedings and arbitration are adversarial in nature, and 
damaging to a relationship. Mediation and negotiation are not. One 
of the objectives of transformative mediation is to maintain, and 
improve, the relationship. 
 
10. Timing 
Mediation, negotiation, and some other less formal methods 
can be used at any time and can be used more than once. Conse-
quently, parties can negotiate or mediate as soon as a claim is filed. 
If there is no settlement, it can be attempted again. Even after a 
court decision, parties frequently mediate when the case is on ap-
peal. 
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Section 5: Criticisms of the trial and the shift towards alterna-
tive dispute resolutions 
 
 
There are too many reproaches concerning the trial’s function. 
A key concern is the fact that parties lose control of dispute reso-
lution when they cede authority to external parties like lawyers and 
judges, which could impose norms and solutions without taking 
care of parties’ wills. Consequently, the law focuses on rights and 
obligations at the expense of parties’ interests.101  
Court based systems can be impersonal, insensitive and inac-
cessible. Moreover, in trial oppositional tactics are encouraged and 
the improvement of these tactics exacerbate conflict. There is a 
reluctant information exchange and settlement occurs at infor-
mation “hot spots” usually associated with litigation deadlines. The 
cross examinations are so rigorous and Courts provide remedies, 
which are always rigid and never towards creative solutions.102 
In addition, we have to think also about the duration of a trial 
and at the costs of all the parties involved. 
These criticisms explain why alternatives to the trial such as 
mediation have developed which have traditionally been under-
pinned by different philosophies of dispute resolution. In many 
                                                          
101 Resnik, J., Secrecy in Litigation: Uncovering, Disclosing and Discovering 
How the Public Dimensions of Court-Based Processes Are at Risk, Kent L. 
Rev. 521, 2006, Vol. 81 2, Available at:  http://scholarship.kent-
law.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol81/iss2/9. 
102 Bilsky, L., Fisher A., Rethinking settlement, Theoretical Inquiries in Law, 
2014. 
102 
 
advanced legal systems across the globe, the use of ADR is now 
such that trials have become very rare occurrences103.  
In such a context the role of the judge should be follow more 
a catalyst conception than the one104, suggested by Fiss, of an “ad-
judicator and remedial architect” which “will bargain against the 
people’ preferences”.105 
These debates raise important questions: what problems with 
adjudication is negotiation and mediation a response to? Are nego-
tiation and mediation suitable forms of dispute resolution for all 
disputes? When determining which form of dispute resolution is 
suitable for a client should we be required to take the collective 
need for adjudication into account? To what extent are negotiation, 
mediation and adjudication alternatives to each other? To what ex-
tent do they rest on completely different ideas about the purpose 
of dispute resolution?106 
The vanishing trial, as above suggested by Marc Galanter, has 
prompted heated debate across jurisdictions about the extent to 
which we should be ensuring that certain cases get to trial.107  
We have to pay attention to the fact that in common law juris-
dictions a diminishing number of cases going to trial may lead to a 
situation where there is no sufficient law for negotiators and me-
diators to bargain in the shadow of. 
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Common law and civilian lawyers have also drawn attention to 
the need for the courts to be seen of being enforcing certain types 
of rights and showing public disapproval of certain types of behav-
iours.108 
On 26 July 1996, Lord Woolf, the Lord Chancellor instructed 
the Master of the Rolls two years before in England and Wales, 
published his Access to Justice Report in which he “identified a 
number of principles the civil justice system should meet to ensure 
access to justice”. 
Those principles can be summarized as follows. 
A civil justice system: 
1. should be just in the results it and they deliver; 
2. should be fair and be seen to be fair; 
3. should ensure litigants have an equal opportunity, regardless of 
their resources, to assert or defend their legal rights; 
4. should ensure that every litigant has an adequate opportunity to 
state his or her own case and answer their opponent’s; 
5. should treat like cases alike (and conversely treat different cases 
differently); 
6. should deal with cases efficiently and economically, in a way 
which is comprehensible to those using the civil justice system 
and which provides litigants with as much certainty as the litiga-
tion permits; and do so within a system best organized to realize 
these principles109. 
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Lord Woolf in his report underlined that “it became increas-
ingly obvious… that the civil justice system was failing most con-
spicuously to meet the needs of litigants”110. 
In consonance with Woolf’s reform courts would be avoided 
wherever possible, litigation will be less adversarial and more co-
operative but principally “less complex”.  
Moreover, the timescale of litigation would be shorter and ver-
dicts more certain. The costs of litigation would be more afforda-
ble and more proportionate to the value and complexity of cases. 
Judges would be deployed effectively so that they can manage 
litigation more effectively. 
As it may be expected, the Woolf’s reform was not enough and 
the progress of Alternative Dispute Resolution, especially the me-
diation, increased more and more in a maturing marketplace, where 
demand and the differing needs of the users were not afforded by 
the trial; as we can easily see in the graphs below.  
                                                          
110 Access to Justice Final Report, by The Right Honourable the Lord Woolf, 
Master of the Rolls, July 1996, Final Report to the Lord Chancellor on the 
civil justice system in England and Wales. 
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The Growth of Mediation CEDR civil mediations 1997-
2006111 
 
Growth in civil and commercial mediation in UK112 
                                                          
111  CEDR Annual Review 2006. www.cedr.com/news/resolutions/Re-
view06.pdf 
112  CEDR Annual Review 2006. www.cedr.com/news/resolutions/Re-
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Section 6: Getting to yes 
 
 
In this section we will be looking at the most common primary 
form of “getting to yes”. Negotiation is an everyday activity: each 
of us is a negotiator in attempting to resolve daily disputes.  
Even if it is often argued that some people are “born negotia-
tors”, no one can deny that that negotiation training can signifi-
cantly improve the chances of succeeding in getting your client a 
good outcome.  
It’s essential to reach a proper preparation in the field of nego-
tiation. Contemporary negotiation theorists and practitioners 
acknowledge that there are a range of different ways of being an 
effective negotiator and that dispute resolution experts need to be 
able to determine what style of negotiation will suit particular par-
ties or particular disputes113. 
 This means that dispute resolution experts need to recognize 
and acquire knowledge about different styles and to be flexible in 
their approach. Approaches to negotiation that rely on the notion 
of a bottom line or strategy that has been fixed in advance are less 
likely to succeed in getting the best deal for their client. Negotiation 
training now favours an approach that views negotiations and me-
diation as cyclical processes rather than linear ones in which strat-
egies need to be re-aligned as you acquire additional information 
from the other side114. The first questions arising when thinking 
                                                          
113 Roberts, S. & Palmer’s, M., supra note 94. 
114 Id. 
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about negotiation are the following: Do I need an intuitive based 
approach or singular approach to a negotiation? What’s the value 
of having advance strategy(s)? What strategy is most likely to 
achieve a result for your client? When might it be appropriate to 
adjust your preferred style? How can you develop strategies so that 
the dispute does not get “locked in” or stuck? How to win a nego-
tiation? 
Before going to the fulcrum of negotiation, it’s crucial to bear 
in mind constantly the importance of analysing the dispute and risk 
involved in a (possible) failure of dispute resolution; the fact that 
you have to understand your needs, preferences and options but 
previously you have to understand the other side’s needs, prefer-
ences and options. Successively, you have always to consider that 
the best outcome is not necessarily who gets the best immediate 
financial deal, it’s better to think in long-term outcomes115. 
Of course, a negotiation works well when non-legal remedies 
required or a speedy solution is required or even when parties are 
evenly balanced and there’s no lack of transparency. 
According to Fisher and Ury, who wrote, possibly the most 
famous book on how to negotiate called Getting to Yes, the parties 
involved in a negotiation have to be open minded; they have to 
focus on inter-dependency; the interest will not be position based; 
both parties have to be proactive and trying to find eventual “ex-
pand the pie” solutions; they have to focus on shared problems 
and joint gains, being prepared to reveals their own needs because 
relational aspects of deal have to be into account 116.  
                                                          
115 Mulcahy, L., supra note 85. 
116 Fisher, R., & Ury, W., supra note 36. -24 
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Moreover, it’s essential to focus on what outcome the parties 
desire rather than what the law can deliver. In other words, it’s 
better to separate the problems from the legal merits of the dispute. 
Therefore, in their book Fisher and Ury suggest to improve 
position without having guarantee that you will win and what you 
have to do if the other side is more powerful. To be a good and 
effective negotiator requires substantial skill.117 
Negotiations may be competitive and integrative: where the is-
sue is division of a fixed asset then competitive approach may be 
the correct one, but when your goal is to preserve good relation-
ships then integrative approach may work better. 
Fisher and Ury dwell on the dyad concept of BATNA-
WATNA (Best and Worst alternative to negotiated agreement). 
What scenario does seem the most realistic? In other words, 
which are the real options you have if negotiations fail? 
It’s really important to assess your own BATNA and WATNA 
in advance of negotiations, to find out as much as possible about 
their secret facts during negotiations, to use the negotiations to try 
and tease out your opponents BATNA and WATNA, to work to 
change the views of an unduly optimistic opponent118. 
According to Fisher and Ury, if you have a good BATNA you 
should reveal it during negotiations, whereas if you have a bad 
BATNA you should be reluctant to reveal it.  
Besides, if both sides have good BATNAs it may lessen the 
chance of an agreement being reached. 
                                                          
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
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The prominence of the language in negotiation is something to 
be reckoned with 119.  
 
 
Section 7: The six phases of negotiation 
 
 
According to De Girolamo, I report below a few sentences 
where it would be easy to feel the “voluntas negotiandi” of the parties 
involved: 
Moving to a procedural approach, it’s possible to disclose the 
existence of a six-phase bidirectional procedural foundation, su-
perimposed by a repetitive procedural arc of phases interacting 
with one another within and during the process. The six stages dis-
closed by the data are:  
1. Unilateral Articulation of Positions, 
2. Information Exchange,  
3. Testing of Positions, 
4. Shift in Position,  
5. Bargaining Proposals and  
                                                          
119 Bazerman, M. & Neale, M., Negotiating rationally, New York: The Free 
Press, 1992. 
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6. Joint Decision-making for Final Agreement120. 
During the first phase (Unilateral Articulation of Positions), the 
parties articulate their opening positions which reflect their views 
about the strengths of their case and the weaknesses of the others. 
In this moment it’s easy to identify a competitive approach among 
the parties that are focusing only on their own positions. 
In the second phase (Information Exchange), it happens the 
selection of information disclosed. The parties discuss facts and 
express what they believe is an appropriate way to resolve the dis-
pute. Again, they are not willing at this stage to accept another view 
of the facts, be influenced by their opponent’s case; they use this 
phase to strengthen their bargaining position, hoping to influence 
the other party as to the merits of their view. 
In this phase the degree of attention, diligence and protection of 
the other party’s convenience will depend on what is imposed or 
authorized by the regulatory system under which the parties nego-
tiate. Of relevance in this sense would be the existence of a legal 
provision generally regulating the negotiation process (which, un-
der Italian Law, is regulated by the general bona fide clause) which 
might imply, in its application, the duty to disclose with reasonable 
care to the other party every relevant, known or even knowable 
information in negotiating the contract.121 
In the third phase, (Testing of Positions), The parties reduce 
the distance not by numbers, but by trying to undermine the 
                                                          
120 De Girolamo, D., The Negotiation Process: Exploring Negotiator Moves 
Through a Processual Framework, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 
2013. 
121 Court of Cassation Ruling n. 19024 of 29 September 2005; Grand Chamber 
of the Court of Cassation Ruling n. 26725 of 19 September 2007, Grand 
Chamber of the Court of Cassation Ruling n. 26724 of 19 September; Court 
of Cassation Ruling n. 24795 of October 2008). 
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other’s confidence in their own case, but still they have not yet 
begun to consider real potential outcomes. It is not until the move-
ment into the next phase that shifts in positions occur. Essentially, 
the parties engage in strategic distributive conduct: the unwilling-
ness to accede to any form of compromise, the demand for unilat-
eral concessions, the unrelenting hold on a positive view of one’s 
case with the accompanying denial of weakness in any form, and 
the need to ensure that the pie is divided unequally-more for one 
than the other122. 
In the fourth phase (Shift in Position), the movement by the 
parties to begin to formulate, articulate, and respond to bargaining 
proposals follows a change that occurs within the parties’ assess-
ments of their positions. This stage must occur before bargaining 
is contemplated. 
The shift is a culminating event, one that may take parties by 
surprise and surreptitiously lead them to the offer and counteroffer 
dance of bargaining proposals or one that occurs as a result of the 
rational assessment of information disclosed during the course of 
the process thus far. 
In the fifth phase, (Bargaining Proposals), it can be seen a shift 
from the competitive mode of the prior phases to a seemingly 
more cooperative approach as the parties seek to find an accepta-
ble outcome. During this stage, parties re-evaluate their expecta-
tions, they assess their opponents' expectations, they speculate on 
the possible reactions to their offers, they formulate offers within 
the contract zone, and they postulate reasons why their offer mer-
                                                          
122 Gifford, D., A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Nego-
tiation, 46 Ohio St. L.J., 1985; Menkel-Meadow, C., Toward Another View of 
Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, Ucla L. Rev., 1983-84. 
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its acceptance. (Phenomenon of exchange of offers and counter-
offers, according to Schelling we can entitle this phase as “pure 
bargaining”)123. 
Here, the parties are balancing between two goals: to maintain 
bargaining strength and to reach agreement. On the one hand, in 
seeking agreement, they desire the most advantageous bargain they 
can get and in this way they are at odds with each other. On the 
other, they both realize there must be compromise to reach agree-
ment124. 
Finally, in the last phase (Joint Decision-making for Final 
Agreement) a cooperative effort is clearly evident. The parties 
work together to formalize the details of the agreement and the 
arrangements necessary for the agreement to be finalized. 
It is only in the final phase that problem-solving and coopera-
tion dominate. 
 
 
Section 8: the four barriers of negotiation 
 
 
Indeed, final agreement is reached when the parties sign the 
agreement, either in each other’s presence or alone. 
                                                          
123 Schelling, T., The Strategy of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1980. 
124 Lord Woolf M.R., supra note 53. -14 
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During a negotiation it’s really imperative for all the parties in-
volved to know from the very beginning which are the possible 
barriers that may lead to a fail in settlement. 
Here below I will analyse a few of them. 
According to Mnookin, there are at least four barriers that we 
have to take into account for exploring why negotiations some-
times fail, based on different perspectives125. 
1. The first one is a strategic barrier, based on game theory and the 
economic analysis of bargaining126.  
What unites all negotiations is the tension between the cooper-
ative interest (discovering shared interests and maximizing joint 
gains) and the competitive interest: (maximizing one’s own gains 
where more for one side will necessarily mean less for the other).  
A strategic behaviour could lead to inefficient outcomes, espe-
cially because of the information asymmetry: each side to a nego-
tiation characteristically knows some relevant facts that the other 
side does not know127. 
2. The second barrier concerns the relationship between the princi-
pal and his agent. As a matter of fact, in many disputes, principals 
do not negotiate on their own behalf but instead act through 
agents who may have somewhat different incentives than their 
principals.  
                                                          
125 Mnookin, R., supra note 67. 
126 Dixit, A. & Nalebuff, B., Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in 
Business, Politics, and Everyday Life, 1991. This barrier relates to an underly-
ing dilemma inherent in the negotiation process. 
127 Rasmusen, E., Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, 
1989. 
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This is the so called “principal/agent problem” in law and eco-
nomics and transaction cost economics128.  
It is not simple to align perfectly the incentives for an agent 
with the interests of the principal. 
3. The third barrier is cognitive, and relates to how the human mind 
processes information, especially in evaluating risks and uncer-
tainty.129 There are a lot of biases related to a negotiation but ac-
cording to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky two of them are 
truly relevant:  
a. Loss aversion. 
Before speaking about loss aversion it is better to start with the 
phenomenon called “risk aversion”: most people will take a sure 
thing over a gamble, even where the gamble may have a somewhat 
higher “expected” payoff. 
For instance, in a group of 4 people in which everyone could 
have $50 today or just one of them $200 tomorrow, the over-
whelming majority of people would choose the sure gain of $50, 
even though the “expected value” of the second, just possible but 
not sure, alternative, $200, is slightly more.  
In other words, most of people would not gamble for a gain, 
even though the expected value of $200 exceeds the sure thing of 
$50. 
                                                          
128 Williamson, O., The Economic Institution of Capitalism, 1985; Milgrom, 
P., and Roberts, J., Economics, Organizations and Management, 1992. 
129 Kahneman, D., et al., Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
1982. 
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On the other hand, the phenomenon called “loss aversion” il-
lustrates that most of people would gamble to avoid a sure loss, 
even though, on the average, the future possible loss is higher.  
For instance, in the same group of 4 people in which everyone 
has to spend $50 today or just one of them $200 tomorrow the 
overwhelming majority of people would choose to gamble, even 
though the “expected loss” of the second, just possible but not 
sure, alternative is slightly more.  
In other words, most of people would gamble for a sure loss, 
even though the expected possible value slightly exceeds the sure 
loss. 
Thus, comparing risk aversion and loss aversion after experi-
mental evidence suggests that the proportion of people who will 
gamble to avoid a loss is much greater than those who would gam-
ble to realize a gain130. 
b. Framing effects 
One of the most striking features of loss aversion is that 
whether something is viewed as a gain or loss - and what kind of 
gain or loss it is considered - depends upon a -reference point, and 
the choice of a reference point is sometimes manipulable131. 
                                                          
130 Id. 
131 Id.: e.g. Imagine that you park your car in Cleveland and make a horrifying 
discovery – you’ve lost the tickets. Assume that you cannot be admitted to the 
symphony without tickets. Also imagine that someone is standing in front of 
the Symphony Hall offering to sell two tickets for $100. You have a choice. 
You can use the $100 you intended for the fancy dinner to buy the tickets to 
hear the concert, or you can skip the concert and simply go to dinner. What 
would you do? 
Consider a second hypothetical. After you park your car, you look in your 
wallet and you realize to your horror that the $100 is gone, but the tickets are 
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The point is that whether or not an event is framed as a loss 
can often affect behaviour. This powerful idea concerning “fram-
ing” has important implications for the resolution of disputes. 
4.  The fourth and final barrier, “reactive devaluation”, relates to the 
fact that bargaining is an interactive social process in which each 
party is constantly drawing inferences about the intentions, mo-
tives, and good faith of the other132. 
According to a large number of experiments conducted by Lee 
Ross, a given compromise proposal is rated less positively when 
proposed by someone on the other side than when proposed by a 
neutral or an ally.  
Mr. Ross and hi team also demonstrated that a concession that 
is actually offered is rated lower than a concession that is withheld, 
and that a compromise is rated less highly after it has been put on 
the table by the other side than it was beforehand.133 
 
 
                                                          
there. In front of the Symphony Hall is a person holding a small sign indicat-
ing she would like to buy two tickets for $100. What do you do? Do you sell 
the tickets and go to dinner? Or do you instead skip dinner and simply go to 
the concert? 
Experimental research suggests that in the first example many more people 
will skip the symphony and simply go out to dinner, while in the second ex-
ample, the proportions are nearly reversed; most people would skip dinner 
and go to the concert. The way we keep our mental accounts is such that, in 
the first instance, to buy the tickets a second time would somehow be to over-
spend our ticket budget. And, yet, an economist would point out that the two 
situations are essentially identical because there is a ready and efficient market 
in which you can convert tickets to money or money to tickets. 
132 Ross, L. & Stillinger, C., Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 1991. 
133 Id. 
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Section 9: Ten reasons to mediate 
 
 
As mentioned in section 3, with regards to a third party ap-
proach I will focus on mediation, but what is a mediation in simple 
words? According to the Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution 
(CEDR), mediation is “A flexible process conducted confidentially 
in which a neutral person assists the parties in working towards a 
negotiated agreement of a dispute or difference, with the parties in 
ultimate control of the decision to settle and the terms of resolu-
tion.”134 
Although part of the doctrine used to distinguish among three 
forms of mediation (evaluative facilitative and transformative), I 
prefer to discern between facilitative and transformative (following 
the scheme indicated by Brown and Marriott)135. 
Following Brown and Marriott, I strongly believe that the dif-
ference between evaluative and facilitative is just a false dichotomy: 
“all mediation is facilitative, since that is an integral aspect of the 
process, with parties for example being assisted in communicating 
and negotiating effectively”136. 
In addition, “an evaluative mediator gives advice, makes assess-
ments, states opinions, including opinions on the likely court out-
come, proposes a fair or workable resolution to an issue or the 
                                                          
134 www.cedr.com/solve/mediation/ 
135 Brown, H. & Marriot, A., supra note 92. 
136Id. 
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dispute, or presses the parties to accept a particular resolution … 
but those activities are inconsistent with the role of a mediator”137. 
Love underlines this theory based on ten reasons. 
Reason 1: 
The role/task of an evaluator (arbitrator, judge or neutral ex-
pert) and of a facilitator (mediator) are different and thus the me-
diator risks losing neutrality and losing focus in his task. 
Reason 2: 
Evaluation promotes positioning and polarization, which are 
antithetical to the goals of mediation. 
When parties are in the presence of an evaluator, they make 
themselves look as good as possible. They do not make offers of 
compromise or reveal their hand for fear that it weakens the eval-
uator’s perception of the strength of their case. They are in a com-
petitive mind-set seeking to capture the evaluator’s favour and win 
the case.” 
When parties are in presence of a facilitator, “an atmosphere 
of respectful collaboration is a necessary foundation for creative 
problem-solving” is needed. 
Reason 3: 
Assuming a specific position violates the ethical mediation 
codes. 
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators highlight party 
self-determination as a fundamental principle to mediation, and the 
                                                          
137 Love, L., The top ten reasons why mediators should not evaluate, Florida 
State University Law Review, 1996. 
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committee to the standards rejected that mediation could evalua-
tive stating that the mediator should rather refer a dispute to the 
more evaluative forums than becoming evaluative. 
Vice versa for arbitrators (they should not assume a neutral 
role) which is based on the notion that the arbitrator may be im-
properly influenced by the settlement discussions. So why should 
this rationale not be applied to mediators? 
Reason 4: 
By accepting that mediators may be evaluative, they must be 
lawyers; but this would weaken the field 
If the field is the layer’s, then they would probably pull media-
tion into an adversarial paradigm. 
Reason 5: 
There is insufficient protection against wrong settlements 
You can appeal a judgment, but you can’t appeal a settlement 
And mediators are in most cases immune from liability for 
careless opinions (quasi-judicial immunity). 
Reason 6: 
The disputing world needs alternative paradigms 
There are so many evaluative kinds of dispute resolution; we 
need an alternative – the “collaborative paradigm of mediation” 
Mediation offers a dispute resolution “through which parties 
are taught how to resolve their disputes, listen to each other differ-
ently, broaden their own capacities for understanding and collabo-
rating, and create resolutions that build relationships, generate 
more harmony, and are win-win”. 
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Evaluative mediators “trash” the parties’ cases, predicting loss 
and risk if litigation is pursued. They “bash” settlement proposals 
that the other side will not accept. We lose a great deal if mediation 
becomes a mere adjunct of the adversarial norm. Having mediators 
use evaluation as a technique to get movement takes us in that di-
rection.  
Reason 7: 
Evaluation detract the focus away from party responsibility for 
critical evaluation, re-evaluation and creative solutions 
As a society, we need to think higher levels of creativity. And 
accepting evaluative mediation is way thinking backwards, not for-
wards. 
“… Evaluative mediation pulls mediation away from creativity 
and into the adversarial frame. If we are to continue to survive and 
evolve as a species, we need to nurture the processes that tap our 
affinity to create and imagine”. 
Reason 8: 
Evaluation can stop negotiation 
The parties may use the mediator’s opinion as leverage in ne-
gotiations. 
Reason 9: 
A uniform understanding of mediation is critical to the devel-
opment of the field 
Studies show that the term mediation is a used in an extraordi-
nary variety of ways. A uniform understanding will make parties 
more comfortable choosing ADR. 
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Reason 10: 
Mixed processes can be useful, but call them what they are! 
When lawyers and scholars use term like med-arb, neg-med and 
mini-trial, they must make sure that it is correctly labelled. 
A properly labelled process promotes integrity, disputant satis-
faction and uniform practice. 
 
 
10. Facilitative mediation 
 
 
The facilitative mediator’s skills are, first of all, to be an impar-
tial third party, to speak in a confidential way, to operate in a secure 
negotiation environment, to be selected by the parties or nomi-
nated by a mediation agency. 
The characteristics of this process are the following: 
Firstly, the authority of the mediator derives from parties. The 
parties involved, with the help of the mediator will empower them-
selves. It’s important to underline that the mediator has no author-
ity to make a determination of outcome, but he will facilitate the 
negotiation among the parties, which will hopefully reach a con-
sensual resolution or an agreement. 
In this type of mediation, we are able to distinguish two stages: 
one before mediation commences and one during it. 
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The following framework provides a structural overview of the 
facilitative mediator’s role before mediation commences: 
Engage the parties in the mediation forum – provision of in-
formation  
Obtain commitment and agree mediation “rules”  
Preliminary communication and preparation 
Organisation of joint meeting rooms and caucus space 
Meet and greet at staggered times  
Contrariwise, during the mediation the third impartial party has 
to establish the issues and prepare the agenda, to gather infor-
mation, to conduct a substantive negotiation, to deal with the pos-
sible impasse, in particular with creative solutions and to conclude 
the mediation, recording the outcome. 
The transformative mediation was developed by Proff. Robert 
Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger, the authors of The Promise of 
Mediation, a key text in the field of alternative dispute resolution 
methods138. 
Bush and Folger consider mediation something more than a 
problem-solving method: they fiercely believe that the transform-
ative approach goes deeper and has the capacity to change not only 
how people behave in a particular conflict but also in their future 
life. 
                                                          
138 Baruch Bush, R.A. & Folger, J.P., The Promise of Mediation; The Trans-
formative Approach to Conflict, revised edition, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 
2005. 
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They said that parties “learn how to draw on those positive 
capacities in dealing with life’s problem and in relating to oth-
ers”139. 
This particular approach has two main goals and no one of 
these includes the settlement of dispute (to settle is not viewed as 
a priority): 
Empowerment: “helping parties to find their own strength to 
explore goals, resources and options and make their own deci-
sions”. 
Recognition: “giving due consideration and recognition to the 
views of the other party to the conflict: the evocation in individuals 
of acknowledgment and empathy for the situation and problems 
of others”140. 
The following framework provides a structural overview of the 
transformative mediator’s role: 
Parties structure process and outcome. 
Aims at maximum empowerment and long lasting personal 
change. 
Parties must meet together because of need for joint recognition. 
Focus on opportunity to hear and understand another point of 
view. 
Telling can be cathartic and repair relationships. 
Opens up emotional space for apology. 
                                                          
139 Id. 
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Part of therapeutic justice movement. 
From the idea of the transformative mediation and the one of 
a narrative mediation, Gary Paquin & Linda Harvey spoke about 
“therapeutic jurisprudence”, which the main goal is to find ways in 
which the legal system can have a positive emotional impact on 
people, or have less of an aversive influence. It emphasises the im-
portance of parties’ stories.141 
 
 
Section 11: Narrative and transformative mediation 
 
 
11.1. Narrative mediation 
Focuses on the dispute as just being one view of the relation-
ship between the disputants. The mediator helps the parties de-
velop an alternative story of their relationship, one that might en-
courage reasonable trust. 
Based on four criticisms of facilitative and evaluative media-
tion: 
 Parties’ lack of entitlement in a dispute. 
 The assumption that mediators are neutral and leave their own 
“stories” at the door. 
                                                          
141 Paquin, G., & Harvey, L., Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Transformative me-
diation and narrative mediation: A natural connection, Florida Coastal Law 
Review, 2001. 
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 The assumption that the mediator can stay neutral and act in the 
manner of the scientist-practitioner. 
 The belief that mediators are able to separate the process of me-
diation from the content of the messages offered by the parties.  
Counteracts this through questioning, which facilitates parties 
developing their own stories. Mediators help parties examine the 
meaning in the messages they are saying, and the origin of the ideas 
that make up that meaning. 
Process: Engagement; deconstructing the dominant story; and 
constructing alternative stories. 
 
11.2. Transformative mediation 
Encourages people to clarify their positions in the dispute and 
to open up opportunities for each to hear and consider the other’s 
viewpoints. 
Based on the objectives of providing opportunities for empow-
erment and recognition. 
Process: Introduction; micro focusing on parties’ issues; en-
couraging deliberation and choice making; and fostering perspec-
tive-taking. 
The difference between the narrative and the transformative 
approach is that transformative mediators look at changing the cul-
tural worldview through the parties’ experience of resolving con-
flict; while narrative mediators seek to expose the impact of this 
cultural worldview, by having the parties deconstruct the dominant 
social discourses in order to resolve their dispute. 
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Paquin & Harvey based on these two methods created their 
own hybrid method based on the strengths of both models: 
They believed in expanding transformative work by providing 
the more specific techniques of narrative therapy, but still retaining 
a focus on helping the parties become empowered and recognising 
each other’s position.142 
 
 
Section 12: Riskin’s grid  
 
 
As we said in the Section 8, sometimes negotiation fails because 
of some barriers,143 and the parties involved may go to an impasse. 
The mediator may solve the situation with creative solutions 
and going over these barriers. In particular, he may help in putting 
more information on the table or may also help in perceiving each 
other more fully and accurately. 
Thus, the parties will have more power control with the direct 
effect that there will be a greater degree of participation during this 
process and a fuller opportunity to express themselves and to com-
municate their views. 
The outcome effects are valued by parties. 
The Mediator’s role is twofold: on the one hand, he has to in-
crease the level of parties’ participation and their control of the 
                                                          
142 Id. 
143 Roberts, S. & Palmer’s, M., supra note 94. 
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mechanism, and, on the other hand, he has to improve the quality 
of communication144. 
In other words, he has to support parties to their own deliber-
ation and to enhance of their participation, control and self-deter-
mination over the process. 
With regards to the interests in play, according to Riskin, it’s 
better to divide them in four levels145: 
Level 1 – Litigation issues – The primary goal of mediation in 
this level is to settle the matter at hand through an agreement. 
Level 2 – Business Interests – This level focuses on the pro-
longed interests and life of the business such as a long lasting rela-
tionship between the parties, profitability, reputation etcetera. 
Level 3- Personal Issues – This focuses on solving the personal 
and emotional issues of the individuals within the party organiza-
tions. These personal issues may range from humiliation, anger, 
anxiety, or loss of self-esteem. The mediator must focus on solving 
these problems and removing these barriers to mediation. 
Level 4 – Community interests – This is the broadest level of 
interests such as setting precedents for the community with similar 
issues and the focus is on improving the community. 
                                                          
144 Bush, R., What do we need a mediator for? Mediation’s value added for 
negotiators, Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution, 1996 Vol. 12 1, 1-36. 
145  Riskin, L., Understanding Mediators’ orientations, strategies and tech-
niques: A grid for the perplexed, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 1996, Vol. 
1 7, 7-51. 
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Moreover, Riskin intended to develop a categorisation system 
for different variations of mediation: 
Figure 14146 
1) Evaluative Narrow – to help party better understand their position, 
the mediator stresses the outcome of litigation and what he consid-
ers that is likely to occur is what he will emphasize that the parties. 
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2) Evaluative Broad – Med educates themselves about the underlying 
interests of the parties, they predict the impact of not settling, they 
develop offers focusing more on company interests, they urge the 
parties to accept their proposals. 
 
3) Facilitative Narrow – the mediator asks questions to help the parties 
understand the legal positions of the parties, these can be in the form 
of private caucuses they help the parties develop their own narrow 
proposals.  
 
4) Facilitative Broad – They help the parties understand the underlying 
interests of both the parties. They help the parties develop broad and 
interests based options for settlement. They help the parties evaluate 
proposals. 
 
To this extent, Riskin illustrated also the mediator’s techniques 
but it’s really important to underline that mediators do not always 
fit cleanly in a category and they sometimes shift category in the 
course of the mediation: 
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Figure 15147 
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Evaluative narrow – to help parties understand strengths and 
weaknesses of positions as well as likely outcomes of litigation. 
 
Facilitative-Narrow – to educate parties on strengths and weak-
nesses of their claim and consequences of failing to settle. 
 
Evaluative Broad – the strategy is to learn about circumstances 
and underlying interests. 
 
Facilitative-Broad – to help participants define subject matter 
of mediation in terms of underlying interests, and to help de-
velop/choose solutions responding to the interests. 
 
In accordance with Riskin, here I underline the advantages and 
disadvantages of various approaches148. 
 
In the first approach, the so called Narrow Problem Definition, 
the advantages are the increasing chances of resolution, the time 
reduction and the possibility of keeping proceeding relatively sim-
ple. On the other hand, the disadvantages are the increasing 
chances of impasse, with little creativity and this kind of approach 
does not address long-term mutual interests. 
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In the second approach, the so called Broad Problem Defini-
tion, the advantages are the accommodation of parties’ underlying 
interests, the increment of the likelihood of settlement, the time 
reduction and the reduction of chances of impasse, with a high 
creativity. On the other hand, the disadvantages are the percentage 
increase of chances of impasse, a focus on unnecessary issues and 
a possibility of making parties and lawyers uncomfortable not only 
with the with process but also with the atmosphere. 
 
In the third approach, the so called Evaluative Approach, the 
advantages are the removal of decision making burden from par-
ties and lawyers. On the other hand, the disadvantages are the pos-
sibility of impairing parties’ faith in mediator’s neutrality, the re-
striction of parties’ flexibility, the drop of parties’ participation, a 
lowering satisfaction, a reduction in opportunities for changing and 
growing. 
 
In the fourth approach, the so called Facilitative Approach, the 
advantages are a higher party participation and a higher control, 
the parties are allowed to fine-tune problem definition and to 
strengthen their communication, an agreement often reflective of 
parties’ interests and an improvement on the abilities for parties of 
working together. On the other hand, the disadvantages are that 
the parties’ lack of knowledge may impede ability to reach optimal 
agreement and the possibility of time wastage and incoherence 
with parties’ underlying interests. 
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Riskin’s grid received a lot of critics. One of the main was to 
one of Prof. Joseph Stulberg.149 
Stulberg said that the Riskin model can be used as a description 
model, but only if we accept 4 false assumptions.  
 
The assumptions are:  
 
1. You are unable to critique or criticize the intervener per-
formance. The grid assumes that the only test of success is whether 
the mediator convinced the parties to accept an outcome. In the-
ory, a mediator could have bullied his or her way to an outcome 
but the grid overlooks improper performance. 
2. The grid assumes the client is able to dictate the mediation 
style. The problem with the grid is that it assumes that the client is 
able to demand that the mediator conduct him or herself a partic-
ular way – overlooks the mediator’s style. 
3. Some styles of mediation may favour one party over an-
other. Some styles favour the characteristics of one party of an-
other. Therefore, if you follow the description, it may lead to ineq-
uitable mediation. 
4. Limit the possible range of the uses of mediation. 
The image the grid puts of mediation is another form of trial 
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Stulberg also criticizes the definition of facilitative and evalua-
tive because it distorts the strategies, techniques, and theories that 
distinguishes them. Stulberg argued that any mediation that is eval-
uative is not consistent with mediation.150 
 
 
Section 13: Conclusion 
 
 
In trying to conceptualise what exactly alternative dispute res-
olutions or ADR are the concept of “getting to yes” is useful. It 
allows most disputes to be viewed under a single concept, some-
thing that no legal approach appears able to offer. Getting to yes de-
scribes the ability of find the best way for people to deal with their 
differences by a fair and mutually satisfactory agreement. A practi-
cal method, defined by the authors of one of the all-time bestsel-
ling books on negotiation, able to negotiate an agreement amicably, 
without giving in, based on the work of the Harvard Negotiation 
Project, a group that deals with all levels of negotiation and conflict 
resolution. 
Such instruments are often criticized because of their perceived 
low level of impact upon individual citizens. Their impact is con-
sidered low because individuals are sceptical and reluctant towards 
all the methods described above for solving their disputes other 
than litigation – and for litigation I mean not only cases that actu-
ally go to trial but also lawsuits that are settled before they get to 
court – for having their rights to be respected. This stance has to 
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be overcome, especially now that traditional adversary method in 
civil cases may lead not only to theoretical but also practical prob-
lems. First, it is not the most effective way to resolve some kinds 
of disputes. Second, it can be made more effective for most kinds 
of disputes by borrowing certain of the non-adversarial features of 
other forms of dispute resolution. Third, from both the societal 
and the individual perspective, we may no longer be able to afford 
it in its undiluted form151.  
As a consequence of this limited impact on individuals, there 
is, in general, an encouragement of alternative dispute resolution 
methods, on the one hand, by international organisations, such as 
the European Union, and, on the other hand, at a national level, by 
every national judicial system. 
The use of ADR methods in reality however often involves 
more than the mere idea that the truth will emerge when opposing 
sides present their cases as aggressively as possible. ADR can often 
be infused with advice, efforts at persuasion and they are all at-
tempts to save legal and managerial time and money, and they all 
try to take at least some of the edge off the adversarial attitude.152  
The possibility of using ADR instruments to settle disputes as 
painlessly as possible needs not only a good communication, but 
also, some degree of trust, and. The creation of trust is central to 
the design of many ADR techniques. 
Given that the traditional adversary system of dispute resolu-
tion nurtures animosity, distortion, and distrust, the contention of 
ADR instruments is based on the trust and dialogue. The ability of 
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Review, 1990. https://hbr.org/1990/01/five-ways-to-keep-disputes-out-of-
court 
152 Id. 
136 
 
individuals to not be simply the beneficiaries but also the produc-
ers of the agreement. 
This chapter has presented a small overview of the three main 
ADR methods, discussed in section 3, starting by the description, 
in section 1, of the perception of an injury and the process of Nam-
ing – Blaming – Claiming that will lead individuals to the birth of 
a dispute. In section 2, I clarified the idea of Litigotiation, dwelling 
on the factors to bear in mind when the parties have to choose 
which one is the most appropriate method for themselves, in sec-
tion 4. In section 5, I analysed the main critics towards the trial 
compared to ADR and from section 6 to section 12, I focused en-
tirely on two of the three form illustrated in section 3, negotiation 
and mediation. 
In order to illustrate the importance of choosing the best 
method for solving a dispute, this chapter presented in details two 
different ways in which ADR are often used for getting to yes. 
(i) Negotiation  
As suggested by Fisher and Ury, individuals first have to deal with 
relational issues, including considering each party’s perception – 
for example by reversing roles – seeking to make negotiation pro-
posals consistent with the other party’s interests, making emotions 
explicit through active listening. In negotiation, there are multiple, 
shared, compatible, and conflicting interests. Identifying shared 
and compatible interests as a “common ground” is helpful in es-
tablishing a groundwork for additional negotiation discussions. 
Fisher and Ury recommend to do, firstly, a brainstorming, in other 
words to develop multiple solution options prior to evaluation of 
those options and, secondly, a selection for decision-making, based 
upon objective criteria as precedent, tradition, a course of dealing, 
outside recommendations, or the flip of a coin. 
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 (ii) Mediation 
Differently from negotiation, the parties agree to work with a 
facilitator or mediator to resolve a dispute. Mediation has a special 
and distinctive use: it is generally employed when a process has 
reached an impasse or major breakdown. Sometimes consensus-
building efforts lead to an impasse and this is especially true for 
controversial or complex projects. In such cases, both agencies and 
participants need another means to determine which way to go. 
Mediation has been employed in transportation projects and 
long-range planning studies where profound disagreement has oc-
curred. Any mediation involves a trained, impartial third party to 
help reach consensus on substantive issues at disagreement among 
conflicting parties. A mediator can be from within or outside an 
agency but must be neutral and perceived as such by all parties. He 
frequently creates a draft working document that is modified 
through discussions with all parties to reflect developing points of 
consensus. A mediator is able to work on a single issue on a short-
term basis, with the possible option to remain involved as a moni-
tor of future activity or implementation. 
Whilst on the one hand it may seem pointless for lawyers and 
third parties to only help the parties in creating their own settle-
ment based on an economic and non-legal sphere, the ability of 
these individuals to express their attitudes and opinions in such 
area is, on the other hand, seen as an integral aspect of these ADR 
processes. A real benefit of using these methods is the fact that 
even when it fails to produce an acceptable resolution, the effort 
will not be wasted. Most of the time and money already spent on 
the unsuccessful ADR procedure will be useful in preparing for 
trial. 
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The fact that no single ADR method is necessarily best, and 
since sometimes no ADR method will work, choices about ADR 
should take into account several key factors, as described in section 
4. 
In addition, in order for the people to be able to choose the 
best method for a proper settlement they need to know how fun-
damental will be the role of a third party, particularly in a negotia-
tion or in a mediation, as observed by Black and Baumgartner.  
The aim of this chapter was to show some of the varying ADR 
in which a dispute can be solved by the parties, especially being 
themselves part of the solution and not just let a third party to de-
cide their own problems and differences. The examples provided 
demonstrate the variety of methods that, although called alterna-
tive, they seem to be, in more than one occasion, the most appro-
priate153 to resolve certain types of disputes, such as family disputes 
or those of e-commerce. 
This possible appropriate use of ADR demonstrates that our 
system needs not only to implement these “alternative” forms but 
also to stimulate the dissemination of several positive results which 
could be achieved by the use of this kind of methodologies instead 
of the traditional ways. 
Using the traditional courts in all cases would simply not be 
feasible, most notably because it would prevent the parties from 
being the main characters to protect their interests, especially the 
most sensitive issues. Given these opportunities to both parties it 
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to suggest that processes like mediation need not be viewed as alternative to 
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is therefore necessary to guide them through a mutual solution, an 
approach which could be offered to parties online or offline. This 
“online approach” to guide the parties will take place in chapter 3, 
with reference to the notion of online dispute resolution system, 
in particular as meant by Steven J. Brams (introduced in chapter 1). 
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Chapter 3 
 
Online Dispute Resolution 
 
 
 
 
Tom Peters: “Under-
promise; over-deliver”. 
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Chapter Aims 
•  An introduction to the concept of Online Dispute Resolu-
tion. 
•  Making the reader aware of what differences ODR from 
ADR. 
• Describe two types of ODR: E-mediation and E-negotiation. 
•  Describe the application of these principles into the ODR 
field 
•  Describe actual ODR platforms, developed into the EU do-
main and possible new application of fair division principles 
into these platforms 
 
Sections: 
 
Section 0: Introduction 
Section 1: the state of the art of ODR 
Section 2: ODR benefits 
Section 3: Online negotiation (E-Negotiation) 
Section 4: Online mediation (E-Mediation) 
Section 5: ODR platforms  
Section 6: EU platform 
Section 7: Conclusions 
Section 0: Introduction  
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The past twenty years have seen increasingly rapid advances in 
the field of Online Dispute Resolution (hereafter ODR). 
Nowadays that our society has embraced technology so thor-
oughly, many questions have been raised about how these technol-
ogies should assist parties in solving their disputes. 
At the very beginning the first platforms of online dispute res-
olution simply replicated face-to-face dispute resolution ap-
proaches online.  
On the other hand, Frank Sander, since the Pound Conference 
in 1976, envisioned a courthouse with many doors, each leading to 
a resolution process appropriate for a different kind of dispute. 
Doors that can be customized to individual disputes on demand.  
In addition, according to an article written by Colin Rule on 
“Dispute Resolution Magazine” last Winter 2015: “Experience 
quickly demonstrated that online dispute resolution required new 
approaches to reach its full potential. For example, ODR is push-
ing practitioners to break down some of the silos we have con-
structed within the face-to-face dispute resolution field. Instead of 
bright lines between diagnosis, negotiation, mediation, arbitration, 
and ombuds (terms parties often don’t understand), many online 
disputants prefer a seamless progression from communication to 
evaluation, perhaps within hours”.154 
                                                          
154 Rule, C., Technology and the Future of Dispute Resolution, Dispute Res-
olution Magazine, 2015, 21(2). Retrieved on 10 October 2015 from 
www.americanbar.org/publications/dispute_resolution_maga-
zine/2015/winter/technology-and-the-future-of-dispute-resolution.html. 
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However, Online Dispute Resolution is not a good fit with 
every dispute. Because of this statement, it is crucial that Dispute 
Resolution professionals should know how to use technology 
when it is appropriate and avoid using it when it is not. 
Online Dispute Resolution will be the normal answer to future 
disputes: not controversial at all or even seen as particularly inno-
vative. 
In this chapter, I will focus on the state of the art of Online 
Dispute Resolution and their benefits (section 1 and 2 respec-
tively), which may help the parties in different ways to reach an 
agreement. 
Moreover, in the following sections, I will focus on the two 
main developed ODR systems: I will examine specifically the 
online negotiation in section 3 and the online mediation in section 
4. 
Finally, in section 5, I will analyse the existing platforms, focus-
ing my attention in section 6 on the EU platform (opened last 15th 
of February).  
This chapter will be a right introduction to the use of algo-
rithms in online dispute resolution. A use that I will treat analyti-
cally in chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
Section 1: the state of the art of ODR 
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Internet and cyberspace in general is continuing to evolve and 
the use and the deployment of new communication tools is in-
creasing. Like all the evolutions, it does not bring just a positive 
trend.  
Of course communication technologies and speed are soared 
and now it’s almost everywhere possible to virtually communicate 
synchronously and asynchronously, but this will not imply that the 
web will be always a harmonious place. 
Obviously, since the World Wild Web was invented in 1989 
and the online population at that time was not willing to generate 
a range or a quantity of conflicts that would suggest something 
different from the physical and concrete dispute resolution meth-
ods and entities. 
E-commerce disputes, privacy and copyrights are currently 
common disorders characterised by the online field and people 
ought to have an easy and safe mean to solve eventually their dis-
agreements. 
Traditionally the online population would often find ways to 
avoid the solution of the potential conflicts which could be arise in 
the web domain just in the physical world entities. 
On the other hand, as a consequence of these needs’ safeguard, 
it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the progression of 
Online Dispute Resolution multifaceted phenomenon.  
Even if the term ODR was coined in the mid-1990s what is 
lacking is a cogent and univocal theoretical base. 
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Online Dispute Resolution can broadly be defined as the use 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution techniques over the internet.155 
Since its origin, ODR was focused on disputes related to online 
activities, but now this method is also applied in offline disputes. 
As remarked by Katsh, “the marketplace for ODR is now of-
fline disputes as well as those originating online and public sector 
disputes as well as those originating in the private sector”. 
Indeed, currently it is barely preferable to make a distinction 
between proceedings that rely heavily on online technology and 
proceedings that do not.156 
Both, ADR and ODR, especially form the EU point of view, 
they are means of securing greater access to justice and they have 
to be implemented to foster this service to citizens. 
Basically, ODR differs from ADR in one important aspect, as 
ADR typically refers to processes. As many experts in the field of 
ODR already said, one perspective is that ODR is not merely a 
useful tool to cases involving small dollar amounts, distant parties, 
and often relatively obscure issues.157  
ODR is, instead, a natural evolution of the previous ADR trend 
using alternative approaches across a wide range of civil do-
mains.158 
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156 Hörnle, J., Cross-Border Internet Dispute Resolution. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2009. 
157 Wahab, M., Katsh, E. & Rainey D., Online Dispute Resolution: Theory and 
Practice, Eleven International Publishing, 2012. 
158 Ebner, N., Zeleznikow, J., Fairness, Trust and Security in Online Dispute 
Resolution, Journal of Public Law and Policy. Available at: http://digitalcom-
mons.hamline.edu/jplp/vol36/iss2/6 
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A considerable amount of literature has been published on 
Online Dispute Resolution especially in the last few years, but a 
seminal book still remains “Online Dispute Resolution” by Katsh 
and Rifkin.159 
They were the first in observing the fact that our society was 
creating a huge number of disputes born online with no practical 
way for the parties in engaging in traditional face-to-face solutions. 
They introduced the concept of Online Dispute Resolution as a 
“fourth party”. The other three parties may be complemented with 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT).160  
Technology is the “fourth party” in a dispute: it is a another 
participant at the negotiating table. Just picture that the first two 
parties are the two disputants, the third part is the human negotia-
tor/mediator and technology is the fourth party, such as a “friendly 
and patient robot”.161  
The fourth party’ theory is a clear metaphor which stresses how 
technology can be as influential as to change the traditional three 
side model.162 The fourth party embodies a range of facilities in the 
same manner that the third party does.163  
                                                          
159 Katsh E. & Rifkin J., Online Dispute Resolution: Resolving Conflicts in 
Cyberspace, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2001.  
160 Cortes, P., A European Legal Perspective on Consumer Online Dispute 
Resolution. Computer Telecommunications Law Review, 2009, 1-28. 
161 Katsh, E. & Rifkin J., supra note 159. 
162 Katsh, E; Wing, L., Ten Years of Online Dispute Resolution (ODR): Look-
ing at the Past and Constructing the Future, 38 University of Toledo Law 
Review 19, 2006. 
163 Gaitenby, A., The Fourth Party Rises: Evolving Environments of Online 
Dispute Resolution, 38 University of Toledo Law Review 101, 2006 
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Whereas the fourth party may at times take the place of the 
third party – i.e. automated negotiation – it will frequently be used 
by the third party as a tool for assisting the process. 164 
There are a large range of activities that are conducted mainly 
through the use of this fourth party, such as organizing infor-
mation, sending automatic responses, shaping writing communica-
tions in a politer and constructive manner e.g. blocking foul lan-
guage.  
In addition, technological systems can monitor performance, 
schedule meetings, clarify interests and priorities, and so on.165 The 
assistance of the fourth party will increase the more technology 
advances, thus reducing the role of the third neutral party. Actually, 
ICT advance is occurring exponentially since ICT advance speeds 
up over the time.166  
 
Although differences of opinion still exist, there appears to be 
some agreement that Online Dispute Resolution refers to an alter-
native to traditional dispute resolution procedures.  
The acronym ODR embodies a multitude of concepts which 
Schultz and other commentators define it, firstly, as a mixture of a 
sui generis form of dispute resolution responding to the needs of 
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Internet users and, secondly, as a different alternative dispute res-
olution form enriched with online capabilities.167 
Specifically, ODR is the application of information communi-
cations technology to the practice of dispute resolution. Generally 
speaking, ODR involves the application of dispute resolution tech-
niques over the internet. Thus, ODR is used to resolve internet-
related disputes such as e-commerce, but it also can be used for 
more traditional off-line disputes.168  
Petrauskas and Kybartiene argue that the key components of 
ODR can be listed as follows:  
1. Similar to ADR, companies agree to resolve their disputes 
outside the courts, the difference being to use the Internet to 
enhance the process;  
2. Professionals guide the parties and apply their ADR experi-
ence to support the Internet process;  
3. ADR rules and practices are adapted to the Internet environ-
ment, and  
4. Software tools are used to enhance Internet exchanges. 169  
 
Moreover, they also focused on the main web-based services 
offered in ODR systems which have been tested and introduced. 
                                                          
167 Schultz, T., Online Dispute Resolution: The State of the Art and the Issues 
(with Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Dirk Langer & Vincent Bonnet), Univer-
sity of Geneva, 2001. 
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169 Petrauskas, F. & Kybartiene, E., Online Dispute Resolution in Consumer 
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These new services will enable the main parties and the third ones 
to:  
1. Meet online and work in shared, protected work spaces,  
2. Access databases with precedents,  
3. Retrieve and manage key documents, 
4. Hold meetings with voice and video conferencing as desired and 
with translation services as needed.170 
 
 
Section 2: ODR benefits 
 
 
Nowadays, Online Dispute Resolution has been integrated into 
familiar dispute resolution processes and generating novel ap-
proaches to responding to and preventing conflict, approaches not 
possible to develop in a traditional offline context.171 
It is not essential to underline whether this fourth party is sig-
nificant or limited in the dispute solution, but accordingly it is cru-
cial to emphasize the fact that it is still likely to be a factor.  
Colin Rule, co-founder of MODRIA 172  – one of the well-
known ODR providers in Silicon Valley – writes that the distinc-
tion between online and offline is a false dichotomy: “Most of us 
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are comfortable using technology to communicate sometimes and 
at other times getting together face-to-face. We constantly navigate 
back and forth between our online and offline channels, some-
times in the space of just a few minutes. This is true in ODR as 
well. We may begin a process with an online filing form and move 
to telephone calls and then to face-to-face meetings before finaliz-
ing the agreement online. Joint sessions might be held in person, 
with in-between conversations happening over email. This is the 
way our parties live their lives, and they expect to be able to resolve 
their disputes with similar fluidity”.173 
Indeed, it is useless to pick online or offline dispute resolution, 
we can choose both. 
There are several benefits which make ODR especially attrac-
tive: 
These include cost savings, the speed of resolution, conven-
ience, and individually tailored processes. In terms of money, ODR 
is mostly useful in cases where the attorneys’ fees would exceed the 
likely award amount. ODR is faster than a typical trial or even ADR 
because technology can shorten the distances parties might other-
wise need to travel. Furthermore, ODR does not depend on clear-
ing time on a mediator’s or a judge’s calendar. Using e-mail, dis-
cussion groups, and web sites, agreements can be written and 
amended when convenient.174 Further, instead of a cookie cutter 
approach, each dispute process can be tailored to fit the disputants’ 
individualized needs and it would be easy to avoid the possible dis-
traction due to the presence of the emotional aspect of the conflict. 
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Generally, the key companies’ and individuals’ needs and con-
cerns can be listed as follows: reputation, quality control, infor-
mation strategies and mutual learning. 
As a result, Online Dispute Resolution can often resolve the 
dispute quickly in an efficient way and with more participation and 
control of the outcome by the parties who must work with each 
other to resolve the dispute. The parties using Online Dispute Res-
olution can have more flexibility, a flexibility that is not just a geo-
graphic flexibility – ODR can allow parties in different locations 
or countries to avoid the costs and inconveniences of travel – but 
also about the choice of which laws apply when the parties are 
from different countries. In addition, companies – especially E-
commerce ones – which showed on their homepages the possibil-
ity of solving directly online the possible argues may reach more 
reliability and trust on web users, who want to trust online trans-
actions and know a reliable dispute resolution process exists in the 
event of a dispute and they will encourage other customers to fre-
quent often your website. 
Actually the key advantage of resolving disputes through an 
online system is that it avoids the matter of whether a specific court 
has jurisdiction or not over the dispute.175  
Moreover, ODR could be the only feasible option for people 
unable to afford expensive travelling costs or for those involved in 
e-commerce negotiations regarding small amounts of money.176 
                                                          
175 Lide, E., ADR and Cyberspace: The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion in Online Commerce, Intellectual Property and Defamation, Ohio State 
Journal on Dispute Resolution, 1996, 921-941. 
176 Bordone, R., Electronic Online Dispute Resolution, 3 Harvard Negotiation 
Law Review 175, 1998. 
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Many sceptic practitioners have argued that an online negotia-
tion are less influential than face-to-face dispute resolutions since 
it is more difficult for both parties to understand each other’s in-
terests due to the absence of non-verbal signals, which in turn re-
duces the chance of achieving a satisfying agreement.177 
 
Recently, researchers have shown that online communication 
is more unsharpened and rough than face-to-face communication 
and can therefore more easily lead to misunderstandings.178  
Several studies have attempted to explain that it would be easier 
to increase the likelihood of finding an integrative agreement if ne-
gotiators know each other prior to the negotiation, hence they have 
more cues to interpret the other party’s actions and motivations. 
Otherwise, misunderstandings can easily lead to negative commu-
nication, distrust and eventually impasse. As suggested by Diane 
Moore, for ODR to be triumphant it is accordingly important to 
have some insights into the other party’s intentions which can “be 
achieved by shared group membership or mutual self-disclo-
sure”.179  
On the one hand, it may consequently be argued that divorce 
cases are particularly suited for ODR since both parties know each 
other well enough to interpret each other’s actions, and, on the 
other hand, especially during divorces parties could be distracted 
                                                          
177 Bazerman, M., Negotiation, 51 Annual Review of Psychology, 2000, 279-
314. 
178 Sproull, L. & Kiesler, S., Connections: new ways of working in the net-
worked organization, 1991. 
179 Moore, D., Long and short routes to success in electronically-mediated ne-
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by the emotional sides of the divergence, but thanks to the dis-
tance, they could focus on the matter that need to be settled. 
 One of these benefit is definitely ODR’s potential for growth 
as a means of dispute resolution. It is certain that ODR field is 
being changed by technological development, the only uncertainty 
that remains is whether this change will take one, five ten or more 
to elect Online Dispute Resolution as the normal way of solving 
disputes. 
Online Dispute Resolution may be divided into two main clas-
ses: 
 
On the one hand, the first class, the so-called Hard ODR – or 
traditional ODR – which covers procedures intending directly to 
resolve conflicts and, on the other hand, the second class, the so-
called Soft ODR that seek to prevent disputes, or to facilitate their 
resolution once disputes have arisen, without actually adjudicating 
them.  
 
As suggested by Thornburg – an US commentator – this dis-
tinction is supported by the idea of thinking ODR as encompass-
ing not just traditional resolutive processes but also newer preven-
tative processes by content owners to forestall copyright infringe-
ment.180 
 
                                                          
180 Thornburg, J., Going Private: Technology, Due Process and Internet Dis-
pute Resolution, 2000. 
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Online Dispute Resolution systems may be classified according 
to the “hard systems” into three main categories: 
 
a. Online negotiation, using expert systems to automati-
cally settle financial claims;  
b. Online mediation, using a website to resolve disputes 
with the aid of qualified mediators.  
c. Online arbitration, using a website to resolve disputes 
with the aid of qualified arbitrators.  
 
It is essential to emphasize that not all of these types of ODR 
are fully developed yet. Online negotiation and online mediation 
are currently the most advanced and I am going to examine these 
two figures in the following sections.  
 
 
 
 
Section 3: Online negotiation (E-Negotiation) 
 
 
Online negotiation may be divided into two main sub-groups 
but sometimes may involve a combination of these two methods:  
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Automated Negotiation  
Assisted Negotiation 
 
Whereas there are providers such as Cybersettle181, who pro-
vide blind-bidding model also called automated negotiation, other 
platforms – such as eBay182 and PayPal183 – offer so-called assisted 
negotiation, by outlining, based on prior experience from similar 
cases, a number of possible remedies to the parties to a dispute.184 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Automated Negotiation  
 
Online Dispute Resolution uses Information and communica-
tions technology (ICT) for Negotiations, not only tools such as e-
mail or videoconferencing, but also with providers which help par-
ties in negotiating online through a process called “blind-bidding”. 
During automated negotiation ICT takes over the negotiation. 
                                                          
181 www.cybersettle.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
182 www.ebay.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
183 www.paypal.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
184 Cortés, P., A new regulatory framework for extra-judicial consumer re-
dress: where we are and how to move forward, University of Leicester School 
of Law Research Paper, 2013.   
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Blind-bidding is a negotiation process designed to determine 
economic settlements for claims in which liability is not challenged. 
Indeed, automated negotiation is ideal for online settlement of fi-
nancial claims.  
This is a very simple, easy and straight forward method with no 
other assistance needed. 
Generally, automated negotiation provides two parts: 
1. Offering Party, which is the party who makes the offer or 
the party who is going to pay.  
2. Demanding Party, which is the party who makes the demand 
or the party who is seeking payment. 
 
As a general rule, as blind-bidding example, we should consider 
a dispute between two insurance companies as to who pays out in 
what proportions in relation to a car accident.  
Typically, in blind-bidding one party (hereinafter A) contacts 
an ODR provider and presents his or her case against a second 
party (hereinafter B). 
The online dispute resolution provider contacts B, who can ac-
cept or refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of the institution. The 
parties then enter the so-called “blind bidding” procedure.  
Each of them in turn enter their respective offer and demand. 
The proposed figures are confidential; they are neither made public 
nor communicated to the other party. The figures are kept confi-
dential regardless of whether the case settles or not. 
158 
 
The parties also choose a percentage range. The ODR algo-
rithm computes a settlement amount between the offer range and 
the demand range provided the figures are within the given range. 
The number of bids varies between three and unlimited. If the 
two bids in any of the rounds come close enough to one another, 
the midpoint figure will be deemed as accepted 
Most sites offering automated negotiation also impose a time 
limit for the parties to reach an agreement. 
 
Automated negotiation ODR is mainly applicable only to 
purely monetary disputes and cannot deal with factual or legal dis-
putes of any complexity. Examples of such sites include Cyberset-
tle, SettlementOnline,185 ClickNsettle,186 ClaimRoom,187 Smartset-
tle188 and FairOutcomes, 189 all of them which claim to have pro-
cessed large amounts of cases successfully.190 
On the one hand, Cybersettle and SettlementOnline both allow 
three rounds of bidding, using a simple and practical system based 
on double blind bidding. In such a procedure, both parties are un-
aware of the specifics offered by the other party, only that a nego-
tiation is in process. The computer operates according to a formula 
for each round –  compares the offers and counteroffers – and 
when the offers are within a specific range it announces a deal. If 
                                                          
185 www.settlementonline.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
186 www.clicknsettle.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
187 www.theclaimroom.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
188 www.smartsettle.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
189 www.fairoutcomes.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
190 Edwards, L. & Wilson C., Redress & Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
Cross-Border E-commerce Transactions, Briefing Note, 
(IP/A/IMCO/IC/2006-206). 
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the software determines that a settlement has not been reached, 
then their offers remain confidential and future bargaining posi-
tions are unaffected. 
The difference between the two system is that while on Cyber-
settle, a settlement is reached if there is less than 20% between the 
offers in any of the rounds, and then the claim will settle for the 
average of the two amounts, 191  on the other hand, Settle-
mentOnline allows the parties to set their own settlement range for 
each individual case.192  
On the other hand, Smartsettle and ClickNsettle use a method 
called visual blind bidding. In Smartsettle – based on visual blind 
bidding – that is applicable to simple cases and scalable to complex 
multiparty cases, the visible suggestions are put forward by each 
party and the computer operating as an intelligent agent, but each 
side’s acceptances are kept hidden from the other party. The com-
puter announces a deal when hidden acceptances coincide.  
ClickNsettle, however, allows many rounds of offers and coun-
teroffers within a specified period of time. For ensuring the good 
faith of the negotiations, partiers are required to increase/decrease 
their offer/counteroffer by a specified percentage over their pre-
vious offer. If a settlement is not reached within the specified time 
period, then the offers expire and the cyber-negotiation fails and 
parties are free to resubmit their dispute or to move towards an-
other dispute resolution method.193 
                                                          
191 www.cybersettle.com/demo/demo_pf.asp (last access 31st March 2016). 
192 www.settlementonline.com/Proposal2.html (last access 31st March 2016). 
193 Ponte, L., Boosting Consumer Confidence in E-business: Recommenda-
tions for Establishing Fair and Effective Dispute Resolution Programs for 
B2C Online Transactions, 2002.  
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In the end, Fair Outcomes Inc. is the most interesting one as a 
provider, because it provides parties with access to several propri-
etary systems that are grounded in mathematical algorithmic theo-
ries of fair division and of games – it is into this provider that 
Brams’ algorithms of fair division are applied. 
 
 
3.2 Assisted Negotiation  
 
In order to describe the assisted negotiation is useful to bear in 
mind what was stated before about negotiation. Such as the offline 
negotiation the assisted negotiation, indeed, is a process where par-
ties negotiate and settle their issues, disputes or grievances.  
Negotiation is chosen by parties on a voluntary basis. Attorney 
may represent the parties during the process. Parties reach agree-
ment without any external entity empowered to make a decision 
against their will. 
The main difference is that in the Assisted Negotiation is the 
technology who assists the negotiation process between the dis-
putes parties.  
The Online dispute resolution provider supplies facilities such 
as a secure site, communication facilities, and possibly storage for 
documents and other such facilities. 
 
The main service provided are the following: 
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developing agendas,  
engaging in productive discussions,  
identifying and assessing potential solutions,  
writing agreements.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the assisted negotiation procedures 
are designed to improve parties’ communications through the as-
sistance of a third party or a software.  
The major advantages of these processes, when used online, 
are their informality, simplicity and user friendliness.194 
A well-known example is the Internet auction website eBay 
which has a business relationship with the ODR provider Square-
Trade,195 and thereby provides assisted negotiation to a large num-
ber of eBay users alongside other processes. 
 
So far, once we illustrated the difference between automated 
negotiation and assisted negotiation, we can introduce the concept 
of E-Negotiation. It is a process that uses a negotiation support 
system including computers or other forms of electronic commu-
nications that enable parties to negotiate their own agreements.  
“In its most advanced form, E-Negotiation is a form of artifi-
cial intelligence that fully automates mediation (perfectly neutral, 
                                                          
194 Motion, P., Article 17 ECD: Encouragement of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution. Online Dispute Resolution: A View from Scotland, Hart Publishing, 
2005. 
195 www.squaretrade.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
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super intelligent, and very secure). While in many cases unneces-
sary, E-Negotiations can include face-to-face meetings if such 
meetings enhance the process”.196 
In 1980s the first E-Negotiation systems or computer-medi-
ated negotiation systems were built197: 
Around the world we have (just in alphabetic order): 
Adjusted Winner,198  
AniMed,199  
AutoMed,200  
Asset Divider201 (ex Family Winner), 
Cybersettle,202  
                                                          
196 Thiessen, E.M., Miniato, P. & Hiebert, B., ODR and eNegotiation, Online 
Dispute Resolution: Theory and Practice (a treatise on technology and dispute 
resolution), Eleven International Publishing, Wahab M., Katsh E. & Rainey 
D., eds, 2012. 
197 Id. 
198  See supra n. 54. 
199 Lin, R., Gev Y., and Kraus, S., Facilitating Better Negotiation Solutions 
using AniMed”, 2010. Available at u.cs.biu.ac.il/~linraz/Papers/linetal-
acan11.pdf, (last access 31st March 2016). 
200 Chalamish M. & Kraus, S., AutoMed – An Automated Mediator for Multi-
Issue Bilateral Negotiations”, Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multi-
Agent System, 201, www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICCCD/ICCCD09/pa-
per/viewFile/1025/3320 (last access 31st March 2016). 
201 Abrahams, B., Bellucci, E. & Zeleznikow, J., Incorporating Fairness into 
Development of an Integrated Multi-agent Online Dispute Resolution Envi-
ronment, Group Decision and Negotiation, published online 3 March 2010: 
vuir.vu.edu.au/6967, (last access 31st March 2016). 
202 www.cybersettle.com, (last access 31st March 2016). 
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Fair Outcomes,203   
Genie,204  
Genius,205  
Invite,206  
Joint Gains,207  
Negoisst,208  
Negoplan,209  
Persuarder,210  
                                                          
203 www.fairoutcomes.com, (last access 31st March 2016). 
204 Wilkenfeld, J., Kraus S., Holley, K.M. & Harris, M.A., GENIE: A Decision 
Support System for Crisis Negotiations, 1999. Available at www.sciencedi-
rect.com/science/article/pii/016792369400027P, (last access 31st March 
2016). 
205 Lin, R., Kraus, S., Tykhonov, N., Hindriks K. & Jonker, C.M., Supporting 
the Design of General Automated Negotiators”, in T.Ito, M. Zhang, V. Robu, 
S. Fatima, T. Matsuo, and H. Yamaki(eds.), Innovations in AgentBased Com-
plex Automated Negotiations,”, Volume 319 of Studies in Computational In-
telligence. Available at http://u.cs.biu.ac.il/~linraz/Papers/linetal-
agentDesignBookChapter.pdf, (last access 31st March 2016). 
206 Kersten G. & NoronhaS.: Negotiation via the World Wide Web: A Cross-
cultural Study of Decision Making, Group Decision and Negotiation, 1999, 8, 
pp. 251-279. invite.concordia.ca, (last access 31st March 2016). 
207 sal.aalto.fi/en/personnel/raimo.hamalainen/publications, (last access 31st 
March 2016). 
208 wi1.uni-hohenheim.de/negoisst.html, (last access 31st March 2016).. 
209 Matwin, S., et al., NEGOPLAN: An Expert System Shell for Negotiation 
Support, IEEE Expert, 4(4), 1989, 50-62. 
210 Sycara, K., Machine Learning for Intelligent Support of Conflict Resolu-
tion, Decision Support Systems, 10, pp. 121-136, 1993. 
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Smartsettle211  
and Split-Up212. 
Using these systems, stakeholders may solve their dispute just 
online, regardless of where it originated.213 Some systems are de-
signed also with the possibility of face-to-face meetings.214 
Nowadays, so many case studies illustrate “how cross-cultural 
negotiations can be managed through modern channels of social 
influence and information-sharing and shed light on the critical so-
cial, cognitive and behavioural role of the negotiator in resolving 
on-line, cross-cultural, conflicts and disputes, and generally in bar-
gaining and negotiation”.215 
As said by Ernest Thiessen, Paul Miniato and Bruce Hiebert, 
“the key difference with E-Negotiation is that the parties are in full 
control both during the process and in accepting or rejecting an 
outcome… and a well-designed E-Negotiation system will reduce 
the conflict or eliminate it by changing the fundamental nature of 
the interaction between the parties”.216 
                                                          
211 See supra n. 188. 
212 Stranieri, A., et al., A Hybrid-Neural Approach to the Automation of Legal 
Reasoning in the Discretionary Domain of Family Law in Australia, Artificial 
Intelligence and Law, 7(2-3), pp. 153-183, 1999. 
213 Thiessen and Zeleznikow believe ODR systems face five main challenges 
as they attempt to present an effective medium for online dispute resolution: 
1) Problem representation, 2) Preference elicitation, 3) Effective communica-
tion, 4) Neutrality provision and 5) Degree of automation. 
214 Thiessen E. & Zeleznikow J., Technical aspects of online dispute resolution 
challenges and opportunities. Conley Tyler, M., Katsh, E. & Choi, D., Pro-
ceedings of the Third Annual Forum on Online Dispute Resolution, 2004. 
215 Harkiolakis, N., E-Negotiations: Networking and Cross-Cultural Business 
Transactions, Gower, 2012. 
216 Lide, E., supra note 175. 
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Section 4: Online mediation (E-Mediation) 
 
 
The so-called E-supported mediation (or just E-Mediation) re-
fers to mediations that are fully e-supported as well as the hybrid 
mediations, where they are partly computerized and partly face-to-
face. Participation is voluntary and confidential. 
During an e-supported mediation, the parties need to fill out 
an online intake before the joint mediation takes place.  
For answering the intake questions are used asynchronous 
messages which are only shared with the mediator, not also with 
the other party.  
Once the intake is finalized, appointments are made for the 
face-to-face mediation. As soon as parties finish their mediation, 
they receive an e-mail inviting parties to participate in the study.217 
In ODR mediation, compared to a traditional mediation, asyn-
chronous are opposed to real time discussion and common and 
private communication rooms are desirable but not always availa-
ble.  
                                                          
217 Bollen, K. & Martin Euwema M., The Role of Hierarchy in Face-to-Face 
and E-Supported Mediations: The Use of an Online Intake to Balance the 
Influence of Hierarchy, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 
2013. 
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The main disadvantages are that the lack of face-to-face contact 
may inhibit development of trust, deny clients their chance to “tell 
their story” and thus inhibit the reaching of possible solutions. 
A study conducted by Juripax has shown that adding an online 
element to workplace mediation processes contributes to their ef-
fectiveness by eliminating 
asymmetry in hierarchal workplace disputes.218 
 
The first notable e-mediation projects219 may be listed as fol-
lows: 
 the Online Ombuds project, which was a pilot ODR program 
established in 1996,220 
 the Maryland Family Mediation project, which was another early 
initiative funded by the National Center for Automated Infor-
mation Research (NCAIR) in the United States,221 
 the Cybertribunal project at the University of Montreal School of 
Law, which later developed into e-Resolution, a commercial ser-
vice provider providing e-mediation as well as arbitration for do-
main name disputes,222 
                                                          
218 Bollen, K., Martin Euwema M., Angry at Your Boss or Fearing Your Em-
ployee? Negative Affect in Hierarchical Conflicts and the Moderating Role of 
E-Supported Mediation, Kyoto, IACM, 2009. 
219 Katsh, E., Rifkin, J. & Gaitenby, A., “E-Commerce, E-Disputes, and E-
Dispute Resolution: In the Shadow of eBay Law”, 28 Ohio St. J. on Disp. 
Resol. 810, 2000. 
220 Katsh E. & Rifkin J., supra note 159. 
221 Getz, C., Closing the Distance with Technology: Report on Phase I of the 
Technology-Assisted Family Mediation Project, 2007. 
222 Katsh E. & Rifkin J., supra note 159. 
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 SquareTrade, which picked up the eBay mediation project where 
the Online Ombuds left off, as a business venture.223 
 
This last one example – referring to eBay in conjunction with 
the internet start-up SquareTrade – introduced an online dispute 
resolution system which allowed buyers and sellers to settle various 
contentious issues in a structured format.224  
In this E-mediation provider, parties are asked to answer ques-
tions on a customised complaint form and provide supporting doc-
umentation for their claim.  
During this initial stage, the parties try to reach an agreement 
by communicating directly with each other through SquareTrade’s 
Direct Negotiation tool, which is a completely automated web-
based communications tool. 
SquareTrade will transmit the form to the other party and en-
courage that party to respond. If the parties fail to reach a compro-
mise, through direct negotiation, then they have the option of re-
questing assistance from a mediator. SquareTrade is careful to ex-
plain that the mediator is not a judge or arbitrator, but merely seeks 
“to facilitate positive solution-oriented discussion between the par-
ties… The mediator will only recommend a resolution if the parties 
request it”.225 
                                                          
223 Abernethy, S., The Square Trade Experience in Online and Offline Dis-
putes, Proceedings of the 2003 United Nations Forum on ODR 2003. 
224 Abernethy, S., Building Large-Scale Online Dispute Resolution & Trust-
mark Systems, Proceedings of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe, UNECE, 2003. 
225 www.squaretrade.com/cnt/jsp/odr/learn_odr.jsp (last access 31st March 
2016). 
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Even then, the mediator’s recommendation is not binding on 
the parties. 
The dispute resolution mechanism established by Wikipedia 
works in a similar fashion and is another prominent example of 
online mediation.226 
 
In addition, such as SquareTrade, there are websites like Inter-
net Neutral,227 and WebMediate,228 to facilitate the resolution of 
disputes.  
Although these websites rely primarily on online technologies 
such as e-mail, chat rooms, and instant messaging, they also incor-
porate more traditional communication methods into the negotia-
tion process.  
Normally, a party contacts the service and fills out an online 
form that identifies the problem and possible resolutions. A medi-
ator, then, reviews the form and contacts the other party to see if 
they will participate in the mediation. If the other party agrees to 
participate, they can fill out their own form or respond to the initial 
from through e-mail.  
This early talk of opinions may help the parties to understand 
the dispute better and possibly to reach an agreement. If the dis-
pute remains unresolved, the mediator will work with the parties 
to help determine issues, articulate interests, and evaluate potential 
solutions. 
                                                          
226 Rabinovich-Einy, O., Katsh, E., Digital Justice, Reshaping Boundaries in 
an Online Dispute Resolution Environment, 1(1) International Journal of 
Online Dispute Resolution, 2014, 5-36.   
227 www.internetneutral.com/forum.htm (last access 31st March 2016). 
228 www.webmediate.com/intro.html (last access 31st March 2016).  
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Internet Neutral, on the one hand, allows parties to choose 
from several online mediation alternatives, including e-mail, instant 
messaging, chat conference rooms, and/or video conferencing.  
The costs, however, vary depending on the online technology 
used and the length of the mediation sessions.  
Disputes with simple facts that rely entirely on e-mail are 
charged for the time that the mediator spends preparing, sending 
and reviewing emails.  
Internet Neutral uses conferencing software that enables the 
mediator to communicate with the parties in designated channels 
or “rooms” accessed by passwords.  
During the mediation, the software enables the parties to com-
municate through two channels: one channel is for a private dia-
logue between one party and the mediator, while the other channel 
is an open dialogue with all participants, including the mediator.229 
 
WebMediate, on the other hand, provides a range of cyber-me-
diation services along with other dispute resolution systems, in-
cluding arbitration.  
It claims to be the “only company to provide a fully-integrated 
range of ADR processes online – alternatively, simultaneously, or 
sequentially.”  
                                                          
229 Goodman, J., The Pros and Cons of Online Dispute Resolution: An As-
sessment of Cyber-Mediation Websites, Duke Law & Technology Review, 
2003, Vol. 2 1, 1–16. 
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WebMediate offers parties an opportunity to begin with less 
powerful dispute resolution mechanisms and, if those fail to reach 
a settlement, to move onto more powerful dispute resolution 
mechanisms. 
Almost all of WebMediate’s cases enter into their system 
through a fully automated cyber-mediation process, WebSettle-
ment. 
If the dispute is not resolved through the WebSettlement, then 
“parties may choose to involve an experienced online WebMedia-
tor, to facilitate the discussion of their dispute and assist in identi-
fying and assessing options for resolution”.230 
After exhausting the WebSettlement and WebMediator op-
tions, the parties may then choose WebArbitration and “submit 
their dispute for resolution by a third-party sitting in the role of a 
private judge”.231 
 
 
Section 5: ODR platforms  
 
 
As illustrated by Professor Julia Hörnle in 2011, an interna-
tional ODR platform should have five separable basic functions. 
                                                          
230 Id. 
231 Id. 
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Firstly, it is mandatory to set minimum standards for 
ADR/ODR providers and only admits ADR/ODR providers 
complying with these (the so-called Clearing House Function). 
Secondly, it is essential to search engine to enable consumers 
to find competent ADR/ODR scheme in trader’s state and tests 
whether dispute is in scope (the so-called Referral Function). 
Thirdly, it is fundamental to give consumer choice and info and 
to provide information about outcomes of other disputes (the so-
called Transparency Function). 
Fourthly, it is noteworthy to allow consumer to file dispute 
(claim plus evidence and to transfers dispute to competent 
ADR/ODR (the so-called Transfer Function). 
Finally, it is significant to maintain record of ADR/ODR out-
come, to record whether trade has complied or not and to compile 
statistics (the so-called Enforcement Function).232 
In the previous paragraphs we discussed a little bit about Cy-
bersettle, Modria and SquareTrade/eBay system. 
 
However, there are more ODR platforms already developed. 
Among them, in alphabetic order, I have selected the following233: 
 
a. Canadian Civil Resolution Tribunal 
                                                          
232 Hörnle, J., www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/dr_julia_hornle.pdf. 
233 Susskind, R., Report of Civil Justice Council’s Online Dispute Resolution 
Advisory Group, www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/02/Online-Dispute-Resolution-Final-Web-Version1.pdf. 
172 
 
b. Financial Ombudsman Service 
c. Nominet 
d. Online Schlichter 
e. Rechtwijzer 2.0 
f. Resolver 
g. Traffic Penalty Tribunal 
h. Youstice 
a. The Canadian Civil Resolution234 
 
The Canadian Civil Resolution Tribunal is regulated under the 
Civil Resolution Tribunal Act 2012. It is an online tribunal 
launched in 2015 in British Columbia, Canada. 
The online tribunal is available as an alternative pathway to the 
traditional courts for resolving small claims through a process that 
is expected to be more convenient and less costly. Although it is 
essential to specify that this year, in 2016, the Civil Resolution Tri-
bunal will move from voluntary to mandatory to resolve minor 
strata and many small claims disputes up to 10.000 dollars. At pre-
sent, it deals with claims (under 25.000 Canadian dollars) relating 
to debts, damages, recovery of personal property, and certain types 
of condominium disputes. It doesn’t handle disputes affecting 
land. There are two systems being developed to support the CRT 
and increase access to justice in Canada. The first system, the So-
lution Explorer, is designed to provide people with the tools they 
need to assess their options and resolve their disputes themselves. 
                                                          
234 www.civilresolutionbc.ca, (last access 31st March 2016). 
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The second system, the Dispute Resolution Suite, will enable the 
CRT to pursue further early resolution options and adjudications. 
The online tribunal operates in several stages. In the first instance, 
the facility will help users explore possible solutions. Then, parties 
will be required to use the tribunal’s online negotiation platform, 
which is subject to short timelines and supported by templates for 
statements and arguments. If a settlement is not reached, then a 
tribunal case manager will be appointed to assist the parties to set-
tle their dispute through a mediation process that will take place 
online or over the telephone. If parties do not settle by this medi-
ation process, they will then be invited to agree to a third and final 
stage of adjudication. The adjudicator will contact the parties via 
the online platform, over the phone, or, when necessary, through 
video-conferencing, and then will make a decision that will be final 
and binding. 
 
b. Financial Ombudsman Service235 
 
The UK Financial Ombudsman Service was established by 
statute in 2000 as the mandatory ADR body in the financial ser-
vices sector. Its purpose is to resolve disputes between consumers 
and UK-based financial businesses quickly and with minimum for-
mality. Its process is designed around the principle that a dispute 
is usually best resolved at the earliest possible stage and that most 
problems can be resolved without needing a formal determination 
by an ombudsman. Businesses covered by the ombudsman have 
the opportunity to resolve disputes before the service becomes in-
volved, but they must resolve complaints promptly – and always in 
                                                          
235 www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk, (last access 31st March 2016). 
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fewer than eight weeks. Once a complaint is referred to the service, 
its process is geared towards early and informal resolution. Its ad-
judicators attempt to facilitate an amicable resolution to the dispute 
between the two parties, usually resulting in adjudicators writing to 
parties with their view on what the fair and reasonable outcome 
should be. If both parties agree (which typically happens in around 
90% of cases), the dispute is resolved. But either party may disagree 
and ask for the case to be referred to an ombudsman for final, 
binding, determination. The service has trialled new ways of work-
ing that will allow some disputes to be settled even more informally 
and quickly - that is, in hours and days. An ombudsman’s determi-
nations can be accepted or rejected by a consumer, but if a con-
sumer accepts the decision then it is binding.  These decisions are 
not appealable, but are subject to judicial review. The service is a 
‘distance’ service, so that each year there are usually less than 20 
face-to-face meetings with adjudicators or ombudsmen.  
 
c. Nominet236 
 
Nominet is a domain name registry company which has run the 
.uk domain name since 1996 and has run the .cymru and .wales 
domain names since September 2014. Nominet has to register .uk 
domain names on a “first-come, first-served” basis - without ex-
amining the merits of the application.  It therefore established a 
Dispute Resolution Service (DRS) to provide a means of resolving 
.uk domain name disputes without recourse to court. To pursue a 
claim through the DRS, complainants have to demonstrate that 
they have rights in a name that is the same or similar to the disputed 
                                                          
236 www.nominet.org.uk, (last access 31st March 2016). 
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domain name and that the registration has been abusive (for exam-
ple, the spelling of a domain name is deliberately very similar to the 
complainant’s in order to confuse Internet users).  The first stage 
of the DRS requires a complainant to complete a form on Nomi-
net’s website.  This includes specifying what remedy is being 
sought (the most common remedy is the transfer of the disputed 
domain name to the complainant). The material submitted by the 
complainant is then sent to the registrant of the domain name. 
Nominet then appoint a mediator, who contacts both parties by 
telephone to seek a solution.  The majority of cases settle at this 
stage and the mediation generally takes around two weeks.  There 
is no cost to either party at this stage. If the case does not settle via 
mediation, the complainant can pay to have an independent expert 
appointed. The expert’s decision will be based solely on the mate-
rials submitted by the complainant and the registrant. Appeals 
from the expert stage are permitted, but rare. Both the expert’s 
decision and that in any appeal are published on the Nominet web-
site. 
 
d. Online Schlichter237 
 
The Online Schlichter is an online mediation service for Busi-
ness-to-Consumer e-commerce and direct selling disputes. It has 
been run by the Centre for Consumer Protection in Europe (ECC) 
in Kehl/Strasbourg since 2009. Its aim is to increase access to jus-
tice and reduce the number of cases reaching the regular courts. 
The service is free for both parties and the mediators/advisors are 
independent lawyers at the ECC. There is considerable emphasis 
                                                          
237 www.online-schlichter.de, (last access 31st March 2016). 
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on analyzing the case from the start and providing both parties 
with legal advice and evaluation of their legal position, thereby cor-
recting any unfounded expectations about their rights. This online 
advice is partly automated by using textual building blocks and de-
cision trees. This up-front advice and evaluation often helps to 
achieve early settlement. The mediator makes a non-binding rec-
ommendation. In about two-thirds of all cases both parties accept 
the recommendation and the case is settled accordingly. Its high 
settlement rate attests to the success of this technique for small 
claims. 
 
e. Rechtwijzer 2.0238 
 
Rechtwijzer 2.0 was developed for the Dutch Legal Aid Board 
by The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of the Law 
(HiiL). The service is provided by the Netherlands Ministry of Jus-
tice and Security. It is designed to help parties resolve disputes 
through a process that takes them from problem diagnosis, 
through facilitated, Questions & Answers based framing of their 
case, to problem solving and assisted negotiation and, finally, to 
various forms of ODR. To assist in negotiation, the process pro-
vides automated legal guidance, based on the answers parties have 
given during the Questions & Answers session. The first service is 
for matrimonial disputes, including divorce and ancillary matters, 
such as custody and maintenance. Landlord and tenant and neigh-
bour disputes are planned for the future. The ADR phase is 
reached on failure of the parties to reach a resolution by them-
selves. This takes the form of online mediation or arbitration. The 
                                                          
238 www.hiil.org/project/rechtwijzer (last access 31st March 2016). 
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process takes place online on a secure and confidential platform, 
designed for asynchronous dialogue. The platform enables the me-
diator to engage in separate confidential discussions with each 
party, consistent with normal mediation practice. Finally, as a “fail 
safe” against a resolution being reached that does not satisfy the 
criteria of “fairness”, agreements go before an independent lawyer 
for confirmation. 
 
f. Resolver239 
 
Resolver is a UK-based online facility that helps consumers 
raise complaints with suppliers and retailers. The operators of the 
site have populated it with the e-mail contacts of the complaint 
departments of over 2000 major organizations. Through a form-
filling exercise and helped by the provision of standard phrases, a 
consumer is given online assistance in drafting a complaint. This is 
then e-mailed directly to the relevant complaint department. The 
suppliers and retailers are urged to respond to the Resolver e-mail 
address so that the exchange of messages can be stored on the 
consumer’s case file that is then maintained on the site. The service 
presently covers energy, telecoms, transport, loan companies, res-
taurants, high street shops, solicitors, and many more sectors. Re-
solver provides a platform through which parties can discuss their 
differences in a structured way. Emoticons are provided to help 
consumers better express their emotions. The service holds details 
of the escalation procedures of the 2000 organizations and guides 
users from first-tier complaints handling up to the highest level. 
Users are alerted by e-mail to any responses and are prompted to 
                                                          
239 www.resolver.co.uk, (last access 31st March 2016). 
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escalate when responses are not received. The service is free of 
charge, both to consumers and to the organizations to whom they 
are complaining. 
 
g. Traffic Penalty Tribunal240 
 
The Traffic Penalty Tribunal (TPT) of England and Wales has 
launched a web-based portal BECK (Best Evidence Cloud 
Knowledge), for use by appellants, respondent authorities as well 
as the adjudicators and administrators. The Portal enables appel-
lants to appeal, upload evidence and follow cases and hearings un-
der one evidence screen and account. Likewise, each authority has 
a dashboard showing current cases, enabling them to submit evi-
dence, comment, and follow progress of hearings and decisions. 
Appellants create an account and receive all notifications by email. 
They comment on evidence, request their preferred hearing type 
and follow progress of the case through to the decision, viewed 
online. Their dashboard displays the status in each case, prompting 
actions. The TPT administrators, who no longer data-input, now 
focus on customer service, for example, ‘offline’ appellants phon-
ing for a form or help. TPT’s workload, which will shortly increase 
by 30%, will be administered by the same staff numbers with re-
duced case closure times. Adjudicators can manage their own case-
load, send directions to parties, and easily see uploaded evidence, 
including videos, which is also displayed to all parties. At telephone 
conference hearings all participants can view the same evidence, 
guided by the adjudicator. 
                                                          
240 www.trafficpenaltytribunal.gov.uk, (last access 31st March 2016). 
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h. Youstice241 
 
Youstice is an ODR service for handling large volumes of low 
value consumer complaints, relating both to goods and services, 
whether or not the purchases took place online. There are two 
tools. The first enables negotiation between parties. It provides as-
sistance in framing arguments – parties are invited to describe their 
position by selecting from a series of phrases, with relevant icons 
for each. The site also suggests suitable solutions that again can be 
represented by icons. A form of structured (asynchronous) dia-
logue can take place within a limited area for free form comment. 
The objective is to encourage and facilitate the parties to reach an 
agreed settlement directly between themselves. Using the second 
tool, customers can escalate cases and seek an independent review 
by one of a number of neutrals accredited by Youstice. Customers 
can file their claims either directly at the retailers´ websites or at 
websites of consumer organizations. Shops are entitled to use the 
Youstice logo if they reach agreement on Youstice with consumers 
in at least 80% of cases and they implement at least 98% of the 
agreements reached or of decisions by third-parties. Use of the fa-
cilitated negotiation platform is free to consumers, with Youstice 
earning its income from the retailers who pre-register and who dis-
play the Youstice logo in their marketing. 
 
Section 6: EU platform 
 
                                                          
241 www.youstice.com (last access 31st March 2016). 
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So far, we will start focusing on the European ODR platform. 
In accordance with the provisions of Regulation 524/2013 on 
online dispute resolution for consumer disputes – the “ODR Reg-
ulation” – the EU has currently created an ODR platform, aimed 
at enhancing the accessibility of ADR schemes online. This plat-
form has become operational on the 9th of January 2016. It will 
serve as a single connection point for EU-based traders, consum-
ers, and ADR entities and will apply strictly to online transactions 
between these parties, both domestic and cross-border.  
The ODR platform is operational since the 9th January 2016 
and has been made accessible in stages. It is accessible to consum-
ers and traders since the 15th February 2016.  
Dispute resolution bodies are currently not available on this 
site for some sectors and in the following countries: Croatia, Ger-
many, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, 
Spain but The EU Commission will try to cover all the EU mem-
bers by next summer (2016). 
The link to the ODR platform is: www.ec.europa.eu/odr and 
it is possible to find more information on the following website:
  www.ec.europa.eu/consumers/solving_consumer_dis-
putes/non-judicial_redress/adr-odr/index_en.htm 
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Figure 1242 
 
As shown in Figure 1 above, a main role is the one of the na-
tional contact points established in each Member State to provide 
assistance to users of ODR platform, a network243 of online dis-
                                                          
242 Image from the EU ODR platform. 
243 See article 7, Regulation (Eu) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, 21 May 2013, on online dispute resolution for consumer 
disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 
2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR). 
Network of ODR contact points: 
1.   Each Member State shall designate one ODR contact point and communi-
cate its name and contact details to the Commission. The Member States may 
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pute resolution facilitators (“ODR facilitators’ network”). A net-
work composed of contact points for ODR in the Member States 
which host online dispute resolution facilitators. 
                                                          
confer responsibility for the ODR contact points on their centres of the Eu-
ropean Consumer Centres Network, on consumer associations or on any 
other body. Each ODR contact point shall host at least two ODR advisors. 
2.   The ODR contact points shall provide support to the resolution of dis-
putes relating to complaints submitted through the ODR platform by fulfilling 
the following functions: 
(a) if requested, facilitating communication between the parties and the com-
petent ADR entity, which may include, in particular: 
(i) assisting with the submission of the complaint and, where appropriate, rel-
evant documentation; 
(ii) providing the parties and ADR entities with general information on con-
sumer rights in relation to sales and service contracts which apply in the Mem-
ber State of the ODR contact point which hosts the ODR advisor concerned; 
(iii) providing information on the functioning of the ODR platform; 
(iv) providing the parties with explanations on the procedural rules applied by 
the ADR entities identified; 
(v) informing the complainant party of other means of redress when a dispute 
cannot be resolved through the ODR platform; 
(b) submitting, based on the practical experience gained from the performance 
of their functions, every two years an activity report to the Commission and 
to the Member States. 
3.   The ODR contact point shall not be obliged to perform the functions 
listed in paragraph 2 in the case of disputes where the parties are habitually 
resident in the same Member State. 
4.   Notwithstanding paragraph 3, the Member States may decide, taking into 
account national circumstances, that the ODR contact point performs one or 
more functions listed in paragraph 2 in the case of disputes where the parties 
are habitually resident in the same Member State. 
5.   The Commission shall establish a network of contact points (‘ODR con-
tact points network’) which shall enable cooperation between contact points 
and contribute to the performance of the functions listed in paragraph 2. 
6.   The Commission shall at least twice a year convene a meeting of members 
of the ODR contact points network in order to permit an exchange of best 
practice, and a discussion of any recurring problems encountered in the oper-
ation of the ODR platform. 
7.   The Commission shall adopt the rules concerning the modalities of the 
cooperation between the ODR contact points through implementing acts. 
Those implementing acts shall be adopted in accordance with the examination 
procedure referred to in Article 16(3) 
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These facilitators should provide support to the resolution of 
disputes relating to complaints submitted via the ODR platform. 
They host at least two advisors and have access to dispute data if 
anyone ask for their assistance. This could be a leading role not 
only for helping parties in case of problems but also to disseminate 
the opportunity for consumers and traders to use such a solution 
instead of going to the trial, and hopefully to surpass the scepticism 
regarding the use of online-tools for solving a dispute. 
In the EU portal, it is possible to do everything online in 4 main 
steps: 
 
1) Complaint Submitted 
Traders or a consumers have filled in the online complaint 
form and submitted it to this site. The other party has received it.  
A party will now need to agree with the other party on the dis-
pute resolution body that will handle their dispute. They have 30 
days to do so.  
The complaint has been sent to the other party. 
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Figure 2244 
 
2) Agreement on Dispute Resolution Body 
A party has 30 days to agree with the other party on the dispute 
resolution body that will handle their dispute. Once you do so, this 
site will automatically send the details of their dispute to that body. 
If a party cannot agree, her complaint will not be processed further. 
                                                          
244 Image from the EU ODR platform 
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Figure 3245 
 
3) Dispute Handled by the Dispute Resolution Body 
a. The dispute has been sent to a dispute resolution body.  
b. The dispute resolution body will get back to parties. 
c. The dispute has been sent to a dispute resolution body. The dis-
pute resolution body will get back to parties. 
d. The dispute has been sent to a dispute resolution body. The dis-
pute resolution body has three weeks to decide whether it is com-
petent or not to deal with your dispute and inform the parties 
thereof. It may contact the parties for more information. 
                                                          
245 Image from the EU ODR platform 
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e. The dispute resolution body will have an outcome for their dis-
pute within 90 days. 
 
 
Figure 4246 
 
5) Outcome of the Procedure  
Once the procedure is over, the dispute resolution body will inform 
the parties of the outcome. This outcome varies per dispute resolu-
tion body. 
                                                          
246 Image from the EU ODR platform 
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Figure 5247 
 
Section 7: Conclusions 
 
Online dispute resolution entities in the private sector – such 
as e-Bay – and in courts and government agencies have used a va-
riety of online platforms – such as Modria – to provide the oppor-
tunity for consumers to raise complaints and seek redress through 
online dispute resolution.  
Whereas many have automatic algorithms – such as Fair Out-
comes.Inc – others provide access to live mediators, arbitrators or 
even adjudicators – such as Rechtswijzer2.0 – with varying tem-
                                                          
247 Image from the EU ODR platform 
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plates for form complaints or opportunities to customize negotia-
tions and complaints directly with companies and government 
agencies. 
As many online dispute resolution experts have suggested, 
technology will be a positive force for enhancing access to justice 
and broader opportunities to negotiate for redress.248 
Online negotiation allows direct negotiation with a “hosted” 
negotiation partner (e.g. the company from which you bought 
something or the government agency with whom you want to ne-
gotiate over a benefit or an obligation).  
In addition, new online dispute resolution platforms allow one 
to negotiate with others, as a platform provides a place for non-in 
person negotiation (such as old algorithm driven Cybersettle for 
monetized civil and insurance cases, or technology assisted (Skype) 
negotiations in both synchronous and asynchronous time.   
To the extent that similar negotiations and data of outcomes 
are available on the above mentioned sites, parties to negotiation 
may actually become better informed about what is possible or le-
gal or customary in particular matters. Like medical-disease affinity 
groups, online and hosted “legal problem” sites can enhance bar-
gaining power by providing data and sharing stories of successes.249 
For instance, ODR providers may use their settlement agree-
ments in previous similar cases to give possible remedies and sug-
gestions – using ICT for identifying recurring patterns of disputes 
or categorising complaints – in order not only to solve disputes, 
                                                          
248 Susskind, R., Susskind D., The Future of the Professions: How technology 
will transform the work of human experts, Oxford University press, 2015. 
249 Menkel-Meadow, C., Schneider, A.K. & Love, L., Negotiation: Processes 
for Problem Solving. New York: Aspen Wolters Kluwer Law and Business, 
2014. 
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but also to prevent them, 250 offering to disputants an opportunity 
for changing their behaviours.251  
For a long time people considered e-supported communication 
to be inferior to the ones face-to-face; however – especially in cases 
such as the arrangement of a divorce – a specific type of e-sup-
ported mediation can be successfully applied to mediate family dis-
putes with outstanding results of high settlement rates and high 
scores, reaching not only an agreement, but also a high level of 
justice perceptions.252 In particular, starting from the beginning 
stages of a mediation an asynchronous communication may offer 
parties a protected atmosphere to voice their emotions, share their 
opinion and talk without any sort of negative emotional preju-
dice.253 After all, it is the way parties perceive the mediation that 
will affect their current and future behaviours, feelings and 
thoughts.254 
An appreciation of these ODR systems is important in order 
(as this thesis aims) to develop a normative position on the use of 
ODR methods by citizens and to look at the ability of ODR plat-
forms in its various guises to meet a normative approach. In par-
ticular, this chapter has looked at aspects of online dispute resolu-
tions that are relevant to this thesis. These include: 
                                                          
250 Cortes, P., A supra note 160. 
251 Susskind, R., The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the nature of legal services, 
Oxford University Press, 2010. 
252 Poitras, J. & Le Tareau, A., Quantifying the quality of mediation agree-
ments. Negotiation and Conflict Management Research, 2009. 
253 Yen, J.Y., Yen, C.F., Chen, C.S., Wang, P.W., Chang, Y.H., & Ko, C.H., 
Social anxiety in online and real-life interaction and their associated factors. 
CyberPsychology, Behavior and Social Networking, 2012. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1089/cyber.2011.0015. 
254 Bollen, K., Verbeke, A. & Euwema, M., Computers work for women: Gen-
der differences in e-supported divorce mediation, Computers in Human Be-
havior, 2014. 
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(i) The phenomenon of ODR 
The recognition of Online Dispute Resolution as a raising phe-
nomenon and its engagement by the law may not be straightfor-
ward given some of the properties that define it. It is, as a concept, 
closely linked to other alternative dispute resolution methods such 
as Mediation and Negotiation, both analysed in depth in chapter 2. 
It has a number of properties however that will likely make its en-
gagement (especially in family disputes and e-commerce) necessary 
and not just alternative. 
 
(ii) Proper approach towards ODR  
In terms of dispute resolution, my research has tended to focus on 
ODR systems as a place – where to settle – rather than also the 
process – how to settle – or both of them. This includes the bene-
fits of developing such a system, such as avoiding, on the one hand, 
the matter of whether a specific court has jurisdiction or not over 
the dispute and, on the other hand, to afford expensive travelling 
costs. 
 
(iii) Aspects of developed ODR systems 
As mentioned above in section 2, currently, online negotiation (so 
called e-negotiation) and online mediation (so called e-mediation) 
are the most advanced systems and I examined these two sub-
groups in sections 3 and 4 respectively, with all the differences be-
tween their correlative offline figures: negotiation and mediation. 
With regards to e-negotiation, I analysed the fork roads of Auto-
mated Negotiations and Assisted Negotiations, focusing mainly on 
the automated ones where the platforms already applied algorithms 
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for solving disputes, such as the Adjusted winner in Fair Out-
comes, Inc. (www.fairoutcomes.com). 
 
(iv) The existing platforms and the new EU ODR platform 
In sections 5 and 6 I focus my attention on eleven developed 
Online dispute resolution platforms and the new European portal 
for ODR. The most interesting finding is that one and the only one 
platform is operating in a civil law system, Rechtwijzer 2.0, and 
clearly is not an automated but just an assisted negotiation portal. 
The other platforms are all operating in a common law context, 
where there is a different conception of solving disputes, concep-
tion that we will discuss further in conclusions. 
What I will do in my next chapter is to analyse several judgements 
in the Italian family disputes domain and trying to apply fair divi-
sion algorithms instead of the judge’s decision and to verify if this 
method could be more satisfying and closer to the parties’ wills.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Application of Adjusted Winner in 10 judgements 
 
 
 
 
Stephen Covey: 
 “I am not a product 
of my circumstances. I 
am a product of my de-
cisions”. 
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Chapter Aims 
• Applying Adjusted Winner in judgements 
• Comparing the results of the algorithm with the final judgement   
• Demonstrate the advantage and the differences between the Ad-
justed Winner and the traditional way of solving dispute 
• Describe how the Adjusted Winner could be more convenient, 
more satisfying than the traditional trial  
 
Sections: 
Section 0: Introduction 
Section 1: Case 1 
Section 2: Case 2 
Section 3: Case 3 
Section 4: Case 4 
Section 5: Case 5 
Section 6: Case 6 
Section 7: Case 7 
Section 8: Case 8 
Section 9: Case 9 
Section 10: Case 10 
Section 11: Conclusions 
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Section 0: Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I will apply one of the algorithms described in 
chapter 1, the Adjusted Winner, in judgements already made by the 
Italian Courts, in order to prove that in many cases the final results 
of this economic tool could be more satisfactory (Pareto optimal) 
and efficient for the disputants than the final verdict that they re-
ceived by a judge. 
In the previous chapters, I described the state of the art of the 
algorithms already used in law platforms in order to solve law cases 
but almost all of them are used in common law systems, thus it 
would be impossible for the aims of my research to have enough 
data from the only platform used in a civil law system,
 Rechtwijzer 2.0, operating in The Netherlands. Thus, in the fol-
lowing chapter, I decide to verify the practicability of these algo-
rithms even in civil law schemes. 
In European civil law systems, due to the lack of unity of the 
European Public Order and, consequently, to the presence of var-
ious multiple and different mandatory rules in each Member State 
– that have to be taken into account before trying to applying any 
algorithm or economic principle – there are not international plat-
forms already operating at European level. Differences between 
civil and common law systems stems from insights in the area of 
mandatory and available rights. Remarkable differences could be 
found among company law and other contracts, but also in other 
fields, such as family law. 
The distinction between mandatory rules and available rights is 
crucial in order to assert the possibility of operating only on the 
available rights at an international European level with these algo-
rithmic procedures instead of the judiciary ones. Such a scheme 
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will preserve the role of each national legal system in modern soci-
eties.   
Before focusing on the experimental phase, it is crucial to un-
derline the fact that even if the parties wanted to choose a method 
like the Adjusted Winner, they both have to take into account the 
possibility of an output which could be appealed before the appro-
priate State authority, in respect of the right to defence which, pur-
suant to Art. 24, Paragraph 2 of the Italian Constitution, is «invio-
lable at every stage and instance of legal proceedings». Indeed, a 
method such as the Adjusted Winner is particularly suitable for 
people which are really interested in settling a dispute in a short 
time without wasting a lot of money and consequently are not in-
terested in appeals. 
Hence, for the practical corroboration of the purposes of this 
research, I applied the algorithms to Italian judgments decided ac-
cording to traditional methods (da mihi factum dabo tibi ius) in order 
to verify that the alternative algorithmic solution could have given 
more effective and useful results than the trial. 
To this extent, as an experimental analysis, I focused my atten-
tion on family affairs, even if game theoretical literature empha-
sised an algorithmic approach to other kind of disputes, such as 
disputes arising from bankruptcy situations or from cost allocation 
problems – even in cooperative situations where coalitions of 
stakeholders may form. From section 1 to 10 I analysed 10 Italian 
cases of family disputes, involving always specific goods, identified 
by both parties involved and in section 11, the analysis of data is 
followed by a discussion of the research findings. The findings re-
late to the research questions that guided the study. In this section, 
data obtained from the analysis of the previous chapters will be 
examined and the comparison with the final judgments discussed. 
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Data were analysed to identify, describe and explore the use of 
economic algorithms such as the Adjusted Winner in a legal frame-
work such as family disputes and to determine the need for an e-
supported system like this in such a context.  
Data were obtained thanks to the help of two Italian lawyers 
that helped me in my research. I asked explicitly to share with me 
confidential document – because in the official judgment is almost 
impossible to identify always the parties’ wills – which where fun-
damental for the attribution of values into the Adjusted Winner 
simulation.  
A total of 300 cases were received, however, I enclosed in 10 
sections the most common cases – the ones more frequent during 
my analysis of judgements and confidential legal documents – 
which were functioning for this study and met the required inclu-
sion criteria as discussed in chapter 1. I preferred to select cases 
where one party or even both were not satisfied after the judge’s 
decision, showing the chance of reaching a different outcome, 
closer to the parties’ initial wills, through the involvement of the 
Adjusted Winner. 
Before analysing the case one by one I strongly underline that 
the attribution of values was accurately made in order to preserve 
the parties’ wills. 
 
Section 1: Case 1 
 
The first case I analysed is an ordinance granted by Naples 
Court of Justice on the 09/07/2013,255 in which a couple of people 
                                                          
255 Judgment delivered by Naples Tribunal, n. 6307/2013. 
198 
 
– which lived on the outskirts of Naples – asked for the approval 
of the separation agreement. 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 4 
items:  
1) the possession of an apartment  
2) the possession of a lumber-room 
3) the alimony 
4) the ordinary maintenance and repair costs 
Actually, this case was not that difficult because the parties 
agreed on the assignment of every single item; however, this is a 
proper case where is it possible to apply easily the Adjusted Win-
ner. 
Before applying the algorithms in this case, it’s recommended 
to take a closer look at the decision issued by the judges: 
The judges decided on the assignment of the possession of the 
apartment to the wife without any alimony or ordinary mainte-
nance and repair cost towards of her husband which received also 
the possession of a lumber-room. This possession should be sep-
arated by the possession of the apartment just because the lumber-
room is located outside of the apartment assigned to the wife (oth-
erwise, according to Italian law, the household objects should fol-
low the fate of the main good they are related, as established by art. 
818 of the civil code). 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement in an efficient, 
easier and cheaper way in terms of time and money. 
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The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
Apartment posses-
sion 
40 60 
Lumber-room pos-
session 
20 10 
Alimony 15 10 
Ordinary mainte-
nance and repair 
costs 
25 20 
Table 1 
 
With the first assignment which should be like this: 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
Apartment possession  60 
Lumber-room posses-
sion 
20  
Alimony 15  
Ordinary mainte-
nance and repair costs 
25  
TOTAL 60 60 
Table 2 
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It is apparent in tables 1 and 2 that, on the one hand, the wife 
with the application of the algorithm should receive the possession 
of the apartment, while, on the other hand, the husband should 
receive the possession of the lumber-room and the avoidance of 
alimony and the ordinary maintenance and repair costs. 
What is interesting in this data is that parties would have 
reached always the same results but with the application of the al-
gorithm this result should have been reached in a simple, low-cost 
and proficient way. 
 
Section 2: Case 2 
 
The second case I analysed is an ordinance granted by the 
Rome Court of Justice on the 22/09/2010,256 in which a couple of 
married people asked for the termination of their joint tenancy. 
 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 7 
items:  
 
1) assignment of apartments A & B 
2) assignment of apartment C 
3) house-hold objects of apartments A & B 
                                                          
256 Judgment delivered by Rome Tribunal, n. 18800/2010. 
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4) house-hold objects of apartment C 
5) shed related to apartments A & B 
6) shed related to apartment C 
7) jewellery and valuables 
 
Essentially, this case was more difficult than the previous one 
because the parties didn’t agree on the assignment of the items.   
In this case I always applied the Adjusted Winner but before 
applying the algorithms it is useful to take a closer look at the de-
cision issued by the judges: 
The judge decided on the assignment of the possession of the 
apartment C to the wife, included the house-hold objects and the 
shed related to it, and the possession of the jewellery and valuables, 
with a subsequent cash compensation towards the husband for the 
value of 50% of the allocated assets.  
With regards to the husband, the judge assigned to him the 
possession of the apartments A & B, included the house-hold ob-
jects and the shed related to them, and the cash compensation due 
to assignment of the possession of the jewellery and valuables to-
wards his wife. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement in an efficient, 
easier and cheaper way in terms of time and money. 
 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
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ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apartments A 
& B 
30 10 
assignment of apartment C 10 30 
house-hold objects of 
apartments A & B 
15 5 
house-hold objects of 
apartment C 
5 15 
shed related to apartments 
A & B 
15 5 
shed related to apartment C 5 15 
jewellery and valuables 20 20 
Table 3 
 
 
 
 
With the first assignment which should be like this: 
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ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ments A & B 
30  
assignment of apart-
ment C 
 30 
house-hold objects 
of apartments A & 
B 
15  
house-hold objects 
of apartment C 
 15 
shed related to 
apartments A & B 
15  
shed related to 
apartment C 
 15 
jewellery and valua-
bles 
10 10 
TOTAL 70 70 
Table 4 
From the data in tables 3 and 4 it is apparent that, on the one 
hand, the husband with the application of the algorithm should 
receive the possession of assignment of apartments A & B, the 
house-hold objects of apartments A & B, the shed related to apart-
ments A & B and the cash compensation, due to assignment of the 
possession of the jewellery and valuables towards his wife. 
Whereas, the wife should receive the assignment of apartment 
C, the house-hold objects of apartment C, the shed related to 
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apartment C and the assignment of jewellery and valuables, with 
the cash compensation due to her husband, for the amount of the 
50% of the total values of jewellery and valuables. 
As both tables 3 and 4 show, it is significant that parties would 
have reached always the same results but with the application of 
the algorithm this result should have been reached in a simple, low-
cost and proficient way. 
 
Section 3: Case 3 
 
The third case I analysed is a judgement decided by the Novara 
Court of Justice on the 08/11/2010,257 in which a couple of mar-
ried people asked for the judicial separation and the custody of 
their daughter. 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 6 
items:  
1) assignment of apartment with house-hold objects 
2) assignment of child’s custody 
3) alimony  
4) child support 
5) housing expense reimbursement 
6) personal goods 
                                                          
257 Judgment delivered by Novara Tribunal, n. 1040/2010. 
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Basically, this case was even more difficult than the previous 
ones because the parties didn’t agree on anything.   
In this case I always applied the Adjusted Winner but before 
applying the algorithms it is useful to take a closer look at the de-
cision issued by the judges: 
The judges decided on the child’s custody and the assignment 
of the possession of the apartment to the husband, included the 
house-hold objects.  
In addition, the husband has to pay the alimony to her wife, 
but he doesn’t have to reimburse the housing expenses to her wife 
not to give her back the personal goods she was asking for. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement in an efficient, 
easier and cheaper way in terms of time and money. 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apartment with 
house-hold objects 
10 0 
assignment of child’s custody 30 15 
alimony  30 35 
child support 20 10 
housing expense reimbursement 10 5 
personal goods 0 35 
Table 5 
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With the first assignment which should be like this: 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ment with house-hold 
objects 
10  
assignment of child’s 
custody 
30  
alimony   35 
child support 20  
housing expense re-
imbursement 
10  
personal goods  35 
TOTAL 70 70 
Table 6 
 
 
From the data in tables 5 and 6, we can see that the husband 
with the application of the algorithm should receive the child’s cus-
tody, the assignment of apartment with house-hold objects and the 
avoidance of paying the housing expense reimbursement to his 
wife. 
Whereas, the wife should receive the assignment of the alimony 
from her husband and the personal goods she was interested for. 
In this case tables 5 and 6 are quite revealing in several ways: 
this should be a case where the parties would have not reached the 
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same result by using the Adjusted Winner instead of going to the 
Courts. By the application of the algorithm the result should have 
been different and maybe more useful and satisfying for both than 
the judgement pronounced by the civil court. 
In case 3 the wife could reach her personal goods with the use 
of the Adjusted Winner, but not with the trial because the judges 
stated that her request on her personal goods was inadmissible and 
avoiding to put her attention on the housing expense reimburse-
ment maybe she would have reached a bigger alimony than the one 
stated by the judges. 
 
 
Section 4: Case 4 
 
 
The forth case I analysed is a judgement decided by the Monza 
Court of Justice on the 07/05/2013,258 in which a couple of mar-
ried people asked for the division of their community property. 
 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 3 
items:  
1) assignment of apartment A 
2) assignment of apartment B 
3) assignment of apartment C 
                                                          
258 Judgment delivered by Monza Tribunal, n. 1260/2013. 
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Effectively, this case was different from the previous ones and 
the parties didn’t agree on a possible solution.   
In this case, I always applied the Adjusted Winner but before 
applying the algorithms it is useful to take a closer look at the de-
cision issued by the judges: 
The judge decided on the assignment of the property of the 
apartment A to the wife, with a subsequent cash compensation to-
wards the husband for the value of 50% of the allocated asset. 
Moreover, the judge assigned apartment B to the wife and apart-
ment C to the husband with a small cash compensation to the hus-
band, due to the fact that the property of apartment B is a little bit 
more expensive than the apartment C allocated to the husband. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement in an efficient, 
easier and cheaper way in terms of time and money. 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of 
apartment A 
50 50 
assignment of 
apartment B 
20 30 
assignment of 
apartment C 
30 20 
Table 7 
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With the first assignment which should be like this: 
 
 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of 
apartment A 
25 25 
assignment of 
apartment B 
 30 
assignment of 
apartment C 
30  
TO-
TAL 
55 55 
Table 8 
 
From the data in tables 7 and 8, we can see that the husband 
with the application of the algorithm should receive the property 
of apartment C and the cash compensations for the value of 50% 
of the apartment A. Whereas, the wife should receive the property 
of apartments A and B, always taking into account that she has to 
compensate her partner for the 50% of the value of apartment A. 
What is interesting in tables 7 and 8 is that parties would have 
reached a better deal than the one stated by the judge just in the 
case that they agreed on who would have received the possession 
of apartment A and who the cash compensation. Otherwise the 
algorithm is useless. This is because the application of such a tool 
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is based on the mutual agreement, the real will of both parties in-
volved to go together until a final and a common settlement.  
 
 
Section 5: Case 5 
 
 
The fifth case I analysed is a judgement decided by the Messina 
Court of Justice on the 10/10/2006,259 in which a couple of mar-
ried people asked for the judicial separation and the restitution of 
defined goods. 
 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 3 
items:  
1) assignment of apartment (property of the wife) 
2) alimony for the wife 
3) assignment of an old video projector 
 
The particularity in this case is represented by the presence of 
a specific object, a request that in a judicial separation and the fol-
lowing division cannot be asked but that can be done by use of the 
Adjusted Winner. 
                                                          
259 Judgment delivered by Messina Tribunal, on the 10th October 2006. 
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In this case, I always applied the Adjusted Winner but before 
applying the algorithms it is useful to take a closer look at the de-
cision issued by the judges: 
The judge decided on the assignment of the property of the 
apartment to the wife (but it was a superabundant measure because 
it was already in her and only property) and the alimony until the 
woman renounced due to the start of a commercial activity, while 
he held inadmissible the request of the husband. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement also on the 
video projector in an efficient, easier and cheaper way in terms of 
time and money. 
 
 
 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ment  
0 10 
alimony  20 80 
assignment of an 
old video projector 
80 10 
Table 9 
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With the first assignment which should be like this: 
 
 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of 
apartment  
 10 
alimony   80 
assignment of an 
old video projector 
80  
TOTAL 80 80 
Table 10 
 
From the data in tables 9 and 10, we can see that the husband 
with the application of the algorithm should receive the assignment 
of the old video projector. Whereas, the wife should receive the 
property of her apartment and the alimony until the day she asked 
for the cancellation, because of the new commercial activity that 
she was involved during the process. 
As tables 9 and 10 show, there is a significant difference be-
tween the use of the algorithm or going to the trial, especially for 
the specific interest of the husband toward a specific item, such as 
the old video projector, an item that is not possible to assign in 
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such a dispute in a trial where the parties are asking for a judicial 
separation and the following division of goods. 
A division that would have been easily made by the use of Ad-
justed Winner, where, as shown in tables 9 and 10, the interest of 
the husband was almost totally on his old video projector. This is 
one of the main cases where the solution of the trial is totally un-
satisfied for one of the party but the same party should have been 
satisfied by the use of our economic tool. 
 
 
Section 6: Case 6 
 
 
The sixth case I analysed is a judgement decided by the Trani 
Court of Justice on the 10/10/2006,260 in which a couple of mar-
ried people asked for the division of defined goods and adequate 
compensation. 
 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 3 
items:  
1) assignment/division of apartment  
2) adequate compensation 
3) assignment of house-hold objects 
                                                          
260 Judgment delivered by Trani Tribunal, n. 1057/2008. 
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The distinctiveness in this case is represented by the absence 
of a possible agreement between the parties, and without a possi-
bility of an agreement it is almost impossible to use the Adjusted 
Winner instead of going to the Court. 
In this case, I always tried to apply the Adjusted Winner but 
before applying the algorithms it is useful to take a closer look at 
the decision issued by the judges: 
The judge decided on the division of the apartment by selling 
it with the help of an expert and by dividing between the parties 
the money from the sale but he rejected every other request. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement also on every 
request in an efficient, easier and cheaper way in terms of time and 
money. 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment/division of 
apartment  
50 50 
adequate compensa-
tion 
25 25 
assignment of house-
hold objects 
25 25 
Table 11 
With the first assignment which should be like this: 
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ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of 
apartment  
25 25 
alimony  12,5 12,5 
assignment of an 
old video projector 
12,5 12,5 
TOTAL 50 50 
Table 12 
 
From the data in tables 11 and 12, we can see that the couple 
cannot reach any agreement with the Adjusted Winner because 
their wills are not directed to achieve any settlement. 
In such a situation it is useless any chance for any economic 
method because each method is based on parties’ agreement. 
However, in this case the only way to end their dispute is to let a 
third party decide, without any possibility for them to be active 
parts of the solution. 
 
Section 7: Case 7 
 
The seventh case I analysed is a judgement decided by the Na-
ples Court of Justice on the 19/11/2013,261 in which a couple of 
married people asked for changing from a judicial separation to the 
approval of the separation agreement. 
                                                          
261 Judgment delivered by Naples Tribunal, n. 3387/2013. 
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In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 4 
items:  
1) assignment of the apartment  
2) property of the apartment 
3) assignment of child’s custody 
4) child support 
The uniqueness in this case is represented by the fact that the 
couple decided together to settle their dispute from a judicial sep-
aration to the approval of the separation agreement. 
In this case, I always tried to apply the Adjusted Winner but 
before applying the algorithms it is useful to take a closer look at 
the decision made by the parties: 
They decided to proceed with the approval of the separation 
agreement based on the assignment of the apartment and its prop-
erty to the wife, a with the joint custody of the child, with residence 
in the mother’s apartment and with a monthly support by her fa-
ther. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement on every re-
quest in an efficient, easier and cheaper way in terms of time and 
money. 
 
 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
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ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ment  
25 25 
property of the 
apartment 
25 25 
assignment of 
child’s custody 
25 25 
child support 25 25 
Table 13 
 
With the first assignment which should be like this: 
 
 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ment  
12,5 12,5 
property of the 
apartment 
12,5 12,5 
assignment of 
child’s custody 
12,5 12,5 
child support 12,5 12,5 
TOTAL 50 50 
Table 14 
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From the data in tables 13 and 14, we can see that the couple 
could have reached the same agreement with the Adjusted Winner 
because their wills are directed to achieve a settlement. 
This situation is one of the main cases where the solution of 
Adjusted Winner (or another economic tool) is not only proper but 
necessary to have a prompt decision, useful for all the parties in-
volved (daughter included), and cheaper in terms of money and 
especially time. 
 
 
Section 8: Case 8 
 
 
The eighth case I analysed is a decree declared by the Naples 
Court of Justice on the 14/06/2011,262 in which a couple of mar-
ried people asked for the judicial separation and the division of 
defined goods. 
 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 5 
items:  
1) assignment of apartment A 
2) assignment of apartment B 
                                                          
262 Judgment delivered by Naples Tribunal, on the 14th June 2011. 
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3) assignment of apartment C 
4) child support  
5) alimony 
 
The distinctiveness in this case is represented by the presence 
of a common will for a settlement. 
In this case the parties went to the court just asking for the 
homologation of their agreement, however also in this condition is 
possible to apply the Adjusted Winner in order to divide the iden-
tified goods. 
Thus, in this case, I always applied the Adjusted Winner but 
before applying the algorithms it is useful to take a closer look at 
the decision issued by the judges: 
The judge decided on the assignment of apartments A and B 
to the wife, which renounced to a possible alimony due to the ap-
proval of her husband about supporting their child with his uni-
versity’s fees. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement in an efficient, 
easier and cheaper way in terms of time and money. 
 
 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
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ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ment A 
5 20 
assignment of apart-
ment B 
5 20 
assignment of apart-
ment C 
40 10 
child support  10 40 
alimony 40 10 
Table 15 
 
With the first assignment which should be like this: 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ment A 
 20 
assignment of apart-
ment B 
 20 
assignment of apart-
ment C 
40  
child support   40 
alimony 40  
TOTAL 80 80 
Table 16 
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From the data in tables 15 and 16, we can see that the couple 
could have reached the same agreement with the Adjusted Winner 
because their wills are directed to achieve a settlement. 
This situation is another case where the solution of Adjusted 
Winner (or another economic tool) is not only proper but neces-
sary to have a prompt decision, useful for all the parties involved 
(children included), and cheaper in terms of money and especially 
time. 
 
Section 9: Case 9 
 
The ninth case I analysed is a decree declared by the Naples 
Court of Justice on the 07/06/2013,263 in which a couple of mar-
ried people asked for the judicial separation and the division of 
defined goods. 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 3 
items:  
 
1) assignment of apartment  
2) child custody and support 
3) alimony 
 
The distinctiveness in this case is represented by the presence 
of an initial dispute turned out into a common settlement. 
                                                          
263 Judgment delivered by Naples Tribunal, n. 8722/2013. 
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In this case the parties went to the court just asking for a judi-
cial separation. As we have already seen, also in this condition is 
possible to apply the Adjusted Winner in order to divide the iden-
tified goods. 
Thus, just before applying the algorithms it is useful to take a 
closer look at the decision issued by the judges: 
The judge decided, on the one hand, on the assignment of 
child’s custody and the apartment to the wife, which accepted a 
lower alimony than the one she initially requested. On the other 
hand, the husband left the property of his apartment to his wife, 
paying at the same time the amount of money he initially requested 
for alimony and for child’s support. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement in an efficient, 
easier and cheaper way in terms of time and money. 
 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of 
apartment A 
20 30 
child custody and 
support 
20 30 
alimony 60 40 
Table 17 
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With the first assignment which should be like this: 
 
 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apartment   30 
child custody and support   30 
alimony 60  
TOTAL 60 60 
Table 18 
From the data in tables 17 and 18, we can see that the couple 
could have reached the same agreement with the Adjusted Winner 
because their wills are directed to achieve a settlement. 
This situation is another case where the solution of Adjusted 
Winner (or another economic tool) is not only proper but neces-
sary to have a prompt decision, useful for all the parties involved 
(children included), and cheaper in terms of money and especially 
time (here they started their dispute in 2011 and they received the 
verdict on 2013). 
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Section 10: Case 10 
 
The tenth case I analysed is a judgment issued by the Naples 
Court of Justice on the 10/06/2008,264 in which a couple of mar-
ried people asked for the judicial separation and the division of 
defined goods. 
 
In this cases both parties agreed on the identification of 5 
items:  
 
1) assignment of apartment A 
2) assignment of apartment B 
3) children custody and support 
4) alimony 
5) personal goods 
 
The singularity in this case is represented by the presence of 
two children and the fact that a separation agreement turned into 
a judicial separation because the husband discovered to be cheated 
by his wife during their wedding. 
 
 
                                                          
264 Judgment delivered by Naples Tribunal, n. 9212/2018. 
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In this case the parties went to the court just asking for a judi-
cial separation. As we have already seen, even in this condition is 
possible to apply the Adjusted Winner in order to divide the iden-
tified goods. 
Thus, just before applying the algorithms it is useful to take a 
closer look at the decision issued by the judges: 
The judge decided, on the one hand, on the assignment of 
apartment A and custody of a child and several personal goods to 
the wife, which accepted of not receiving any alimony. On the 
other hand, the husband received the assignment of apartment B 
and custody of the other child, paying at the same time a little 
amount of money for the other child’s support. 
If the parties had chosen the adjusted winner instead of going 
to the courts, they would have reached an agreement in an efficient, 
easier and cheaper way in terms of time and money. 
 
 
The possible scheme with the attribution of values should be 
like this: 
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ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ment A 
20 30 
assignment of apart-
ment B 
30 20 
children custody and 
support 
20 20 
alimony 20 10 
Personal goods 10 20 
Table 19 
 
With the first assignment which should be like this: 
ITEMS Husband Wife 
assignment of apart-
ment A 
 30 
assignment of apart-
ment B 
30  
children custody and 
support 
10 10 
alimony 20  
Personal goods  20 
TOTAL 60 60 
Table 20 
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From the data in tables 19 and 20, we can see that the couple 
could have reached the same agreement with the Adjusted Winner 
because their wills are directed to achieve a settlement. 
This situation is once again another case where the solution of 
Adjusted Winner (or another economic tool) is not only proper but 
necessary to have a prompt decision, useful for all the parties in-
volved (children included), and cheaper in terms of money and es-
pecially time (here they started their dispute in 2004 and they re-
ceived the verdict on 2008). 
 
Section 11: Conclusions 
 
 
As already stated in the previous chapters and in the section 0, 
I analysed various cases in order to apply one the algorithms de-
scribed in chapter 1, the Adjusted Winner, in judgements already 
made by the Italian Courts. 
I decided to operate with this kind of analysis in order to prove 
the efficiency, the proportionality and the envy-freeness of the Ad-
justed Winner. As already shown in chapter 1, the Adjusted Winner 
in all the cases involving easily specified issues or well-defined 
goods, such as divorce settlements or the division of marital prop-
erty, could be more satisfactory (Pareto optimal) and efficient for 
the disputants than the final verdict that they received by a judge. 
In the previous chapters, I described the fair division principles 
which rules economic tools such as the Adjusted winner (chapter 
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1), I made a close examination of the various forms of alternative 
dispute resolutions where these algorithms may be used (chapter 
2), dwelling on the figure of Online dispute resolution and on the 
platforms already in use, opened to citizens for solving any dispute 
(chapter 3). Thus, in the following chapter, I corroborated the fea-
sibility of these algorithms in civil law framework, applying the Ad-
justed winner to 10 Italian judgments decided by the Italian Na-
tional Courts of Justice. 
This chapter has presented a small sample of the possible ap-
plication of economic tools based on fair division principles to the 
national and cross-border disputes. Such statements are able to in-
fluence the future choice of which forum a citizen should use for 
settling a dispute and to open new possible scenarios for online 
dispute resolution, not just as the place where to settle but also a 
support for the parties to realise how to settle (chapter 3). 
In order to illustrate the importance of having such an alterna-
tive way of intending ODR, this chapter presented ten different 
cases in which Adjusted Winner are often used in a stigmatising 
manner.  
In particular, this chapter has looked at family disputes con-
cerning the assignment of items that are relevant to this thesis. 
These include: 
 
(i) The approval of a separation agreement 
As shown in section 1, this is the easiest case where it is possible 
to apply the Adjusted Winner because the parties would have 
reached always the same results but with the application of the al-
gorithm this result should have been reached in a simple, low-cost 
and proficient way, in terms of costs and money. 
229 
 
 
(ii) The termination of a joint tenancy 
As shown in section 2, even in a situation like this, the parties 
would have reached always the same result of going to the Court, 
but with the application of the algorithm this result should have 
been reached in a simple, low-cost and efficient way. 
 
(iii) The judicial separation and the custody of a child 
As shown in section 3, 8, 9 and 10, a separation involving the cus-
tody of a child is never simple, but once the parents decide which 
should be the best solution for their child and they avoid of putting 
in the dispute the apartment where one of the partners will live 
with his/her child/children, the division of the other items will be 
easier for everyone. 
 
(iv) The division of their community property 
As shown in section 4, in which the number of items is not divisi-
ble for two, the application of the Adjusted Winner is possible just 
in the case where both parties would agree on who will receive the 
possession of one of the apartments and who, however, the cash 
compensation.   
Without an agreement, indeed, the algorithm is useless. This is be-
cause the application of such a tool is based on the mutual agree-
ment, the real will of both parties involved to go together until a 
final and a common settlement. 
 
(v) The judicial separation and the restitution of defined goods 
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As shown in section 5, the Adjusted Winner could be very useful. 
Indeed, there are cases like this where the use of the algorithm will 
reach to a decision which should not be reached by going to the 
trial, especially for the specific interest, as mentioned in the above 
case, of the husband toward a specific item, such as the old video 
projector. An item that is not possible to assign in such a dispute 
in a trial where the parties are asking for a judicial separation and 
the following division of goods in which the house-hold objects 
have to follow the fate of the apartment. 
 
 
(vi) The division of defined goods and adequate compensation 
As shown in section 6, the parties cannot reach any agreement 
with the Adjusted Winner because their wills are not directed to 
achieve any settlement. This is a focal point: even if the parties can 
decide which items are to assign but they don’t want to reach an 
agreement, it is not possible and not convenient to apply the Ad-
justed Winner, while, if both parties agree on the fact of according, 
there should be space for an e-supported tool for solving the dis-
pute. 
 
(vii) The switch from a judicial separation to the approval of the separation 
agreement 
As shown in section 7, the crucial point of such a case is the 
wills of both parties of switching from a judicial separation to the 
approval of the separation agreement in order to save money and 
time. However, it is fundamental to say that is not only proper but 
necessary to have a prompter decision, useful for all the parties 
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involved (children included), and cheaper in terms of money and 
time. 
These were the circumstances, in the field of family disputes, 
in which I applied the Adjusted Winner, based on normal judge-
ments issued by Italian National Courts of Justice and I proved 
that the use of such a tool could be more Pareto optimal and effi-
cient for the disputants than the final verdict from the traditional 
ways of solving a dispute, through an adjudication.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions and Conceptual Messages 
 
 
 
 
Rumi: 
 “When the soul lies 
down in that grass, 
the world is too full to 
talk about. 
Ideas, language, even 
the phrase ‘each other’ 
doesn’t make sense 
any more”. 
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Chapter Aims 
 
• What is currently the link between Game Theory and Law 
• What are the new possible scenario 
 
Sections: 
 
Section 1: Game Theory and the four Fair Division principles 
Section 2: New possible scenario 
Section 3: Two Core Concepts Developed in This Thesis 
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The aim of this thesis was not to undertake a comprehensive 
and extensive analysis of every type of legal approach and its pos-
sible interaction with fair division processes. Its aim was rather to 
raise the profile of a problem that had come to the attention of the 
author in his own scholarship. This was a problem that has thus 
far received limited attention by legal scholars in general. Despite 
the illustrative nature of this thesis it has nonetheless covered a vast 
range of dispute resolution concepts and ideas. The purpose of this 
short note is to distil this mass into a simple message that the reader 
will (hopefully) retain long after reading. It is the author’s hope that 
this message will provide ‘’food for thought’ not only for legal 
scholars, those involved in the legal process but also, where possi-
ble, those individuals involved in searching new forms or ap-
proaches to dispute resolution. The following pages are split into 
two parts. The first will present the relationship between game the-
ory and law and some simple scenarios that could be considered in 
order to reduce the potential problems that have been identified. 
The second will summarise the central message the author would 
like the reader to take from this thesis in two (relatively) succinct 
points. These points represent the core message this thesis was in-
tended to transmit and are the points that the author would hope 
would remain in the mind after reading.  
 
Section 1: Game Theory and Law 
 
One of the most significant current discussions in law and eco-
nomics is the possibility of solving disputes using Game theory’s 
principles instead of law. 
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It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore this argument 
given that many economic principles have been used to analyse 
legal problems since the second half of the twentieth century. 
The first serious discussions and analyses of a link between the 
fields of Economics and Law emerged during the 1960s. Indeed, 
more than a half century has passed since Ronald Coase published 
his pioneering work, “The Problem of Social Cost”, 265 that pro-
vided the foundations for the field now known as “Law and Eco-
nomics”, and paved the way for the use of economic principles to 
analyse legal problems.266 
Besides Ronald Coase’s book, it is important to underline other 
fundamental preliminary works which firmly rooted economics’ 
application to legal questions. The first one is “The Costs of Acci-
dents: A Legal Economic Analysis”, undertaken by Guido Cala-
bresi in 1970 and the second is “Economic Analysis of Law”267, 
undertaken by Richard Posner in 1973268. 
Since several articles were published after these three ground-
breaking  books in this hybrid field, i.e. using game theory to ex-
amine pre-trial negotiations269 or to show how informational asym-
metry influences parties’ settlement decision270 or, also, to solve 
bankruptcy’s cases271, “Game Theory and the Law”, written by 
                                                          
265 Coase, R., The Problem of Social Cost, 1960. 
266 Hawkins, J. & Steiner, N., The Nash Equilibrium meets BATNA: Game 
Theory’s Varied Uses in ADR Contexts, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 
1996, 249-256. 
267 Calabresi, G., The Costs of Accidents: A Legal Economic Analysis, 1970. 
268 Posner, R., Economic Analysis of Law, 1973. 
269 Cooter, R., Bargaining in the shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Strategic Behavior, 1982. 
270 Bebchuk, L., Litigation and Settlement under Imperfection Information, 
15 Rand. J. Econ. 404, 1984. 
271 Jackson, T., Bankruptcy, 1982. 
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Douglas G. Baird, Robert H. Gertner and Randal C. Picker in 
1994272, can be considered the major underpinning in which game-
theoretic principles have been applied to broad legal affairs.273 
The wide-ranging use of game theory is occasionally linked to 
“a tool for explaining and thereby predicting human behaviour, 
and – in its normative usage – it encompasses a tool for determin-
ing the content of normative concepts”.274 
In the literature, the term tends to be used to refer to an ap-
proach for analysing situations that has been increasingly used in 
economics from 1970 to 2000, It has also been increasingly used 
in law-and-economics to “simplify situations enough to show the 
key forces at work. This involves ruthlessly stripping away any fea-
tures of the situation being analysed that are unconnected to these 
key forces”.275 
Game theory has been successfully applied in many areas of 
the natural sciences, i.e., evolutionary biology, and the social sci-
ences, i.e., economics and sociology. Given that game theory can 
be applied also as a useful tool for legal scholars, it deals with var-
ious branches of law, i.e., contract law or constitutional law, for the 
simple reason that strategic interactions constitute an important 
object of legal regulations and lie at the root of the legislative pro-
cess.276  
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Indeed, a large and growing body of literature has investigated 
the possibility of solving legal disputes applying game theory’s 
principles to obtain a fair solution. 
The first systematic study of game theory applied to legal affairs 
by involving economic principles instead of rigorous binding and 
compelling law principles was undertaken by the mathematician 
Hugo Steinhaus.277 
Fair division problems arise when demands or desires of one 
party are in conflict with those of another. However, objects must 
be divided or contents must be shared in such a way that no one is 
treated unfairly. 
Examples of the civil legal affairs where these fair procedures 
can be applied include divorce, inheritance, the liquidation of a 
business, labour-management negotiation, or an international dis-
pute. 
However, the idea of applying game theory to legal affairs has 
been criticised by a number of experts in the field. Anatol 
Rapoport (1960), pointed out that “perhaps enough have been said 
about practical difficulties of applying game theory in human af-
fairs”.278 But he argues that “game theory stimulates us to think 
about conflict in a novel way”279 and also shows how interdepend-
ent decision situations can be “precisely characterized and rigor-
ously analysed”.280 
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The recent years have witnessed an increasing interest by the 
international scientific community, testified by a large number of 
publications in the field from all over the world. 
Unfortunately, very few empirical studies have put fair-division 
procedures to the test. Despite their immense potential we have 
only Pratt & Zeckhauser in 1990,281 Raith in 2000,282 Schneider & 
Kramer in 2004, 283  Daniel & Parco in 2005, 284  Dupuis-Roy & 
Gosselin in 2009.285 
As suggested by Professor Ronald P. Loui, artificial intelli-
gence’s models may be more useful than game theory’s models in 
framing situations. They will offer a broader picture of the phe-
nomenon of negotiated agreement.286 
In the detail, game theory does not consider deliberation upon 
the relative preference for a proposal, which is assumed to be 
known at the outset and unchanging.  
Whereas, in game theory’s models utilities can shift only be-
cause of new evidence on which an agent’s probabilities can be 
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conditioned, which changes an agent’s expectations and spurious 
shifts in an agent’s tastes, in artificial intelligence model outcomes 
are evaluated heuristically: “heuristic evaluation leads to the possi-
bility that different deliberations can result in different prefer-
ences”.287 
The artificial intelligence picture of the agent will be to the 
game theoretic one in the modelling of interactions in direct pro-
portion to the extent to which knowledge informs creativity. 
The main difference is that AI’s models consider topics such 
as Planning, Knowledge representation, automated reasoning and 
argumentation as a separate field of study. 
The lack of game theory’s models relays on the fact that – com-
pared to AI’s models – they seek to explain settlements in a static 
problem formulation with static valuations of proposals. 
The key point is that negotiation includes more important phe-
nomena such as dialogue, planning, focusing and reformulating. As 
sustained by the authors, the aim of an AI model is of “fitting all 
the pieces together, so that the output of one could be the input of 
the next… with the result of a better depiction of negotiation”.288 
 
Section 2: New possible scenario 
 
According to professor Loui, a game theoretical model on its 
own is not enough for the citizens’ needs. However, coupled with 
an AI model which could integrate features such as dialogue and 
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possibility of reformulating there could be chances for ODR’s 
rise.289 
Accordingly, some ODR providers focus on using technology 
as a way of bringing parties into contact without involving the pres-
ence of a human third party such as a negotiator or a mediator. In 
these cases, service providers are more the third party than the 
fourth party, due to the absence of a human third party. 
Conversely, these service providers recognize that many cases 
fail to reach conclusion for other reasons, and that the presence or 
assistance of an E-negotiator or e-mediator can be helpful. These 
service providers offer E-mediation, in one form or another, as an 
add-on process after the primary process of negotiation has failed.  
For instance, SmartSettle also offers third party assistance in 
different forms, eBay and PayPal’s dispute resolution process in-
clude live mediation for parties who do not reach agreement 
through the automated process and Cybersettle offers telephone 
facilitation in the event that parties to a blind-bidding process to 
not overlap, but are judged to be sufficiently close to one another 
that a final nudge might help them to settle the case.290 
E-negotiation and e-mediation systems offer a great many ad-
vantages to traditional forms of alternative dispute resolution. In 
the field of ODR these several advantages can make the difference 
between the inevitability of going to the trial or a failure to address 
a conflict and achieving a resolution. 
At present, one criticism of much of the literature on negotia-
tion is that it can be very expensive in terms of time and energy, 
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especially when they involve face-to-face meetings or high-priced 
professionals. In addition, arranging communication can be com-
plex, time consuming, and costly in support resources.  
Another serious weakness is that many disputes have multiple 
components and without sophisticated tools to deal with the in-
herent complexity, decision-makers are forced to deal with issues 
one at a time. A piecemeal approach to negotiation encourages po-
sitional rather than mutual gains bargaining. Various issues and 
outcomes may lead negotiators to make decisions based on psy-
chological dynamics and emotion rather than reason.  
Moreover, reasonable outcomes are compromised when deci-
sion-makers make logic errors, take short-cuts, or permit emotions 
to get the upper hand when under the stress of intensive negotia-
tions. Without properly assessing the risks, parties are often unre-
alistically confident of a favourable outcome, should the matter be 
taken to court.  
Furthermore, multi-party disputes can be much more complex 
and require many meetings and expert intervention in order to fa-
cilitate resolution of the conflict. Such disputes can be facilitated 
electronically through document transmission and conference 
calls, but they still exist primarily in the face-to-face realm. 
However, to face all these concerns, it is essential to illustrate 
the advantages of e-negotiation and e-mediation systems. 
A well-designed e-negotiation system reduces much of the cost 
of conventional negotiations.291  
These systems offer asynchronous access using the Internet: 
this makes access easy, cuts operational costs, and speeds up the 
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process.292 A well-designed e-negotiation system with an intuitive 
graphical user interface allows parties not only to model the prob-
lem and represent their preferences well, but also, to interact flex-
ibly and asynchronously.293 
Furthermore, in asynchronous processes, the slowed-down 
pace can allow the mediator a more intentional application of the 
mediator’s toolbox. This is enhanced by improved opportunities 
for nuance and subtlety.294 
As argued by Melamed: “Asynchronous Internet communica-
tions have the advantage of being edited ‘best’ communications in 
sometimes contrast to ‘first’ (often impulsive) responses that can 
take place in real time face-to-face mediation discussions”.295 
Mediators might find it easier to tweak and reframe messages. 
They can create opportunities for, light, behind the scenes contact 
with each party to a greater degree than face-to-face processes al-
low, as private communication reduces threats to perceived neu-
trality. Working with asynchronous methods, mediators can con-
duct simultaneous caucusing, saving process-time. Further utility 
can be achieved due to the elimination of those caucuses which 
face-to-face mediators find they conduct for the sole purpose 
showing even-handedness.296 
                                                          
292 Gibbons L., Kennedy R. & Gibbs J.: Frontiers of Law: The Internet and 
Cyberspace: Cyber-mediation communications Medium Massaging the Mes-
sage, 2002. 
293 Lide, E., supra note 157.  
294 Melamed, J., The Internet and Divorce Mediation, available at www.medi-
ate.com/articles/melamed9.cfm   
295 Id. 
296 Rule, C., New Mediator Capabilities in Online Dispute Resolution, 2000. 
Available at <www.mediate.com/articles/rule.cfm>. 
244 
 
A whole category of disputes currently not being considered 
for ODR has become appropriate for application of comprehen-
sive E-Negotiation systems, such as family disputes. 
The main contribution of these studies into family disputes 
aims to show that a specific type of e-supported mediation, namely 
asynchronous text-based e-supported mediation, can be success-
fully applied to mediate divorces resulting in high settlement rates 
and high scores on all types of justice reflecting a high mediation 
quality.297 
Moreover, in order to get an idea of mediation effectiveness – 
given that divorce mediations usually produce high settlement rates 
– it is even more important to look at the perceived quality of the 
mediation instead of the objective outcome.298 
The outcomes of e-mediations and e-negotiations show high 
levels of justice perceptions and agreements reached. Also, recent 
research in the context of therapy shows that certain online appli-
cations can be very successful.299 
During family disputes, an e-negotiation/e-mediation system 
with a range of features provides an opportunity for introducing 
parties to e-negotiation/e-mediation tools in stages. One party 
might first be persuaded to use the system’s decision support fea-
tures as an aid to their own side of the dispute solution. 
In addition, parties could attempt to model their counterparty’s 
preferences and use the tool to simulate the entire negotiation as 
an aid to better understanding.  
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In order to provide even greater comfort prior to actual nego-
tiation parties may be given the opportunity to participate in role 
reversal simulations. Such practices have been shown to be effec-
tive in increasing understanding of the negotiations and the value 
of an e-negotiations tool. With sufficient familiarity all parties can 
gain enough trust to use an e-negotiation tool in their real-life sit-
uation. The productive value and possible individual improve-
ments must be stressed as part of the introduction to these systems.  
For high-value transactions, where computer-based tools such 
as spreadsheets are already used, the advantage of sophisticated e-
negotiation systems will be recognized much sooner. For low-
value transactions, especially in some cultures, it may take explicit 
marketing programs to demonstrate the value of collaborating us-
ing e-negotiation systems. A robust system easy enough for aver-
age technologically literate users to adopt and flexible enough to 
handle multiple types of conflicts would be of high value as a com-
mercial opportunity. 
E-negotiation/e-mediation systems can use third-party neutral 
servers and high levels of encryption. This allows for secure and 
reliable data movement between parties that minimize the risk of 
privacy violation or loss of communication capacity.  
An e-supported system with a web-based interface and multi-
lingual capacity holds the potential to be affordable and work 
within many environments. Web interfaces are popular and rela-
tively well-understood. Such approaches open the possibility of 
dispute resolution to anyone with access to the Internet. 
E-supported system developers can produce systems that ex-
plain themselves through an interactive, iterative process, leading 
to better user understanding and increased comfort with the pro-
cess. 
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The prevalent form of communication in e-negotiation and e-
mediation is text communication. The benefit of such a communi-
cation in e-supported systems is that it often minimizes the effects 
of “good talkers” gaining the upper hand or of dominant figures 
causing others to reduce their participation levels.300  
In addition, the emotion-limiting nature of text communication 
has been suggested as an advantage in e-negotiation and e-media-
tion as reducing confrontational dynamics, although this is cer-
tainly issue for debate.301 
Parties and mediators can engage in discussion without the im-
mediate time pressure and other dynamics associated with syn-
chronous, face-to-face conversations. 
External experts can be consulted with, or brought into the 
process as necessary, regardless of their geographical location, and 
without disrupting the process’ dynamics. 
In such a context, however, the research has tended to focus 
on ODR systems as a place – where to settle – rather than also the 
process – how to settle – or both of them. 
In the previous chapter I analysed several judgements in the 
Italian family disputes domain and I applied fair division algo-
rithms instead of the judge’s decision in order to verify that this 
method is more satisfactory and closer to the parties’ wills.  
Looking at over 300 cases, I encircled in 10 sections the most 
common circumstances which were effective for showing the po-
tential of these algorithms. 
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The situations in which I applied the Adjusted Winner were the 
approval of a separation agreement, the termination of a joint ten-
ancy, the judicial separation and the custody of a child, the judicial 
separation and the restitution of defined goods, the switch from a 
judicial separation to the approval of the separation agreement, 
where this application was very useful, efficient, equitable and 
envy-free (see section 1). 
In cases such as the division of community property or the di-
vision of defined goods and adequate compensation, the applica-
tion of the Adjusted Winner is possible where both parties would 
agree on who receives the possession of one of the apartments and 
who receives the cash compensation. Adjusted Winner and the 
other algorithms are, indeed, useless without the will for settling in 
both parties. This is because the application of these algorithms, 
such as the others illustrated in chapter 1, are all based on the mu-
tual agreement, the real will of both parties involved to go together 
until a final and a common settlement. 
Although it seems we live in a disheartening time of inability to 
negotiate, the new technologies provide opportunities for aggrega-
tions of claims and publicity to move negotiators to grant redress 
or even to change policies. I do not simply believe that these new 
technologies will overcome and realign all the power imbalances, 
but I do think and hope that changing our negotiation strategies, 
altering our traditional canon of skills and theories on ADR, we 
can meet the challenge of new forms of negotiations among and 
between traders, consumers and citizens. 
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Section 3: Two Core Concepts Developed in This Thesis  
 
1. Utility of fair division tools in solving a dispute 
A primary aim of this thesis was to demonstrate the idea that 
the use of fair division tools can be useful and advantageous (es-
pecially in online disputes resolution methods involving family 
matters, as discussed in chapter 3). As described in chapter 2, most 
types of alternative dispute resolution methods are associated with 
a high level of flexibility, a low level of cost – in terms of money 
and time – and a lack of legal restraint, as well as a lack of envy 
towards the opponent’s output. This makes them attractive in 
terms of being tools that can be used to address some wide range 
situations where a fast and flexible agreement may be needed. In 
addition, such tools come with an expectation that they don’t pro-
duce unexpected consequences on individuals, because the parties 
involved in a dispute express their main preferences, a point that 
cannot simply be ignored. As a result, there is often an implicit 
assumption that the use of such tools, if well-explained to the par-
ties, may strengthen their relationship and avoid possible future 
appeals towards the final agreement. 
Internet makes virtually anything available. Not only the most 
requested item online, such as drugs, sex or cars, but also tools and 
services, including transportation (Uber), housing (Airbandb), 
medical (Webmd) and even legal advice (Legalzoom). All these de-
livery methods are opened to possible conflict or dispute over 
time, quality, quantity, payment, availability or even the satisfac-
tion. As an inevitable consequence, it is necessary for consumers 
to be able to negotiate – or even to mediate – with one of these big 
online purveyors. 
249 
 
Online mediation and negotiation are a meaningful way of 
providing legal assistance and solutions to these legal problems but 
there are at least two challenges for these ODR methods. Firstly, 
there are still people with limited resources that are less likely to 
benefit from the legal services on internet or other ICT channels302 
and, secondly, the difficulty of online processes to incorporate the 
negative emotions of disputing parties. However, the day-by-day 
advancement in other ICT fields, such as social media, undoubt-
edly reveal that this limitation could be surmounted with original 
and creative approaches and solutions.303 
The author would for example point to the Netherlands (as a 
European country where several pilot projects304 or platforms305 
were launched) as a possible inspiration to show that such e-medi-
ation and e-negotiation systems are possible. 
Thinking of solving the extended debate on the possible appli-
cation of game theory into the field of law is not an easy task, but 
regarding this new possible approach of settlements, is it possible 
to rest his bases on the principle of freedom of contract306, ex-
pressed by the article 1134 and 1165 of the Belgian civil code and 
the article 1322 of the Italian civil code. The parties can solve their 
disputes as an exercise of their private autonomy.  
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2. The importance of the role of lawyers in the solution 
Nowadays, it is really difficult to understand that not only the 
role of the third party is fundamental for having a positive out-
come, but also the role of lawyers. 
Lawyers, while on the one hand, could be afraid of perceiving 
jeopardized their role or position from other fields such as econ-
omy, game theory, on the other hand, they have to realize that, in 
such contexts, they would take care of the joint interests involved 
in a dispute. In other words, the lawyers will take into account not 
only the legal interest of their client but also the economic interest 
and the emotional or ethical interests involved. This will be made 
considering also the position and the other party’s interests, con-
cerning a legal, economic and emotional approach. 
In addition, the lawyers will consider risk aversion of both par-
ties, because even if your party win, it is essential to understand 
how angry the other side would be – insisting on the fact that this 
will not be just a legal analysis, but it will take into account the 
other no-legal interests. This is what a lawyer 2.0 has to do. 
We need to switch mentality, we need to re-educate lawyers: in 
that way we have not to focus ourselves on blaming judges or law-
yers but to think about the education and training of citizens. It is 
possible to provide to parties some educational tools in order to 
afford the basic notions of game theory useful in these procedures. 
Negotiation and mediation could bring people to a true dia-
logue through a real communication based on active listening. 
It’s crucial to overcome the paradox of looking at conflicts in 
the binary “I win you lose” way. Both negotiation and mediation, 
as discussed in chapters 2, and e-negotiation and e-mediation, as 
discussed in chapter 3, can go beyond this perspective – trying to 
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get all the interests and emotions on the table – looking at conflicts 
not as a threat but as a friction, an opportunity to work together to 
create something different. 
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